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Article 2

Visions of Habeas
David McCord*
In an old fable, several sightless persons who do not know
what an elephant is like are asked to examine one and describe
it. The first person grasps the beast's trunk and opines, "Ah, an
elephant is like a fat snake!" A second feels the elephant's ear
and concludes, "Clearly, this creature is like a palm frond."
Another grabs hold of the critter's leg and chides, 'You're all
wrong: an elephant is like a tree trunk!" Yet another feels the
elephant's side and proclaims, "No, an elephant is like a wall!"
The fmal candidate seizes the elephant's tail and announces,
"Fools! An elephant is like a rope!" The fable is, of course, a
cautionary tale about the dangers of reasoning t o a conclusion
based on incomplete information.
There are striking parallels between this fable and
attempts t o develop a vision concerning the proper role of
federal habeas corpus for state prisoners:' both the elephant
and the writ have dissimilar components, and one's vision of
what the beasts look like is highly dependent upon which
component one is grasping. But there is also one striking
difference between the elephant in the fable and the writ in the
real world. Almost everyone is familiar with an elephant, and
thus few are likely to be misled by incomplete or inaccurate
descriptions of the beast. But hardly anyone is familiar with
the writ, and thus many may be vulnerable t o faulty visions
based on partial or inaccurate information. This vulnerability is
particularly intense when those "in the know" concerning the
* Richard and Anita Calkins Distinguished Professor of Law, Drake Law
School; B.A. Illinois Wesleyan University; J.D., Harvard Law School. The author
extends thanks to his secretary, Karla Westberg, for her tireless efforts in
preparation of this manuscript. The research and writing of this Article was
supported by a stipend from the Drake Law School Endowment Trust, for which
the author is deeply grateful.
1. Federal habeas corpus actions by state prisoners are authorized by 28
U.S.C. $8 2241, 2254(a) (1988). This Article does not deal with post-conviction
petitions by federal prisoners, as to which habeas corpus has been supplanted by a
statutory remedy found in 28 U.S.C. 8 2255.
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writ-primarily Justices of the United States Supreme Court
and selected academic commentators-so often choose (with
their eyes wide open) the components of the writ that they
wish to grasp and then attempt to convince the uninitiated that
those components fairly reflect the whole beast.
This Article is written to enable interested non-ideologues
(or ideologues willing temporarily t o set their proclivities aside)
t o get a grip on the elusive body of doctrine that constitutes
Supreme Court habeas law. In order t o attempt to accomplish
this formidable task, this Article is divided into three Parts. In
Part I, I set forth the theoretical and practical issues that
underlie the habeas debate. Part I1 explains eight visions of
habeas, and examines how each vision deals with the issues set
forth in Part I. In Part 111, I examine how the eight visions
play out in the ten contexts that make up the heart of habeas
litigation, then in Part IV I will present my conclusion
concerning the relative strengths of the eight visions in
contemporary habeas jurisdiction. I hope that a reader who
persists with this Article to that point will be in a position t o
understand current habeas doctrine, to assess its validity, and
to be able to reach some tentative ideas about which visionts)
the reader believes t o be the superior one(s).

One of the great difEculties in understanding habeas is
recognizing and keeping track of all the different issues. This is
wcult because the varied contexts in which the issues arise
can obscure the underlying commonalities and sometimes in
Supreme Court habeas opinions the real issues swim about
beneath the facts and the doctrine, surfacing only occasionally
like whales coming up for air. The purpose of this Part of this
Article is to identify those important issues.

A. Three Issues of Constitutional Interpretation Not Specifi
to Habeas, but Important for Habeas Jurisprudence
It is important to keep in mind that habeas is a procedural
device for litigating constitutional claims: habeas does not define the substance of criminal defendants' rights. That job is
performed by constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, which
can be promulgated either in direct review cases or in habeas.
This Article cannot begin to set forth the law of constitutional
criminal procedure or to list all the considerations of constitu-

VISIONS OF HABEAS
tional theory that are significant in determining the content of
that doctrine. There are three broad issues of constitutional
interpretation, though, that while not peculiar to habeas, recur
so prominently in habeas jurisprudence that they need to be
set forth at the outset: the expansiveness of rights, their
balanceability, and their equality.
The issue of expansiveness deals with the all-important
questions of how many constitutional criminal procedure rights
should be recognized, and how broadly the recognized rights
should be interpreted. For example, the liberal members of the
Warren Court could be classified as rights-expansionists, while
the conservative members of the Rehnquist Court could be
called rights-non-expansionists (or, in some instances,
rights-contractionists).
As to the issue of balanceability of rights, the opposing
viewpoints can be defined by imagining a rights-absolutist and
a rights-preferrer. A rights-absolutist contends that rights have
many attributes that are traditionally ascribed t o God: they are
all-good, all-powerful, and their power does not diminish over
time. Described by a more earthbound analogy, in the card
game of the criminal justice system rights are trump^.^ This
means that rights are non-balanceable: if a constitutional violation is proven-even decades after it occurred-the habeas
court should issue the writ, turning a deaf ear t o any howls
from the prosecuting authorities that the state has some important interests on its side. To a rights-preferrer, this is too 'simplistic. While not denying that rights are valuable, a
rights-preferrer does not view them as either all-good (they
sometimes prevent convictions of lawbreakers), all-powerful
(the state has legitimate interests that should sometimes override them), or as not diminishing in power over time (their
power wanes as the ability of the state to retry the claimant
diminishes). In short, to a rights-preferrer, rights are not always trumps-they must give way when a sufficiently powerful
set of interests is balanced against them.
Concerning the equality of constitutional rights, we can
imagine a rights-equalist and rights-unequalist. A

2. The notion of rights as trumps has been advocated by philosopher Ronald
Dworkin. Ronald Dworkin, Is There a Right to Pornography?, 1 OXFORDJ . LEG.
STUD.177, 200 (1981) ("Rights
are best understood as trumps over some background justification for political decisions that states a goal for the community as a
whole.?,

...
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rights-equalist believes that all constitutional rights are of
equal value and thus are equally entitled to vindication whenever a violation is proven. By contrast, a rights-unequalist
believes that some rights are more valuable than others and
that the favored rights are more entitled t o vindication in some
contexts.
On one end of the ideological spectrum, an arch-liberal
with respect to constitutional criminal procedure doctrine will
be an expansionist, a rights-absolutist, and a rights-equalist. At
the other end of the spectrum, an arch-conservative will be a
non-expansionist (or even a contractionist), a rights-balancer,
and a rights-unequalist. Less doctrinaire positions will be composed of less absolute positions on these three interpretational
issues. The importance of this, for purposes of this Article, is
that one's vision of the procedural mechanism of habeas is
inevitably colored by one's attitude toward the substantive
rights that are the subject of habeas litigation. Thus, while it is
possible to imagine an arch-liberal who construes habeas narrowly, or an arch-conservative who views it expansively, such
persons do not exist in real life (or if they do, they don't advertise it). Accordingly, toward the outset of the explanation of
each of the visions of habeas, I will attempt t o illuminate the
positions on these three interpretational issues that are held by
the proponents of the vision.

B. A Cluster of Theoretical Issues Specific to Habeas:
Function, History, Federalism, and Congressional
Versus Supreme Court Authority
I denominate these theoretical issues as a "cluster" to indicate that while they can be separately identified, they are ultimately inseparably intertwined. The first and most important
theoretical issue is, quite simply, what finction(s) is the writ
supposed t o serve? The issue of function is the ultimate
one-the other three issues in this cluster are significant because they may provide some enlightenment concerning the
issue of function. The second theoretical issue is, what does the
history of the writ tell us about its proper function(s)? In habeas law, function and history are like Mary and her little
lambwherever one goes, the other is sure to follow. The writ's
history is fascinating because it clearly illustrates the fable
with which this Article began-depending upon which piece of
history one grasps, the writ takes on an entirely different character. The third theoretical issue involves an important aspect
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of federalism: exactly what does the existence of the writ indicate concerning the proper relation between the state criminal
justice systems and the federal courts? Indisputably, the existence of the writ says something about the relationship, inasmuch as it empowers a federal court to release a prisoner who
is in custody pursuant t o a state court judgment. The issue of
federalism is closely bound up with the issues of the writ's
function and history because one basic point on which persons
of every visionary stripe can agree is that the Reconstruction
Congress, which enacted the basic statute that governs habeas
to this day: authorized federal courts t o issue writs of habeas
corpus on behalf of state prisoners because of distrust of state
criminal justice systems.' The fourth theoretical issue is Congressional versus Supreme Court authority concerning the habeas statutes. A point of agreement among all visions is that
federal habeas for state prisoners is a creature of federal statute and that the primary lawmaking authority belongs t o Cong r e ~ s .The
~
habeas statutes are, however, r a t h e r

3. 28 U.S.C. 5 2241 (1988).
4. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners: An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAHL. REV. 423, 426 (1961) ("In 1867, Congress was anticipating Southern resistance to Reconstruction and to the implementation of the post-war constitutional Amendments."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking
About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASEW. RES. L. REV. 748, 752 (1987) ("After the Civil
War, Congress feared that southern states would persecute and even literally imprison former slaves."); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Habeas Corpus: The Supreme Court
and the Congress, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 367, 375 (1983) ("These contemporaneous statutes indicate that the 1867 habeas corpus Statute was written a t a time when
Congress distrusted state officers and enacted legislation to secure federal rights,
state law notwithstanding.").
5. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, a t 780-81 ("[Ilt might be argued that . . .
the question of parity [between state and federal courts] is one for Congress to resolve."); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 709 (1990) (suggesting that the tradition of judicial innovations with confirmatory statutory
amendment "should be presumed to continue unless and until Congress indicates
its dissatisfactionn); James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachronistic
Attack on Habeas CorpuslDirect Review Parity, 92 COLUM.fr. REV. 1997, 2091
(1992) (stressing Congress's purposehlness in amending the habeas corpus statutes); Saltzburg, supra note 4, a t 384 ("Assuming that limits may be placed on
habeas corpus review without violating the Constitution, this judgment is not the
Court's to make. Congress makes this judgment when it enacts a habeas corpus
statute.").
There is an interesting question of constitutional law whether Congress is
obliged to provide federal habeas corpus to state prisoners or could choose to completely abolish such jurisdiction. For a discussion of this issue that comes to the
non-traditional answer that Congress could not abolish habeas jurisdiction, see
Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a Constitutional
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bare-boned-they do not address (or address only tangentially
or by inference) many of the key questions that arise in habeas
litigation. The crux of the CongressionaVSupreme Court issue
is how far the Supreme Court can go in creating habeas doctrine without crossing the line into illegitimatejudicial amendment of the statutes.
C. The Practical Issue: The Effectsof Habeas Litigation
The practical issue of the real-world effects of habeas litigation surfaces less often than do the theoretical issues, but the
effects of habeas litigation constitute a very real subtext for the
. ~ obtain an
doctrinal issues with which the court ~ r e s t l e s To

Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH.L. REV. 862 (1994).
6. Data concerning the number of habeas corpus filings is compiled annually
and published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in the
Annual Report of the Director, which are reprinted in REPORTSOF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITEDSTATES COURTS.The individual Annual Reports will be cited as 19x11 ANN. REP. For several reasons these
reports are not totally exact, see Charles D. Weisselberg, Evidentiay Hearings in
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 161 11.165 (setting forth
four reasons why the reports are not totally accurate), but the reports still provide
the best available picture of habeas corpus activity. The number of habeas corpus
filings in 1986 was 10,724. 1990 ANN. REP. 140. For 1987, the number was 11,368.
1991 ANN. REP. 193. For 1988, the figure was 12,059; for 1989, 12,404; for 1990,
13,068; for 1991, 12,019; and for 1992, 12,806. 1992 ANN. REP. 182. While these
are fairly large numbers of filings, only a relatively small percentage of them really engages the federal district courts' attention. For example, a 1990 report found
that district courts hold hearings in only 1.1 percent of all habeas corpus cases.
Report of the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts (Richard A. Posner,
Chair), in 1 Federal Courts Study Committee, Working Papers and Subcommittee
Reports, 484 (July 1, 1990).
Certainly over 10,000 filings per year is a significant number. Yet some other
observations may help put this number in context. For example, according to Professor Daniel J. Meltzer:
One can then estimate (based on numbers dating from the early 1980s to
the present) that of every thousand persons convicted in state prosecutions and committed to custody in any given year, only three to four
actually file habeas corpus petitions challenging their custody. Of those
persons, the studies from the 1970s suggest that only 3.2 percent of petitions, or 7.3 percent of petitioners, actually obtained relief. So of every
100,000 persons committed to state custody, no more than about 30 obtain federal habeas relief.
Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2507, 2524 (1993). Further, Professor Weisselberg demonstrated that %abeas
corpus flings per state prisoner remained fairly constant from 1945 to 1962, rose
dramatically until 1970, and have steadily declined since. In fiscal year 1945, there
were 0.47 federal habeas corpus petitions filed per every hundred state prisoners;
in 1961, 0.52; in 1970, 5.05; and 1.85 in 1988." Weisselberg, supra, at 162-63.
Looking at the figures above, habeas filings have held relatively steady for the
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overview of these effects, we need to examine the costs and
benefits of both unsuccessfil and successfil petitions.
The costs of unsuccessful petitions can be divided into those
costs that are certain and those that are speculatiue. It is certain that unsuccessful petitions create costs to the prosecuting
authorities in having to respond to them and to federal judges
in having to dispose of them. As to speculative effects, it is
possible that crime victims are somehow upset by the continuing litigation of their victimizer. State judges may chafe at the
idea that their decisions continue to be grist for federal litigation years after they were rendered7 and the relatively few
petitioners with meritorious claims may have their claims buried in a n avalanche of unmeritorious petitions? One additional
period 1989 through 1992, which was subsequent to Professor Weisselberg's calculations. Given that prison populations have been increasing yearly during that period, one assumes that the current rate of habeas filings per 100 state prisoners is
less than what it was in 1988. These figures give Professor Meltzer pause to consider whether habeas is really a very useful means of ensuring adequate protection
of federal constitutional rights in state criminal trials. Meltzer, supra, at 2526.
Habeas corpus filings by death penalty petitioners are a different subject. As
Professor Meltzer undoubtedly correctly intuits, the percentage of such cases in
which petitions are filed is close to one hundred percent. Meltzer, supra, at 2525.
Further, there is evidence that the success rate of capital petitioners is quite high.
Donald P. Lay, The Writ of Habeas Corpus: A Complex Procedure for a Simple
Process, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1015, 1044 n.166 (1993) (citing a collection of sources
that put the success rate of capital habeas petitioners between 50 percent and 70
percent). There is some room for skepticism about the validity of this reversal rate.
Charles Fried, Impudence, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 155, 182 11.92 ("I am dubious about
the validity of statistics that show a 40 to 60 percent reversal rate in death cases
on habeas."). There is little room for doubt, however, that a significant percent of
death penalty petitioners do have success in habeas.
7 . Compare John W. Winkel 111, Judges as lobbyists: Habeas corpus reform
263, 266-72 (1985) (examining the lobbying efforts of
in the 1940s, 68 JUDICATURE
state judges in the 1940s to curtail habeas jurisdiction) with Frank J. Remington,
State Prisoner Access to Postconviction Relief-A Lessening Role for Federal Courts;
An Increasingly Important Role for State Courts, 44 OHIOST. L.J. 287, 289 (1983)
(arguing that by the 1970s criticism of habeas by state judges had subsided, probably mostly because of increased state court willingness to deal with important federal constitutional questions). See also Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to
Federal Habeas Corpus: Justice Sacrif~edon the &tars of Expdiency, Federalism
339, 347 (1987-1988) (reasoning
and Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U.REV. L. & SOC.CHANGE
that habeas constitutes a limited affront to state judicial autonomy because of the
small percentage success rate and the declining percentage of habeas as a part of
the federal docket); Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 170 (arguing that state court
judges should not take offense at habeas jurisdiction since it is part of their duties
to willingly submit their decisions to scrutiny by others and because judges are not
infallible).
8. As Justice Jackson once put it with respect to habeas, rh]e who must
search a haystack for a needle is likely to end up with the attitude that the needle is not worth the search." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
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cost for death penalty proponents9 is quite prominent in habeas jurisprudence: the delay in execution of death penalty petitioners because of their availing themselves of federal habeas
petitions.lo
There may be some benefits even to unsuccessful habeas
litigation, but they fall into the realm of the speculative. First,
if more constitutional litigation results in better constitutional
jurisprudence, then even unsuccessful habeas petitions have
some benefit. Second, the ability to bring a habeas petition,
even if ultimately unsuccessful, may provide some psychological
benefit to petitioners who feel that they have been aggrieved by
the state.
As t o successful habeas petitions, the costs are all the
same, but there is a much more certain benefit: a prisoner
whose constitutional rights have been violated finally has them
vindicated." This vindication occurs in the form of an order of
release from custody or for resentencing.
Having identified the three general issues of constitutional
interpretation that bear on habeas jurisprudence, the four
theoretical issues specific t o habeas corpus and the subtext of
the practical effects of habeas corpus litigation, it is now time
to examine the eight visions of habeas corpus that are reflected
in current Supreme Court jurisprudence and academic commentary.

concurring).
9. For opponents of the death penalty, of course, delay in execution constitutes a benefit of habeas.
10. I t may be that the conservative Justices' discontent with habeas as a
mechanism to delay executions has been the tail that has wagged the whole habeas dog over the last decade or so. Most often this c o ~ e c t i o nis seen by death
penalty opponents. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 797, 822 (1992) ("The current Court has expressed its impatience with these
[habeas] costs, primarily in the context of death penalty cases."); Robert Weisberg,
A Great Writ While It Lasted, 8 1 J. CRIM.L. & CRIMINOLOGY
9, 9 (1990) (speculatively attributing some conservative Supreme Court cases regarding habeas to the
f a d that "the Court was simply frustrated with the inadequacy of the execution
rate of America's death row inmatesn); Julia E. Boaz, Note, Summary Processes
and the Rule of Law: Expediting Death Penalty Cases in Federal Courts, 95 YALE
L.J. 349, 356 (1985) ("Members of the Court have repeatedly expressed impatience
and irritation with execution delays, an attitude suggesting illegitimate manipulation of procedures on the part of death penalty lawyers.") (citation omitted).
11. Among all the visions I will discuss, only proponents of the
one-fair-chance vision would not see federal vindication of a right as a benefit.
Those visionaries do not believe there is any ultimate standard of correctness and,
thus, do not believe the federal decision vindicating a right is any better than a
state decision to the contrary. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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The eight visions set forth below are derived primarily
from sifting through Supreme Court cases and, secondarily,
from academic literature regarding habeas corpu~.'~
As far as
I can tell, this listing of visions is exhaustive of current ideas of
what habeas corpus should be. I have assigned each a descriptive name of my own devising. In this Part of the Article, I will
explain each vision in relation t o the issues raised in Part I.
Three of the eight visions (Visions One, Two, and Five) have
been explained in significant detail by their proponents. As to
these, I will need to do little deductive reasoning concerning
the visions' positions. The other five visions have not been fully
explicated-as to those, I will have to extrapolate many of the
visions' stances. This Part should provide the reader with a
basic understanding of what the visions are, and thus prepare
the reader for the plunge into the case law that will occur in
Part 111.

A. Vision One: The De Novo Litigation Vision

De novo litigation visionaries believe that petitioners
should have the opportunity t o litigate in federal court, virtually from ground zero, any federal constitutional claim. The federal court should not be bound by procedural straightjackets
that may limit state courts, nor should the federal court be
bound by state court findings of fact. In this vision habeas is, in
one sense, an "extraordinary writ"'3 because it can look
12. Others have made efforts a t divining theories or models of habeas. See,
e.g., Fried, supra note 6, a t 175-76 (arguing that the two dominant models are the
"process" model and the "relitigation" model); Evan T. Lee, The Theories of Federal
Habeas Corpus, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 151-54 (1994) (arguing that the four theories of habeas corpus are the process-only theory, the process-plus-innocence theory,
the federal forum theory, and the deterrence theory); Jordan Steiker, Innocence and
Federal Habeas, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 303, 308-9 (1993) (stating as the two familiar
understandings of habeas, the full relitigation model, and the model that views
habeas as a limited and extraordinary remedy to be available only where the state
L. REV.
court lacked jurisdiction); Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN.
575, 577-78 & 11.14 (1993) (stating the two primary models of habeas are the "full
review" and "institutional competence" models, and the important intermediate
models include the "deterrence" model, the "innocence based" model, the "liberty
based" model, the "rights based" model, and the "appellate" model). In this Article,
I will argue that there are eight signif~cant"visions" or models of habeas that
appear in Supreme Court jurisprudence. Thus, I think that all of the authorities
just cited oversimplify the richness of available models. The models suggested by
Professor Woolhandler come closest to encompassing the "visions" I will discuss.
13. Habeas corpus, along with mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and cer-
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through all procedural irregularities and cut straight to the
heart of the merits of the constitutional issue. In another
sense, in this vision habeas is not "extraordinary" at all: it is,
in fact, a routine part of the state defendant's post-conviction
remedy. The best exemplar of this vision on the Supreme Court
bench was Justice Brennan.l4 In academia, this vision has
several champions, the most prolific of whom is Professor Larry
Yackle. l5

I . The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
Advocates of this vision invariably are "liberals" with respect to these issues of constitutional interpretation: they view
rights expansively, do not believe that rights should be balanced against other interests, and believe that all rights are
equally weighty.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. In this vision habeas performs at least six
functions. The first function focuses on individual habeas petitioners: the writ vindicates the rights of individuals who have
been constitutionally wronged.16 The remaining five functions
- -

-

p
p
p
p
p

tiorari constitute the "extraordinary" writs. CHESTERJ. ANTIEAU,TKE PRACTICEOF
EXTRAORDINARY
REMEDIES:HABEAS CORP~JS
AND THE OTHERCOMMON
LAWWRITS
(1987).
14. Justice Marshall would make an equally good exemplar except that Justice B r e ~ a nauthored a greater number of significant habeas opinions. Significant
majority opinions of Justice Breman include the following: Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). His significant dissents include those in Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); Murray v.
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); and Stone
v. Powell, 428 U S . 465 (1976).
15. See, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
233 1 (1993) [hereinafter Yackle, Hagioscope]; Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures
of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. REV. LAW & SO(=. CHANGE359
(1987-88) [hereinafter Yackle, Misadventures]; Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991 (1985) [hereinafter Yackle, Explaining]; Larry W.
Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An Argument for a
Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO STATEL J . 393 (1983). Professor Yackle has
also written one of the major treatises concerning federal habeas corpus which contains less advocacy of his position than the afore-cited articles. See LARRYW.
YACKLE,POSTCONVICTION
REMEDIES(1981 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter YACKLE,
POSM=ONVICI'ION].
16. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 441 (1963) ("Surely no fair-minded
person will contend that those who have been deprived of their liberty without due
process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison."); Price v. Johnston, 334
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relate to the federal nature of the American court system: the
threat of federal habeas relief deters states from construing the
substance of federal rights too stingily," provides a means to
force states to make their procedures fairer to criminal defendants," keeps federal district courts involved as to the whole
range of issues by regularly providing them with opportunities
to litigate constitutional issues that may not arise regularly in
federal criminal cases,lg promotes statelfederal dialogue con-

U.S.266, 291 (1948) (''The primary purpose of a habeas corpus proceeding is to
make certain that a man is not unjustly imprisoned."); Chemerinsky, supra note 4,
at 773 ("[Tlhe Warren Court and defenders of broader habeas [corpus] review have
emphasized the importance of collateral review as a method of error correction.");
Graham Hughes, Sandbagging Constitutional Rights: Federal Habeas Corpus and
the Procedural Default Principle, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.CHANGE321, 321
(1987-1988) ("According to one view, our greatest fear should be that there are
those in prison who have been improperly convicted."). But see Yackle, Explaining,
supm note 15, at 992, 1005-1009 (arguing that the physical liberty rationale is not
the strongest one for supporting the existence of habeas jurisdiction).
17. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.545, 562-63 (1979) (stressing that the deterrent
value of habeas corpus review of state actions is effective); Chemerinsky, supra
note 4, at 770-71 (noting that the Warren Court believed that via habeas rights
"are enforced as a way of deterring unlawfil police practices"); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies,
104 HARv. E. REV. 1733, 1787-813 (1991) (arguing generally that one purpose of
remedies for constitutional violations is to "redress individual violations," while the
second focuses on broader structural interests by establishing a judicial check to
ensure that the political branches respect constitutional values); Yackle, Explaining,
supm note 15, at 1039 (The task [of habeas] is to hold state authorities accountable and to insist that they fashion and enforce substantive criminal policies
without denying fair process to individuals haled into court to answer charges.").
18. Joseph L. Hoffmann, Starting h r n Scratch: Rethinking Fedeml Habeas
Review of Death Penalty Cases, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 133, 145 (1992) (arguing,
even though H o f f m a ~is not a de novo litigation visionary, that habeas review
should be a mechanism for forcing state courts to improve capital trials); Curtis R.
Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1315, 1352 (1961) ("On the level of sound policy, one very desirable goal is to
define the federal habeas corpus jurisdiction so as to serve as an incentive for
improvement of state procedures."); Yackle, Misadventures, supra note 15, at 360-63
(tracing the Court's efforts in the 1940s to force Illinois to create a viable
postconviction remedy); Brennan, supra note 4, a t 442 (arguing for a rule permitting federal courts to ignore procedural defaults because "an awareness by state
tribunals that the procedural barrier to state review would not be deemed necessarily a barrier to federal review, would provide an incentive for state courts to
reach serious constitutional claims and vindicate them in proper cases." Of course,
two years later Justice Breman mote an opinion empowering habeas courts to
easily ignore state procedural defaults. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 426-427
(1963)).
19. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 338-39 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that preserving the power of lower federal courts to hear claims for retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure "would not
discourage their litigation on federal habeas corpus and thus not deprive ourselves
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cerning rights," and promotes uniformity of interpretation of
federal law.''
b. History. This vision begins its history by reaching far
back into English law for proclamations about the "Great Writ"
as the most powerful arrow in the quiver of libert~.~'
Proponents of this vision point out that the writ was deemed such an
important part of the rights of citizens by the Founders and
that the Writ is ensconced, though in a backhanded manner, in
the Suspension Clause of the Con~titution.~~
The de novo litigation vision has to struggle with the fact
that during the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century the
Supreme Court seemingly viewed the writ as primarily a remedy for legislative or executive detentions and believed that the
only legitimate sphere of operation of the writ in the context of
imprisonment pursuant to a judicial directive was if the sentencing court lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the
person of the defendant. The key case is Ex parte Watkins,"

and society of the benefit of decisions by the lower federal courts when we must
resolve these issues ourselves*); Joseph L. Hoffmann, The Supreme Court's New
Vision of Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 191
("[Mlost of the opportunities for the lower federal courts to declare . . . or to expound . . . 'new rules' arise in federal habeas cases. This is because there are
many more state criminal prosecutions than federal ones, and because state procedures vary more than do federal procedures, thus raising more interesting and
difficult criminal procedure issues.").
20. Robert-M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALEL.J. 1035, 1048-1053 (1977) (arguing that the Warren Court wisely chose as a path for the continuing definition of constitutional
rights a dialogue between the federal habeas courts and the s b t e courts rather
than more intrusive controls involving liability rules and equity); see also Kathleen
L.J. 939, 1016 (1991) (examining the diaPatchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASITNCS
lectical federalism concept).
21. Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, at 1022 ("[Tlhere is a national interest
in the correct and uniform interpretation of federal law.").
22. The classic homage to the writ was penned by Justice Brennan in the
majority opinion in Fay v. Noia, 372 US. 391, 399-406 (1963). In the same opinion, Justice B r e ~ a ntook the de novo litigation visionaries' first bite at the historical apple. Id. at 399-426. Justice Brennan's history was subjected to searching
criticism by legal historians. See Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867:
The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 31 (1965), and Dallin
L. REV. 451
H. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH.
(1966). A revised de moo litigation visionary history was put forth in Gary Peller,
In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relitigation, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.579
(1982).
23. U.S.CONST.art. I, $ 9, cl. 2 (The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it.").
24. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830).
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where the Court held: "An imprisonment under a judgment
cannot be unlawful, unless that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the court has general jurisdiction of
the subject, although it should be erroneous.'725De novo litigation visionaries take two tacks in trying to downplay the
Watkins principle. First, they argue that the Court narrowly
construed its habeas jurisdiction so as t o not create a substitute for the appellate criminal jurisdiction that Congress chose
not t o confer.26Second, de novo visionaries argue that it was
not the scope of the writ that was restricted during that time
period but rather the scope of due process27-the only component of due process cognizable in federal courts then was the
right not to be convicted by a tribunal lacking jurisdiction."
Thus, all that was required for the expansion of habeas jurisdiction was an expanding body of rights2' and an authorizing
jurisdictional statute as to state prisoners.
The statute came via the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, by
which Congress, for the first time, empowered federal courts to
issue writs of habeas corpus on behalf of any person held "in
violation of the United States Constit~tion."~~
The basic mandate of this statute-that the writ shall extend to a prisoner
who is "restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States7,--has not
changed in substance from its enactment in 1867 to the present
day.31 De novo litigation proponents point out that the language of the statute is as broad as it could possibly be in protecting constitutional rightsS2 and note that the Supreme

25. Id. at 203. This case involved a petition by a federal prisoner because,
except for two limited statutes authorizing federal jurisdiction over a habeas petition by prisoners in state custody, there was no general jurisdictional statute permitting federal courts to hear habeas petitions by state prisoners. Even though
Watkins involved a federal petitioner, it was viewed at the time as stating a general principle applicable to habeas.
26. See Fay, 372 US. at 413.
27. Id. at 409-11.
28. Watkins, 28 U S at 203.
29. See Fay, 372 US. at 413-14.
30. Judiciary Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 8 1, 14 Stat. 385, 386 (1867) (current version a t 28 U.S.C. $9 2241, 2254(a) (1988)).
31. Id. The present governing statutes both provide that the writ shall extend
to any prisoner who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. $8 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1988).
, dissenting)
32. See, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 503-6 (1976) ( B r e ~ a n J.,
(inferring that the "explicit language" of 28 U.S.C. 8 2254 extends habeas jurisdiction to encompass all constitutional claims).
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Court recognized this breadth virtually immediately after the
statute's enactment.33
Proponents of the de novo litigation vision then must
plunge into the murky waters of the period fkom 1867 t o 1953,
when Brown u. Allens4 (the consensus choice of visionaries of
all stripes as the starting point for the modern era of habeas
litigation) was handed down. As we will see in examining other
visions, this period contains signals that point in different
directions35and thus can provide support for several conflicting visions. De novo litigation proponents view this as a transitional period during which two important things happened.
First, the Supreme Court gradually freed itself of the idea that
the only judicially-authorized incarceration that could be unconstitutional was one where the court lacked jurisdicti~n,~~
and worked toward fulfilling the intent of the 1867 Congress
that all claims of constitutional violations were within the
scope of the
From this perspective, Brown is important
because it finally laid to rest this Turisdictional" restriction.
The second important process that de novo litigation visionaries
believe occurred during this period was that the Court began to
lay the foundations of the due process criminal procedure revolution that would be brought to fruition by the Warren Court in
the 1 9 6 0 ~ . ~ ~
33. Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S.(6 Wall.) 318, 325-26 (1867) (This legislation
is of the most comprehensive character. I t brings within the habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge every possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws. I t is impossible to widen
this jurisdiction.").
34. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
35. See infia notes 74-75, 108, and 126, and accompanying text.
36. Brown v. Allen does not specifically recognize the expansion of the writ to
allow claims of constitutional error previously adjudicated in state court. Brown is
only understood as standing for this expansion in scope in light of previous cases.
L. REV.247, 252 & n.27 (1988).
Barry Friedman, A Tale of !l'wo Habeas. 73 MINN.
37. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 413-14 (1963) (stating that the "possibly
grudging scope given [to habeas in some early Supreme Court cases] is overshadowed by the numerous and varied allegations which this Court has deemed cognizable on habeas, not only in the last decades, but continuously since the fetters
of the Watkins decision were thrown off in Ex Parte Lange [85 U.S.(18 Wall.) 163
(1873)l").
38. Peller, supra note 22, a t 649. Professor Peller gives three examples of
pre-Warren Court, expansive, constitutional criminal procedure cases: Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (holding that the due process clause required states
to provide counsel for accused persons in capital cases); Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (holding that the prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony denies due process); and House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945) (holding that a coerced guilty plea violates due process).
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The de novo litigation vision scored a virtually complete
triumph when the Warren Court exploded its habeas trilogy
bombshell in 1963. In Fay v. Noia,sg the Court held that procedural default of a claim at the state level usually does not
bar habeas litigation of that claim in federal court. In
Townsend u. Sain:O the Court held that federal habeas courts
have broad powers to relitigate factual issues that were already
decided in state proceedings. And in Sanders u. United
States:' the Court held that there was no substantial limitation on the ability of federal habeas courts to entertain subsequent habeas petitions by the same petitioner. It is generally
accepted that the Warren Court chose habeas as a key tool to
implement its concomitant criminal procedure revolution
against what it believed would be recalcitrant state authorities:
while the Court's own docket was not large enough to permit
regular policing of renegade state prosecutors and judiciaries,
the dockets of the federal district courts provided an acceptable
De novo litigation buffs believe that the 1963 ha~urrogate.'~
beas trilogy got things exactly right. They deplore the demise of
these principles that began with the advent of Warren Burger
as Chief Justice in 1969, and that has steadily continued to the
present as other visions have gained ascendancy.
c. Federalism. The de novo litigation vision believes
strongly that federal courts are the preferred forum for vindicating federal constitutional rights. Proponents have both an
abstract and a concrete argument in support of this position.
Abstractly, federal courts are superior as to federal law (once
Congress has empowered the federal courts to hear those issues) simply because the Supremacy C l a ~ s e 'says
~
so. Thus,
even if federal courts were not qualitatively "better" a t propounding federal law, they would still be superior to state
courts simply by virtue of the federal structure established by
the Con~titution.~~
The second, and more concrete, argument
39. 372 U.S. 391, 426 (1963).
40. 372 U.S. 293, 311-12 (1963).
41. 373 US. 1, 15 (1963).
42. See Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process: From Warren to
Burger, 28 BAYLORL. REV.533, 533-34 (1976).
43. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof. . . shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
44. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) ("But conventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy
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is that federal courts are in fact better at enforcing federal
constitutional criminal procedure rights because federal judges
have no vested interest in the state criminal justice system,
and are thus not as susceptible as state court judges (many of
whom have to stand for reelection) to sacrifice federal constitutional rights on the altar of law and order.45De novo litigation
visionaries stress that the whole idea of federal habeas for
state prisoners arose directly out of Congress's distrust of state
authorities. In response to the obvious proposition that states
are not currently as untrustworthy in enforcing federal constitutional doctrine as were the Southern states in the Reconstruction era, proponents of the de novo litigation vision have
two rejoinders: first, the 1867 Congress's intent carries down
through the decades until some subsequent Congress significantly amends the statute;46and, second, even if most state
courts can currently be trusted t o enforce federal criminal procedural rights, habeas corpus stands ready to correct the occasional instance in which state courts do not perform their
watchdog fun~tion.~'

that federal constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the
fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial review."); Liebman, supra note 5, a t
2097 ("Federal law is supreme, a s is federal adjudication of that law when mandated by Congress. Throughout the nation's history, moreover, Congress has mandated
final federal adjudication of important federal law whenever life or liberty has
depended on the outcome.").
45. See, e.g., Woolhandler, supra note 12, at 634 (citing authorities that argue
state courts tend to favor enforcement of state substantive criminal law over federal constitutional criminal procedural rights and to be more amenable to political
pressure than federal judges); Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, a t 1031-32 ("The
overriding responsibility of the state courts to carry out state law thus deprives
them of the neutrality and dispassion demanded for contemporaneous enforcement
of the Fourteenth Amendment."). See generally, Abraham Sofaer, Note, Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV.78
(1964) (arguing that federal court offers a better forum for vindication of federal
rights because i t isolates them from other elements of the criminal process that
are matters of state law).
46. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 781 ("Accordingly, if the Court is to follow
congressional views as to parity, the Court should interpret habeas statutes based
on the assumption that state courts are to be distrusted.").
47. Patchel, supra note 20, a t 1054.
We all assume that the current criminal law system is not the one
that the Warren Court confronted; indeed, this is so in large part because
of the internalization of many of the Warren Court era reforms by the
states and their officials. We also know, however, that the current criminal justice process is not the utopia posited by doctrines such as procedural bar and the Rehnquist Court's retroactivity doctrine.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Again,
de novo litigation proponents argue that the intent of Congress
in 1867 still governs and that their intent was to make habeas
broadly available to state prisoners. Thus, the broad wording of
the statute should be given complete effect and, when issues
arise which are not directly governed by the statutory language, those issues should be resolved generously in favor of
the remedy. Thus, proponents of the de nouo litigation vision
have a response to the charge that is sometimes leveled at
them that they are disingenuous because they approve of the
petitioner-favorable innovations of the Warren Court habeas
trilogy, while disapproving of the judicial innovations in the
opposite direction by the Burger and Rehnquist Courtd8 The
response is simply that the Warren Court innovations were
within the spirit of the Congressional intent, while the innovations of the conservative courts fly directly in the face of that
intent!'
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation
Unsurprisingly, de novo litigation visionaries focus on the
benefits of habeas litigation: that prisoners whose constitutional
rights have been violated have them vindicated (although belatedly) in federal court, and subsidiarily, that habeas cases
provide more fodder for constitutional criminal procedure litigation. To proponents of this vision, the costs of habeas litigation
form no legitimate part of the discussion for two reasons. First,
Congress has authorized the broad-ranging habeas remedy and
it is up to Congress to assess the costs and benefits, and to
amend or repeal the statute if it feels the costs outweigh the

48. See, eg., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 212 (1989) ( O ' C o ~ o r , J.,
concurring).
The dissent's charges of "judicial activism" and its assertion that "Congress has determinedn that collateral review of claims like those a t issue
in this case outweighs any interests in bringing a final resolution to the
criminal process ring quite hollow indeed in the context of the federal
habeas statute. The scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction has undergone a substantial judicial expansion, and a return to what "Congress
intended" would reduce the scope of habeas jurisdiction far beyond the
extension of Stone o. Powell to Miranda claims.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 106-07 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("[Lliberal post-trial federal review is the redress that Congress ultimately chose to allow and the consequences of a state procedural default should be
evaluated in conformance with this policy choice.").
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benefits.50 Second, de novo litigation visionaries believe that
Congress has been right in not repealing the statute because,
since constitutional rights are so important that they cannot be
balanced against countervailing interests, the regime that the
1867 Congress authorized is precisely the right one.

B. Vision Two: The Appellate Review Vision
This second vision of habeas holds that the writ should be
routinely available to permit federal review of an appellate
nature regarding claimed constitutional violations alleged to
have occurred in state proceedings. In essence, the federal
habeas court is conceived of as a higher court than any state
court as to federal constitutional issues. Thus, a state petitioner who invokes federal habeas should be treated, to the extent
possible, just like any other litigant who brings a claim from a
lower court to a higher one.
Before we proceed, there are two conceptual hurdles that
must be surmounted before the vision of habeas as a federal
appellate review mechanism makes sense. First, habeas does
not look like an appeal: the appellate process normally involves
a pleading at the trial level, with that same pleading being the
basis for action as the case progresses through the appellate
process. Habeas, by contrast, is commenced by filing a civil action in federal district court distinct from the criminal pleading
Habein the state court that originally led t o the con~iction.~'
as is usually considered to be quintessentially a "collateral
attack" mechanism, an apotheosis of direct appellate review.
Appellate review visionaries argue, though, that while habeas
may not look like an appeal, Congress intended that it should
work like an appeal.52

50. Chemerinsky, supra note 16, a t 781 (raising a hypothetical argument for
judicial deference to congressional intent: "If subsequent developments render this
premise [that state courts are to be distrusted] outdated, then it would be for
Congress to change its directive by modifying the underlying statute."); Saltzburg,
supm note 4, a t 383 ("Unless and until Congress narrows the statute, federal
courts have a duty to identify and protect persons who bring sound claims that
they are in custody in violation of the Constitution.").
51. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 US. 1, 8 (1989) ("Postmnviction relief
is . . . not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be
civil in nature." (quoting P e ~ s y l v a n i av. Finley, 481 US. 551, 556-57 (1987));
Riddle v. Dyche, 262 US. 333, 335-36 (1923) (The writ of habeas corpus is not a
proceeding in the original criminal prosecution but an independent civil suit.").
52. See Liebman, supra note 5, at 2096 (arguing that "[wlhen direct federal
appellate review of federal constitutional claims has not been meaninfilly avail-
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The second conceptual problem with viewing habeas as an
appeal is the long-standing idea, prevalent in the law of state
post-conviction remedies that habeas is "not a substitute for
appeal," which indicates that not only is it not an appeal, it is
something different and narrower in scope." Appellate review
visionaries contend that this dogma, however apropos it may be
as to state post-conviction remedies, simply does not correctly
describe the role Congress has envisioned for habeas ever since
the beginning of the republic.54

able," habeas corpus has been selected by Congress to fill the breach). For a more
detailed discussion of Liebman's thesis, see infia notes 58-64 and accompanying
text.
53. See, e.g., Summerville v. Warden, State Prison, 641 A.2d 1356, 1372
(Conn. 1994); State ex rel. Simmons v. White, 866 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Mo. 1993) (en
banc); Ellis v. McMackin, 602 N.E.2d 611, 612 (Ohio 1992); Petrilli v. Leapley, 491
N.W.2d 79, 81-82 (S.D. 1992); Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 519 (Utah 1994),
cert. denied, 1994 U.S. Lexis 7624; State a rel. Phillips v. Legursky, 420 S.E.2d
743, 744 (W.Va. 1992). The idea that habeas is not a substitute for appeal has a
checkered history in the Supreme Court. In S u d v. Large, a federal habeas case
involving a non-constitutional claim of error, the Court stated "[Tlhe writ of habeas
corpus will not be allowed to do service for an appeal." Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 178 (1947). Six years later in Brown v. ALlen, Justice Frankfurter called the
not-a-substitute-for-appeal doctrine a "jejune abstraction." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 558 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). At the tail-end of the Warren Court
era in Kaufrnan v. United States, the Court rejected the not-a-substitute-for-appeal
doctrine and distinguished S u d as involving a non-constitutional claim of error.
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 & n.7 (1969). But in an opinion in
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 682-83, (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in
the judgment in two of the consolidated cases, and dissenting in the third), Justice
Harlan laid the groundwork for a conservative reversal, stating, "[hlabeas corpus
always has been a collateral remedy, providing an avenue for upsetting judgments
that have become otherwise final. I t is not designed as a substitute for direct review." This conservative reversal partially arrived in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,
305 (19891, where Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy cited Justice
Harlan's position from Mackey with approval. Justice Thomas's opinion in Wright
v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482, 2490 (1992) shows him to be a believer in the Harlan
position as well. When one adds Justice Stevens who, although not characterizable
a s a conservative regarding habeas corpus, does believe that habeas is different
and narrower than direct appeal, there is currently a clear majority on the Court
who believe that habeas should not operate as a substitute for appeal and should
instead perform a narrower function. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332
n.5 (1979) ("It hardly bears repeating that habeas corpus is not intended as a
substitute for appeal . . . . Instead, it is designed to guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems.") (citation omitted).
On the other hand, de novo litigation visionaries believe habeas is not synonymous with appeal because habeas is b d e r . See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,
3 11 (1963) ("The whole history of the w r i t i t s unique development-refutes a construction of the federal courts' habeas corpus powers that would assimilate their
task to that of courts of appellate review.").
54. See, Liebman, supra note 5, a t 384.
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Appellate review visionaries are staunch friends of habeas,
b u t t h e i r vision i s , a s we will s e e , m u c h l e s s
petitioner-favorable in several key respects than the vision of
the de novo litigation visionaries because appellate review
visionaries have greater regard for procedural barriers in habeas if those barriers would also exist on direct review. The primary exponents of this vision are academics, particularly Professors James L i e b m a ~and
~ ~Barry
~
FriedmadB
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation

-

As t o constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, appellate
review visionaries often a r e , b u t need not be,
rights-expansionists. Regarding balanceability of rights, appellate review visionaries are more willing to balance than are de
particular, appellate review
novo litigation visionaries-in
visionaries' logic compels them to put the state's interests in
state procedural rules on the opposite side of the scale, because
those rules are respected by the Supreme Court on direct review as long as the rules are not mere subterfuges designed to
insulate federal constitutional claims from meaningful review.57 As to equality of rights, the appellate review
visionaries' logic dictates that whatever position they take as to
direct review, they should also take as to habeas-if all rights
are equally weighty on direct review, they should be equally
weighty in habeas; if they are not treated equally on direct
review, they should not be treated equally in habeas.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. Appellate review visionaries believe that
habeas fulfills some of the same functions as the de novo litigation visionaries believe, but not all, and not all to the same
extent. A function-by-fundion comparison is in order. First, de
novo litigation visionaries believe so strongly in the vindication
of individual constitutional rights that they are willing to ignore procedural barriers to reach the merits of those claims;
appellate review visionaries believe in vindication of rights, but

55. Id.
56. Barry Friedman, A Tale of
57. Henry v. Mississippi, 379

Two Habeas, 73 MINN.
L. REV.247 (1988).
U.S. 443, 447-48 (1965) (holding that a state

procedural rule may not be adequate to bar Supreme Court direct review if the
rule does not further a legitimate state interest).
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not so strongly as to be willing to so freely ignore procedural
barriers that would exist on direct review. Second, appellate
reviewers also believe that habeas deters state courts from too
narrowly construing the substance of federal rights. But while
de novo litigation visionaries view habeas as a means to force
states to reform their procedures in defendant-favorable ways,
appellate review visionaries put little stock in this as a function as long as state procedures are mere subterfuges to avoid
vindicating federal rights. As to habeas' effect of allowing federal district courts to litigate constitutional issues with regularity, to stay involved in the constitutional dialogue, and to promote uniformity of federal law, appellate reviewers would concur in these goals. They would then contend that their vision
also permits a great deal of federal district court involvement,
and that while some petitioners will be barred from raising
claims that de novo litigators would permit, in the end the
appellate review vision will reach most of the same issues in
other cases .
b. History. The history supporting this vision of habeas
is found in a recent law review article by Professor James
Liebman.58 Liebman's thesis is that ever since 1789, Congress
has, by some combination of statutes concerning writs of error,
habeas corpus, and certiorari (and, to a lesser extent, removal),
sought to assure that state prisoners have one opportunity to
litigate federal constitutional claims in federal court. Liebman
carefully traces the histories of the successive schemes of federal jurisdiction, and makes a plausible case for this historical
interpretati~n.~'Congress's substitution, in a series of statutes enacted from 1914 to 1925, of discretionary writ of certiorari jurisdiction in the Supreme Court for mandatory writ of
error jurisdiction is particularly important in Liebman's
eyes:60after that, a state convict no longer had the writ of error right to have the case reviewed by the Supreme Court, but
only the possibility of review (which became more evanescent
as the Supreme Court's docket swelled with each succeeding
decade)." Accordingly, in the modern era, the primary means
58. Liebman, supra note 5.
59. Id. at 2057, 2035 ("Federal habeas corpus is not a substitute for general
writ of error or other direct appeals as of right. Since 1789, however, it has provided statutorily specified classes of prisoners with a limited and substitute federal
writ of error or appeal as of right.").
60. See id. at 2075, 2083.
61. Id. at 2084 ("In the state-prisoner context, with direct Supreme Court re-
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by which a convict could have the one shot a t federal review
was via habeas, which had stood ready since 1867 to perform
that task. Liebman thus argues for parity: the same standards
(to the extent practicable, given the inherent differences in the
mechanisms) that would apply to a petitioner if the Supreme
Court were to take the case on certiorari review should apply
to the federal district court that takes the case in habeas. For
example, if the Supreme Court would hold a claim to have been
unreviewable because it was not properly preserved, the habeas
court should do likewise.62
c. Federalism. Appellate review visionaries agree with
de novo litigation visionaries that Congress unequivocally
showed in enacting the 1867 Act that it distrusted state judiciaries, and that Congress's intent has never been retracted-indeed, appellate reviewers trace this distrust all the way
back to 1789.63Further, both appellate review visionaries and
de novo litigation visionaries agree that it is within Congress's
power to enable a single federal habeas judge to overrule a
state court decision on a matter of federal constitutional
law-even a decision rendered by a unanimous state supreme
court. Accordingly, neither de novo litigation visionaries nor
appellate review visionaries care if state authorities are somehow offended or hindered by the exercise of habeas jurisdiction-state authorities feel that way because they persist in
failing to appreciate the basic constitutional principle of federal
supremacy. Appellate review visionaries, though, unlike de
novo litigation visionaries, embed habeas within the entire
scheme of federal jurisdiction. This makes appellate review
visionaries concerned about parity of direct review and habeas,
a concern not shared by de novo litigation visionaries.
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. For
appellate review visionaries, the relevant context for determining congressional intent is not limited to the habeas statute,
but encompasses the federal jurisdictional statutes as a whole,
of which the habeas statutes form only part of the grand design. Appellate review visionaries thus believe that any interstices in the habeas statute should be filled by the Supreme

view on the merits as of right having gone the way of the snow leopard-but a
few sightings each year-the bulk of the review responsibility would fall to the
iower federal courts (and, at times, the Supreme Court) on habeas corpus.").
62. Id. at 2007, 2096.
63. See id. at 2057-2060.
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Court consistent with Congress's understanding of habeas as a
federal appellate review mechanism that substitutes for Supreme Court direct review in the vast bulk of cases that do not
evoke Supreme Court certiorari review. Accordingly, appellate
review visionaries take the Warren Court to task for decisions
that destroyed direct reviewhabeas parity by making the standards in habeas more petitioner-favorable than the standards
the petitioner would have encountered had the Supreme Court
taken the case via direct review.64 Appellate review visionaries similarly take later conservative Courts to task for destroying parity in the opposite way.65

3. The practical issue-the

effects of habeas litigation
Since appellate review visionaries see habeas as a litigation opportunity that should be routinely available for properly
preserved claims of error, they are not concerned that there
may be too many first-time habeas petitions filed containing
such claims. On direct review, counsel is supposed to assert
any remotely arguable ground that was properly preserved, so
parity demands no less in habeas? This means that appellate
review visionaries have little sympathy for pleas by prosecutors
or federal judges that habeas a s to such claims overworks
them. In all this they arrive a t the same result as the de novo
litigation visionaries. But appellate review visionaries are concerned about two issues that don't bother de nouo litigation
visionaries: petitions containing procedurally defaulted claims
that could not be considered on direct review; and multiple
petitions, since on direct review an appellant generally gets
only one consolidated appeal for all issues that could be raised.
C. Vision Three: The Rights-Selectiv ist Vision
The rights-selectivist vision has as its touchstone the idea
that some constitutional criminal procedural rights are more

64. See id. at 2094-95.
65. See Friedman, supm note 56, at 286-88 (arguing that Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), which held that Fourth Amendment claims which the petitioner has the opportunity t~ hlly and fairly litigate in state court cannot be reviewed on habeas, is inconsistent with the appellate review vision).
66. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (holding that a
court-appointed lawyer who finds no meritorious claim for appeal may request
permission to withdraw, but the lawyer must file with that request "a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal").
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important than others, and that the important ones are entitled to favored treatment in habeas corpus, while the unfavored
ones are not. A doctrinaire version of this vision would be that
only the important rights are even cognizable in habeas corpus.
A less doctrinaire version of the vision would hold that the
favored rights are not the only ones cognizable in habeas, but
they are entitled t o preferential treatment, e.g., forgiving a
procedural default when no similar forgiveness would be extended to an unfavored right. I will focus on the doctrinaire
version, because it most clearly illustrates the characteristics of
the vision. The rights-selectivist vision operates identically t o
the de novo litigation vision as to the rights the selectivists
deem favored, but differs dramatically as to the rights the
selectivists deem unfavored. Rights-selectivists share little
common ground with the appellate review vision, since the
rights-selectivists' key criterion is the substance of the claim
involved, while the appellate review visionaries' key criterion is
procedural parity between Supreme Court direct review and
habeas litigation.
One key question for rights-selectivists is which rights
should be the favored ones? (The other key question is why
only the favored ones should be able to be vindicated in habeas,
which I will discuss just below under the heading of "History.")
There are three distinct answers suggested in habeas law t o
the question of which rights should be the favored ones: (1)
rights that are fundamental to the fairness of the criminal
proceedingt7 ( 2 ) rights that relate directly to the accuracy of
the guilt /innocence determination;" and (3) rights that reflect
structural error as opposed to trial error?' Although no one
67. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993) (explaining
that habeas corpus is an extraordinary remedy against convictions that violate
fundamental fairness); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 312-13 (1989) (establishing an
exception to the bar on procedurally defaulted claims based partially on the idea of
fundamental fairness); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that habeas corpus is designed to provide relief from errors
that rendered the proceedings findamentally unfair).
68. See, e.g., Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. at 1729-30 (O9Comor, J., dissenting) (arguing that a petitioner-favorable, "harmless-error" standard correctly
promotes accuracy and determination of guilt or innocence); Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 323 (1979) (holding that an i n s ~ ~ c i e n cofy the evidence claim is
cognizable in habeas because it is central to the issue of guilt or innocence); Stone
v. Powell, 428 US. 465, 489-90 (1976) (arguing that illegally seized evidence is
usually reliable and probative on the issue of guilt or innocence).
69. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. a t 1717 (holding that structural error
on habeas is governed by a more petitioner-favorable "harmless-error" standard
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has attempted to define exhausitively which rights fall within
these categories, it seems that the second would be a subset of
the first: while it is easy to think of rights that are fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding, but that are not related to
the accuracy of the guilt/imocence determination-for example,
the right not to be placed twice in jeopardy, the right not to be
indicted by a grand jury chosen in a racially discriminatory
manner-it is hard (perhaps impossible) to think of rights that
are related to the accuracy of the guiltlinnocence determination
but that are not fundamental. Thus, fundamental fairness
rights-selectivists are selective, while accuracy of the
guilt/innocence determination rights-selectivists are even more
selective. The proposed distinction between structural error and
trial error is impossible to classify in terms of its relative
breadth. Despite these differences, I will treat all these
sub-visions together under the rubric of rights-selectivism,
because the visions operate identically except for the scope of
the rights which each recognizes. The primary exponent of
rights-selectivism is Justice Stevens.''
than is a claim of trial error).
70. Justice Stevens voted with the majority in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976). The majority held that one of the reasons that Fourth Amendment claims,
which a petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, were
not cognizable in habeas was because the exclusionary rule does not constitute a
personal constitutional right. Id. a t 486. Stevens also joined the majority opinion in
the second, early important Burger Court habeas precedent, Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977), that tightened up the standards permitting a federal
court to consider a claim that the petitioner procedurally defaulted in state court.
Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence in which the first hints of his
rights-selectivist position emerged: he argued that if a claim of error is grave
enough even an express personal waiver may be excused. Id. a t 94-95 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). He joined with the majority in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 559-64
(1979), which held that a claim of discrimination in grand jury selection is cognizable in habeas, in part because the right is substantially more compelling than the
one in Stone. Stevens' fullest explication of his rights-selectivist position came in
his dissenting opinion in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 538 (1982). Since then,
Justice Stevens has consistently adhered to the rights-selectivist rationale. See, e g . ,
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720-22 (1993) (joining in opinion holding
that a less petitioner-favorable standard of harmless error should apply on habeas
as on direct, because habeas is an extraordinary remedy against violations of h n damental fairness); Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1752-53 (1993) (joining
opinion holding that Stone should not be expanded to encompass claims of Mirada
right violations because the warnings protect a fundamental trial right); Sawyer v.
Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2530 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that fundamental fairness encompasses more than accuracy of the guilt i ~ o c e n c edetermination); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 770-72 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that habeas should encompass all claims of fundamental constitutional
violations); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 320-23 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in
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I . The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
Recall that the three general issues of constitutional interpretation are the expansiveness with which rights should be
construed, their balanceability against other interests, and
their comparative equality. For rights-selectivists, we need t o
start with the third of these, because the key to the whole
vision is that rights-selectivists do not view all constitutional
rights as being equally important. Thus, the expansiveness
issue fades into the background, since no matter how many
rights are recognized or how broadly each right is construed,
the key question becomes whether it is one of the favored
rights entitled to vindication in habeas. As to balanceability,
rights-selectivists view the favored rights as nonbalanceable,
while the unimportant rights are balanced right out of habeas
jurisdiction.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. For rights-selectivists, the function of habeas as an extraordinary writ is t o vindicate favored rights. As to
those favored rights, rights-selectivists believe in all the goals
in which de novo litigation visionaries believe: vindicating constitutional rights of individual petitioners, deterring state
courts from under-construing the substance of federal rights,
pressuring states to make their systems more procedurally
favorable t o claimants, keeping the lower federal courts in
practice with respect to those rights and involved in the constitutional rights dialogue, and promoting uniformity in federal
law. But as to the rights deemed unfavored, rights-selectivists
do not believe that habeas has a h c t i o n t o serve.'l
the judgment) (arguing that the second exception to retroactivity should encompass
claims of fundamental unfairness); Kirnrnelrnan v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377-78
(1986) (joining majority opinion finding that Stone should not be extended to
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to raise Fourth Amendment claims, in part because the right to counsel is fundamental); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 498-99 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the character of the claim should be central to the habeas inquiry and that a Brady right is
hndamental); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S.527, 541 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the "historic ofken of habeas corpus is to remedy violations of hndamental fairness).
71. Even though Justice Stevens is the best example of a rights-selectivist, I
do not mean to suggest that he holds the doctrinaire version of the position that
would completely exclude fiom the ambit of habeas any right that was deemed not
to be favored. Rather, Justice Stevens adheres to the less doctrinaire position that
all rights (except Fourth Amendment ones where the petitioner had a full and fair
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b. History. Although Justice Stevens, the primary proponent of the rights-selectivist vision, has never constructed a
history of the writ to support his position,72it is possible to
generate a plausible history of at least the fundamental fairness version of this vision. One would begin with standard doctrine from the early 1800s that the writ was only available t o
remedy executive or legislative detentions, or judicial
and argue
detentions where the court lacked j~risdiction,~~
that what these detentions have in common is that they result
from the most hndamental sorts of errors. One would then
contend that this narrow scope of habeas review prevailed a t
the time Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, and
must have approximated what Congress had in mind for state
prisoners. Then, as to the important but muddled period from
1867 through 1953, One would note that while the Supreme
Court expanded the concept of "jurisdiction" to the point that it
became a judicial fi~tion,'~these expansions always came
opportunity to litigate in state court) should be cognizable, but the favored ones
are entitled to preferential treatment.
72. Justice Stevens' one partial effort to provide a history for his vision is
found in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 548 n.18 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
There, Justice Stevens argues that when Congress recodified the habeas statute in
1948 there were relatively few constitutional rules of criminal procedure, and
"those that did exist generally were not applicable to the States, and the scope of
habeas corpus relief was narrow." Id. Case law of the time period indicates that
constitutional rules applicable against the states were limited to those that constituted affronts to fundamental fairness. Thus, Justice Stevens concludes, consistent
with the intent of the 1948 Congress, which should still control to limit habeas to
claims involving fundamental unfairness:
This Court has long since rejected these restrictive notions of the
constitutional protections that are available to state criminal defendants.
Nevertheless, the point remains that the law today is very different from
what it was when the current habeas corpus statute was enacted in 1948.
The statute was amended in 1966, but the amendments merely added to,
and did not modify, the existing statutory language. Respected scholars
may argue forcefully to the contrary, but in my opinion a limitation of
habeas corpus relief to instances of fundamental unfairness is consistent
with the intent of the Congress that enacted 5 2254 in 1948.
Id.
73. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
74. The first expansion came in Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176
(1873) (holding that habeas jurisdiction will lie to hear a claim of allegedly illegal
sentence). The next expansion came in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77
(1879) (allowing habeas attack on the constitutionality of the statute creating the
offense). The fiction of "jurisdiction" was finally dispensed with by the Court in
Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1942) ("[Tlhe use of the writ in federal
courts to test the constitutional validity of a conviction of crime is not restricted to
those cases where the judgment of conviction is void for want of jurisdiction for
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when rights that were clearly "fundamental" were alleged t o
have been violated, such as the right to be free of a
mob-dominated trial.75Then, one would argue that Brown v.
Allen76did not radically expand the scope of the writ when it
held that all constitutional violations were cognizable in habeas
because, as of that time, there were relatively few federal criminal procedure constitutional rights and all of them were "fundamental." The final step in this historical reconstruction,
which is also the most controversial one, is the assertion that
the Warren Court was so protective of rights that it recognized
not only rights that were fundamental, but also rights that
were important enough t o be rights, yet not important enough
t o be funda~nental.~~
This is not actually a historical assertion,

the trial court to render it.").
75. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923); see also Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 468-67 (1938) (holding that a claimed denial of counsel can be raised
on habeas); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-15 (1935) (holding that a conviction procured through testimony known by the state authorities to be perjured
constitutes a violation of due process that will support habeas jurisdiction).
76. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see supra note 36.
77. Although he was not primarily a rights-selectivist, Judge Friendly set
forth this tenet of rights-selectivism quite well:
What I do challenge is the assumption that simply because a claim
can be characterized as "constitutional," it should necessarily constitute a
basis for collateral attack when there has been fair opportunity to litigate
i t a t trial and on appeal. Whatever may have been true when the Bill of
Rights was read to protect a state criminal defendant only if the state
had acted in a manner "repugnant to the conscience of mankind," [quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), overruled in part by
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)l the rule prevailing when Brown
v. Allen was decided, the "constitutional" label no longer assists in appraising how far society should go in permitting relitigation of criminal
convictions. I t carries a connotation of outrage-the mob-dominated jury,
the confession extorted by the rack, the defendant deprived of counsel-which is wholly misplaced when, for example, the claim is a pardonable but allegedly mistaken belief that probable cause existed for an arrest or that a statement by a person not available for cross-examination
came within an exception to the hearsay rule.
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.142, 156-57 (1970).
Justice Stevens made the same point:
I recognize the apparent incongruity in suggesting that there is a
class of constitutional error-not constitutionally harmless-that does not
render a criminal proceeding hndamentally unfair. It may be argued,
with considerable force, that a rule of procedure that is not necessary to
ensure fundamental fairness is not worthy of constitutional status. The
fact that such a category of constitutional error exists, however, is demonstrated by the jurisprudence of this Court concerning the retroactive application of newly recognized constitutional rights. In ruling that a consti-
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but a normative one based upon one's perceptions of the whole
panoply of rights recognized by the Warren Court, and in some
cases added to by the later, more conservative C o ~ r t . ' ~
Even if one is convinced that some constitutional rights are
significantly more important than others, one must still ask
whether the historical vision generated provides a convincing
rationale explaining why habeas should lie only to remedy
violations of favored rights, given that the habeas statute itself
does not discriminate among constitutional violations. Perhaps
proponents of this vision can attempt to buttress their subjective post-Warren Court history by arguing that habeas has long
been considered t o be an "extraordinary" writ, which connotes
that it is available only to remedy extraordinarily important
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l violation^.'^ E v e n h e r e , t h o u g h ,
tutional principle is not to be applied retroactively, the Court implicitly
suggests that the right is not necessary to ensure the integrity of the
underlying judgment; the Court certainly would not allow claims of such
magnitude to remain unremedied. . .
[Tlhese decisions demonstrate that the Court's constitutional jurisprudence has expanded beyond the concept of ensuring fundamental fairness
to the accused. My point here is simply that this expansion need not, and
should not, be applied to collateral attacks on final judgments.
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 543 n.8 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
78. The greatest expansion of constitutional criminal procedure rights by the
post-Warren Court is surely that relating to the death penalty. Since the decision
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 US. 238 (1972) (per curiam) striking down the Georgia
death penalty sentencing scheme, the Court's death penalty jurisprudence has
mushroomed. One of the most important cases for generating habeas issues is
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 US. 586, 604 (1978) ("[Tlhe Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.").
79. There is little doubt that the writ of habeas corpus is one of the writs
that were in earlier days deemed the "prerogative writs" and that more recently
have been called the "extraordinary writs." See supra note 13 and accompanying
text. The question is what the term "extraordinary" means. The idea that the writ
is "extraordinary" in the sense that it should be used sparingly has perhaps its
earliest voice in a dissent by Justice Reed:
Respect for the theory and practice of our dual system of government
requires that federal courts intervene by habeas corpus in state criminal
prosecutions only in exceptional circumstances. . . . [Dlue regard for a
state's system of justice admonishes federal courts to be chary of allowing
the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus where the accused, without excuse, has not exhausted the remedies offered by the State to redress
violations of federal constitutional rights.
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 691-92 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting). Fifteen years
later, Justice Stewart, speaking for himself and three other dissenters in Townsend

.
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rights-selectivists run into a problem, because an older understanding of what makes the writ "extraordinary" is that it is
able to cut through all procedural forms and go directly to the
substance of the constitutional claim at issue, not that it is
limited to protecting only extraordinarily important rights."
The version of the selectivist vision that favors those rights
related to the accuracy of the guilt/imocence determination
fares worse in terms of the writ's history than does the fundamental rights version. To demonstrate this, one need only note
that the most firmly grounded historical basis for habeas relief
from a judicial detention-that the convicting court lacked
jurisdiction8'-does not fall into the category of rights that
relate t o the accuracy of the guilt/innocence determination.
Thus, this version of the rights-selectivist vision is demonstrably anti-historical. As to the structural/trial defect vision, it
seems equally difficult t o make a plausible historical case.
v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 327 (1963) sounded the same note: "[Habeas corpus] is essentially an extraordinary writ, designed to do justice in extraordinary and often
unpredictable situations." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). The idea that the writ is
extraordinary in this sense was first enunciated in a majority opinion in Hensley
v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973). "Since habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy whose operation is to a large extent uninhibited by traditional rules of finality and federalism, its use has been limited to cases of special urgency, leaving
more conventional remedies for cases in which restraints on liberty are neither
severe nor immediate." Id. a t 351. The idea found voice again through Justice
Powell in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) ("This accommodation [of finality concerns with expansions of the role of
the writ] can best be achieved, with due regard to all of the values implicated, by
recourse to the central reason for habeas corpus: the affording of means, through
an extraordinary writ, of redressing an unjust incarceration."). By 1983 the conservatives were clearly in control of the Court and a majority held that "[flederal
courts are not forums in which to 'relitigate state trials.'" Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880, 887 (1983). The majority reiterated, in two recent cases, that the writ is
"extraordinary" in this sense. See McFarland v. Scott, 114 S. Ct. 2568, 2574 (1994)
(citing Barefoot for the proposition that "the Great Writ is an extraordinary remedy
that should not be employed to 'relitigate state trials'"); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113
S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993) (Yn keeping with this distinction [between the primary
nature of the state proceedings and the secondary and limited nature of the habeas proceedings], the writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded as an
extraordinary remedy, 'a bulwark against convictions that violate "fbndamental
fairness."'") (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126 (1982) (quoting Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 US. 72, 97 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
80. Justice Holmes expressed this conception when he stated, "that habeas
corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure. I t
comes in from the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and although
every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they have been
more than an empty shell." Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes,
J., dissenting).
81. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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c. Federalism. As should be clear from the foregoing
discussion, rights-selectivists are not at all solicitous of claimed
state interests when the error involved is of the favored variety, but are very solicitous of the state's interests when the
right at issue is not of the favored variety.
d . Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Rights-selectivists juxtapose the narrow scope of habeas
that must have existed in Congress's mind when it enacted the
1867 Act with the broad expanse of constitutional rights that
exists in the post-Warren Court era. This is the basis for an
argument that because the legal landscape has so significantly
changed, the legislative intent of the originating Congress is
not particularly enlightening as t o the current proper scope of
the writ. Thus, according to rights-selectivists, the Court
should fill interstices in the habeas statutes to further the
basic underlying policy of the 1867 Congress, which, they argue, was t o assure a federal forum for the vindication of important federal constitutional rights. While this category of important rights is certainly significantly larger than it was in
1867-when the category seemingly only included the right not
t o be tried by a court acting outside its jurisdiction-the category does not include all of the rights discovered during the due
process revolution that began in the 1960s.
3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation

When the right involved is one of the favored ones,
rights-selectivists show little sympathy for the claimed costs of
habeas litigation. If the right is not of the favored kind, however, rights-selectivists view its inclusion within habeas jurisdiction as cluttering the federal docket and distracting district
courts from their real mission of vindicating favored rights in
habeas cases. In light of the importance of death pen.alty cases
in habeas jurisprudence, rights-selectivists, if Justice Stevens is
representative, tend to view the rights pertaining to the sentencing phase in death penalty cases as within the category of
favored rights,82either under the theory that they are funda-

82. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2531-36 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing for a broader definition of "actual innocence" of a death sentence than the majority's view); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758, 7621
(1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (joining the stinging dissent by Justice Blackmun
to the Court's handling of issues in a death penalty case); McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467, 516-18 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (joining a dissenting opinion de-

766

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

mental, or under the theory that the accuracy of the "death
guilty"/"death innocent" determination is the functional equivalent of the accuracy of the guiltJinnocence determination as t o
the conviction.

D. Vision Four: The Innocence-Selectivist Vision
We have just seen one way of limiting the writ's availability based on permitting only certain types of constitutional
claims t o be litigated. Another way t o limit the writ's availability is to permit only certain litigants to pursue the remedy. This
is the approach of the proponents of the fourth vision, who
believe that only petitioners who can allege that they are actually innocents3 should be allowed to pursue habeas t o vindicate constitutional violations.
As with the rights-selectivist vision, there is a doctrinaire
position and a less doctrinaire one. The doctrinaire position
contends that only persons who have a claim of actual innocence should even be permitted t o pursue habeas, while the

ploring a petitioner-unfavorable standard for abusive petitions); Butler v. McKellar,
494 U.S. 407, 417 (1990) ( B r e ~ a n ,J., dissenting) (joining a stinging dissent regarding the Court's handling of retroactivity in a death penalty case); Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 545 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that, as on
direct review, in habeas "death is a different kind of punishment from any other
which may be imposed in this country").
83. A key question, of course, is what exactly does the term " i ~ o c e n t "mean?
At least three meanings are possible. The first casts an affirmative burden on the
petitioner to show that he or she did not commit the crime. One assumes that
such proof would usually consist either of compelling evidence that some other
specific person committed the crime, or that the petitioner could not have committed the crime, e.g., petitioner's DNA markers are inconsistent with blood that was
concededly left a t the scene by the accused killer. The second, much more
petitioner-favorable definition, would require the petitioner to show that if everything had gone according to the constitutional rules, the trier of f a d might have
entertained a reasonable doubt about the petitioner's guilt. Judge Friendly suggested a third definition that is not as tough on petitioners as the fwst, but tougher
than the second:
[Tlhe petitioner for collateral attack must show a fair probability that,
in light of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally
admitted (but with due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence
tenably claimed t o have been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial, the trier of the facts would have entertained a
reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Friendly, supra note 77, a t 160. The Court has adopted verbatim Judge Friendly's
formulation, a t least as to successive petitions. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436,
454 n.17 (1986). See generally Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway of
Innocence for Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV.
943, 978-86 (1994) (discussing possible definitions of "innocent").
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less doctrinaire position asserts that all persons with constitutional claims should be allowed to pursue habeas, but those
who can supplement with a claim of actual innocence should be
preferred when it comes to excusing procedural defaults, allowing multiple petitions, etc. As with the rights-selectivist vision,
I will explicate the more doctrinaire version of this vision.
Most of the recent conservative Justices have been at least
partially innocence-selectivists, with Justice Powell probably
being the leader.84 Judge Henry Friendly also championed
this idea in a law review articleOs5

1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
The three issues, expansiveness, balanceability, and equality, virtually fade into the background as t o this vision because
the key to the vision hinges not on the legal attributes of the
rights involved, but upon the factual innocence of the petitioner.
2. The four theoretical issues specifk to habeas

a. Function. Innocence-selectivists have a very narrow
vision of the writ's function: it exists solely to vindicate the constitutional rights of petitioners who are factually innocent of
the crime. The narrowness of this vision of function is apparent
when it is contrasted with the broad vision of functions held by
de nouo litigation visionaries that habeas should be available to
vindicate the constitutional rights of all constitutionally
wronged petitioners. Innocence-selectivists do not believe in
any of the functions of habeas that are grounded in the federal
nature of our system. Since so few petitioners will be able to
allege the necessary claim of innocence, there will not be a
great enough number of habeas cases to deter state courts from
construing the substance of federal rights too narrowly, force
states to reform their post-conviction processes to the benefit of
petitioners, keep federal courts involved in constitutional crimi-

84. Justice Powell first expounded his innocence-selectivist vision in
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 265-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). He
wrote innocence as a significant factor into the majority decision in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976) and wrote the opinion in Kuhlrna~v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-54 (1986) which requires a colorable showing of innocence
before a habeas court can consider a successive petition.
85. See Friendly, supra note 77.
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nal procedure adjudication on a broad scale, or promote the
uniformity of federal law.
b. History. There was no history supporting this vision
until 1968, when Justice Black suggested that only petitioners
who have a colorable claim of innocence should be entitled t o
pursue habeas relief? Judge Henry Friendly picked up on
this suggestion in what turned out t o be an influential law
review article published in 1970 entitled Is Innocence Irreleant?.^' Friendly answered this question with a resounding
no: a "colorable showing" of innocence should be a prerequisite
t o a habeas petition." It is important to note that Friendly
put forth this idea as a proposal for legislative change, not as a
prescription for how courts could change the law, let alone as a
description of existing law." Justice Black's and Judge
Friendly's suggestion caught the fancy of Justice Powell, and
formed the basis for his concurring opinion in a 1973 case?'
Innocence as a factor in habeas law made the leap t o a majority opinion in Stone u. Powellg1in 1976, and since then has put
in regular appearance^.^^ Thus, innocence in habeas law has a
history of sorts, though a very short one.
c. Federalism. The upshot of the innocence-selectivist
vision is that state criminal processes will be almost completely
free of federal court intenrention, since it is a very small per-

86. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
("In [habeas corpus] collateral attacks . . . I would always require that the convicted defendant raise the kind of constitutional claim that casts some shadow of a
doubt on his guilt.").
87. Friendly, supra note 77.
88. Id. a t 160.
89. Id. at 143 (arguing that the requirement that the petitioner supplement
the constitutional claim with a colorable claim of innocence "ought to be the law
and . . that legislation can and should make it so") (emphasis added).
90. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US. 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
91. 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31 (1976).
92. See, e.g., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1767-68 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that innocence is the most significant countervailing consideration to finality); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct.
1710, 1729 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[ilf there is a unifying
theme to this Court's habeas jurisprudence, i t is that the ultimate equity [of actual
is sufficient by itself to permit plenary reinnocence] on the prisoner's side
view") (citing Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1757); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496
(1986) (creating an actual innocence exception to the "cause" and "prejudice" requirement); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 451-54 (1986) (establishing the
requirement of a colorable showing of innocence before a federal court can entertain a successive petition).

.
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centage of petitioners who can, as a practical matter, allege
both a constitutional violation and a colorable claim of factual
innocence. As to that very s m d l percentage, federal intervention is appropriate.
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Innocence-selectivists who believe that this vision can be
effectuated by the Supreme Court necessarily believe that the
Court has broad-ranging power to judicially rework the meaning of the habeas statute, since there is no plausible argument
that the 1867 Congress (or any subsequent one) intended the
habeas statutes to be limited in their application to petitioners
who have a n arguable claim of factual innocence.

3. The practical issue-the effects of habeas litigation
Innocence-selectivists focus on the costs of habeas litigation, and have a great deal of sympathy for both state authorities, who must combat seemingly endless post-conviction litigation proceedings by convicts seemingly having little better to do
to pass the time, and overworked federal courts that are flooded with petitions that are mostly pro se, sloppy, meritless, and,
most importantly, do not state colorable claims of factual innocence. Indeed, it was the flood tide of post-Warren Court habeas petitions that evoked Judge Friendly's article in the first
place.g3 T h e only c o u n t e r v a i l i n g benefit t h a t
innocence-selectivists view as capable of outweighing these
costs is the benefit of releasing a person who actually did not
commit the crime for which that person was convicted.

E. Vision Five: The One-Fair-ChanceVision
The two preceding visions showed two different ways of
limiting the scope of habeas: by limiting it to certain types of
claims, or by limiting it to certain petitioners. Yet a third way
of limiting habeas is by only permiting litigants whose cases
are in a certain procedural posture to pursue it. This is the
route taken by proponents of this fifth vision, who see habeas
as a n appropriate remedy only when the petitioner did not
have one-fair-chance to litigate the constitutional claim in state
court. A basic premise of this vision is stated by its originator
and foremost academic champion the late Professor Paul Bator.
"[Ilf a job can be well done once, it should not be done
93. Friendly, supra note 77, at 143-44.
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twice."g4 Most, if not all, of the recent conservative Justices
have been strongly influenced by the one-fair-chance vision,
with Justices Scalia and Thomas seeming to be most thoroughly ~onvinced.'~
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
While the one-fair-chance vision does not dictate that its
proponents be "conservative" with respect to these issues of
constitutional interpretation, as a practical matter most proponents of the one-fair-chance vision are conservatives who are
non-expansivist as to interpretation of rights, believe that other
interests can be balanced against rights, and do not believe
that all rights are equally important. It is probable that the
coincidence between the one-fair-chance vision and the conservative nature of its proponents lies in the fact that this vision
views state courts as the primary adjudicators of issues that
arise in state criminal prosecutions, with the federal courts
serving only a secondary and backstopping role.96This is the
position that accords with the conservative belief in a broad
sphere of state authority.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. Compared with the functions of habeas
espoused by the de novo litigation vision, the functions envisioned by one-fair-chance visionaries are quite limited. The
one-fair-chance vision does believe in the vindication of individual rights, but only when the petitioner did not have a chance
to have those rights vindicated during the state proceeding. As
a practical matter, since all states have many procedural opportunities for defendants to raise constitutional issues, it is rare
that a defendant will not have had one-fair-chance to litigate
the constitutional claim.g7Since this will be a relatively rare
94. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for
State Prisoners, 76 H A W . L. REV. 441, 451 (1963).
95. Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1768 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Prior opportunity to litigate an issue should be an
important equitable consideration in any habeas case, and should ordinarily preclude the court from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to the fairness
of the trial process or to the accuracy of the ultimate result.").
96. Yackle, Misadventures, supm note 15, a t 389-91 (explaining that Bator's
thesis relies on the proposition that state courts are the primary adjudicators of
criminal cases).
97. All states provide mechanisms for presenting federal constitutional issues,
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circumstance, one-fair-chance visionaries do not believe that
habeas serves to deter state courts from too narrowly construing the substance of federal rights. Indeed, one of the most
significant aspects of the one-fair-chance vision is that it exercises no control whatsoever over state court interpretations of
federal constitutional criminal procedure law: As long as the
state has provided a N 1 and fair opportunity to litigate the
matter, the state court judgment should stand even if it appears to be patently wrong. One function on which the
one-fair-chance proponent can agree with the de novo litigation
proponent is that habeas should have a tendency t o force state
courts to provide procedural opportunities for petitioners to
have claims resolved at the state level (as discussed above,
states have developed such procedures, probably more because
of the spectre of direct review of their decisions than the more
remote spectre of collateral habeas corpus review). Finally,
one-fair-chance visionaries do not see any special benefit in
keeping federal district courts involved in litigation of federal
constitutional issues. In the view of these visionaries, the state
and federal courts are fungible when it comes to making federal constitutional criminal procedure doctrine, and state courts
are as likely to promote uniformity as are federal ones.
b. History. Professor Bator provided this vision's history
in his famous 1963 law review article.g8Bator argued that
prior to the 1867 Act it was quite clear that the only kind of
defect that could be remedied in habeas corpus, when the incarceration was the result of judicially authorized detention,
He then argued that Congress
was failure of jurisdi~tion.~~
probably did not have more expansive visions of habeas in
mind when it enacted the Act of 1867.1°0Bator then plunged

both pretrial and during the trial. "[Florty-seven states . . . provide the criminal
defendant with the right to appeal a t least once without obtaining prior court
approval. The remaining states furnish discretionary procedures that are tantamount to an appeal as of right." Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional
Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503, 513-14 (1992). Further, all
states now provide post-conviction remedies in addition to appeal. See YACKLE,
POSTCONVIC!TION,supra note 15, $ 13.
98. Bator, supra note 94, a t 463-499.
99. Id. at 466 (quoting Ex parte Watkins, 28 US. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830)).
100. Id. at 475. Bater states that:
I t would, then, require rather overwhelming evidence to show that it
was the purpose of the legislature to tear habeas corpus entirely out of
the context of its historical meaning and scope and convert it into an
ordinary writ of error with respect to all federal questions in all criminal
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into the murky waters of the period from 1867 to 1953, subdividing it into segments, and examining first the era from 1867
t o 1915.1°' During this period the Supreme Court judicially
stretched the definition of "jurisdiction" to encompass attacks
on illegal sentenceslo2and statutes alleged to be unconstitutional.lo3 Then, in 1915, the Court decided Frank
Mangum,lo4a case that is "crucial" to Bator's analysis.lo5
that case, according t o Bator,
[flor the first time the Court explicitly added a crucial weapon
to the arsenal of the habeas corpus court: if that court finds
that a state tribunal has failed to supply "corrective process"
with respect to the h l l and fair litigation of federal questions,
whether or not "jurisdictional," in a state criminal proceeding,
a court on habeas may appropriately inquire into the merits
in order to determine whether the detention is law-f!ul.106

According to Bator, the Court in Frank divined the true mission of federal habeas corpus: to examine the merits of constitutional claims where the petitioner did not have an opportunity to litigate those claims fairly in state court.'" Bator proceeds t o attempt to harmonize subsequent cases with this proposition from Frank, and concludes that as of 1953 the power of
federal habeas courts extended only to claims of lack of jurisdiction, illegal sentences, unconstitutionality of statutes, and
claims as t o which the state had failed t o provide one fair opportunity for litigation.'" Thus, t o Bator, the 1953 decision in
cases.
The strikingly sparse legislative history does not seem to me to furnish such evidence.

Id.
101. Id. at 463-99.
102. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176-77 (1873), discussed in Bator,
supm note 94 at 467-74.
103. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376-77 (1879); see Bator, supra note 94,
a t 468-74.
104. 237 U.S.309 (1915).
105. Bator, supra note 94, at 484. See generally id. at 484-93.
106. Id. at 486438.
107. Id.
108. Id. a t 488-96. The most difficult case for Bator to harmonize is Moore v.
Dempsey, in which one of the dissenters accused the majority of overruling Frank.
See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 93-95 (1923) (McReynolds, J., dissenting). Both
Moore and Frank involved claims that the defendants' trials in the state court had
been overtaken by mob domination. The Court in Frank had held that the state
court verdict would be permitted to stand because the state appellate court, upon
full investigation, had determined that the trial was not mob-dominated. Frank v.
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Brown u. Allen1o9constituted a radical expansion of federal
Mangum, 237 U.S. a t 335-36. In Moore, the state appellate court apparently had
made no findings with respect to the mob domination claim, and the Supreme
Court held that in that situation the federal habeas court must litigate the claim
de novo. As to Moore, Bator says:
Though the opinion is admittedly far from clear, all Moore v. Dempsey
may be saying, then, is that a conclusory and out-of-hand rejection by a
state of a claim of violation of federal right, without any process of inquiry being afforded a t all, c a ~ o insulate
t
the merits of the question from
the habeas corpus court: if the state's findings are to "count," they must
be reasoned findings rationally reached through fair procedures. So
viewed, the case is entirely consistent with Frank.
Bator, supra note 94, a t 489.
Bator then deals with Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), which
held "that a conviction procured through testimony known by the state authorities
to be perjured, results in a [violation] of due process." Bator, supra note 94, a t
490. According to Bator, the holding of the case is that "the state is 'required'
under Fmnk and Moore to afford corrective process, and in its absence, federal
habeas will be available." Bator, supra note 94, at 491. Bator then turns to a trio
of cases, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (holding that a claim of denial of counsel can be heard in habeas), Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286
(1941) and Waley v. Johnston, 316 U S . 101, 104-5 (1942) (both permitting litigation in habeas of the claim that the defendant was forced to plead guilty). See.
Bator, supra note 94, a t 493-96. According to Bator, these cases are consistent
with the one-fairchance vision because denial of right to counsel, or a coerced
guilty plea, deprives the defendant of the one-fairchance to contest the charges.
Bator, supra note 94, a t 493-95. Finally, Bator finds language in three state prisoner habeas cases supporting the proposition that the federal court should hear the
claim in habeas only if the state courts did not give the petitioner a fair opportunity to litigate the claim. See Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1944); House
v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46-48 (1945); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 766-67 (1945);
Bator, supra note 94, a t 495-99.
Bator acknowledges, however, that the case law of the era does not unambiguously support his position:
I do not mean to give a picture of the law of this time which is neater than it actually was. The Court did not, after Frank, give any rounded
consideration to the reaches and purposes of the habeas jurisdiction. Most
of the cases of the period are explicitly concerned not with the problem of
relitigation of federal questions already canvassed in state courts, but
with the complications created by the exhaustion doctrine and with the
vexing question whether a prisoner must seek direct Supreme Court review of a state judgment as a condition of the right to seek habeas carpus. . . . And there are some opinions which could be taken to intimate
that the writ automatically reaches the merits of all federal constitutional
questions. Furthermore, there can be no doubt that, by 1952, the integrity
and continuing authority of the doctrine of Frank v. Mangum had been
endangered, a s it were, on several occasions.
Bator, supra note 94, at 496-98 (citations omitted). The cases Bator cites, which he
believes could be taken to stand for the proposition that the writ reaches the merits of all federal constitutional questions, are Darr v. Burford, 339 U S . 200 (1950),
overrzded in part by Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948); and Jennings v. Illinois, 342 U.S.104 (1951). See Bator, supra note 94,
a t 497-98 n.155.
109. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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habeas power to encompass all claims of federal constitutional
violation, even if those claims had been fully and fairly litigated in state court.'1° To Bator the result in Brown was anomalous, both in terms of being inconsistent with the writ's history,
and being contrary to the common sense proposition that if a
job has been done once i n state court there is no good reason to
do it again in federal court, given that state and federal courts
are essentially fungible in determining the merits of federal
constitutional issues. 'l
Bator's article was published at an unpropitious moment:
a t the height of the Warren Court-activist era, just before the
Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy." More than a decade
later, however, when the conservatives on the Burger Court
gained influence, Bator's thesis was resurrected and since has
become a bedrock statement of both the writ's history and function for several conservative justice^."^
c. Federalism. The foregoing discussion makes clear the
one-fair-chance vision's view of federalism: state courts and
federal courts are fungible when it comes to adjudicating federal constitutional issues-after all, state court judges are equally bound to uphold the Federal Constitution. As Bator put it,
[tlhere is no intrinsic reason why the fact that a man is a
federal judge should make him more competent, or conscientious, or learned with respect to the applicable federal law
than his neighbor in the state courthouse. The federal judge
is more "correct" under the present system only because our
institutional arrangements make him authoritative.l14

d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Proponents of the one-fair-chance vision necessarily believes that there is great power in the Supreme Court to create
the boundaries of federal habeas power. This is true inasmuch

110. Bator, supra note 94, at 500.
111. Id. at 502-06.
112. The liberal majority in Fay took note of Bator's article and disagreed with
the point it noted, finding the argument that Frank established a one-fair-chance
principle that was left untouched by Moore "untenable." Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
421 11.30 (1963).
113. Eighteen years later, looking back on his own article, Bator noted that it
"had the strange history of being pronounced dead almost as soon as it was written, only to enjoy a mysterious recent resurrection." Paul M. Bator, The State
Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARYL. REV. 605, 613
(1981).
114. Bator, supra note 94, at 509.
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as the one-fair-chance principle that Bator purports to have
found in Frank u. Mangum115 was clearly not part of the
original legislative intent of the Congress that passed the 1867
Act. This is also borne out by the fact that even as the
one-fair-chance doctrine has grown in ascendancy in Supreme
Court case law, at the same time Congress has repeatedly
rejected proposed amendments to the habeas corpus statute
that would essentially embody the one-fair-chance principle. l6
3. The practical issue-the effectsof habeas litigation
Proponents of the one-fair-chance vision see benefits from
habeas jurisdiction only where the federal court is deciding an
issue as to which the petitioner did not have a fair chance to
litigate in state court. In that situation, one-fair-chance proponents acknowledge the benefit of vindicating the rights of the
petitioner. But when a petitioner brings a claim that has already been litigated unsuccessfully in state court, proponents of
the one-fair-chancevision see no benefits to federal jurisdiction,
only costs. The costs, of course, are the well known ones of
burdening the prosecuting authorities and federal judges, as
well as undermining the very notion that a criminal case can
reach a final judgment of guilt."' No benefit can be derived
from such proceedings, according to these visionaries, even if
the petitioner is successful in federal court: there is no reason
t o believe that the federal court's decision in the petitioner's
favor is any more "correct" than the state court decision against

115. 237 U.S. 309 (1915). See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
116. Liebman, supra note 5, at 2084 & n.526 (noting that at least 34 times
between 1953 and 1992 Congress considered bills that would have limited habeas
jurisdiction, many of which were based on the one-fair-chance principle).
117. Bator, supra note 94, at 444-53.
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the petitioner's claim."8 Thus, the relitigation results only in
a different result, not a better one.

F. Vision Six: The Inverse Correlation Vision
The inverse correlation vision postulates that federal habeas power should be broad when state courts are not properly
enforcing the substance of federal constitutional rights, but
should be narrow when state courts are doing a good job of
enforcing those rights. Under this vision the federal habeas
power is not static, but expands when it is needed to counteract
state recalcitrance, and then contracts when state recalcitrance
diminishes. Hints of this vision appear in academic literawhen
ture,llg and in the Court's habeas jurispr~dence,'~~

118. As Bator puts it:
After all, there is no ultimate guarantee that any tribunal arrived a t the
correct result; the conclusions of a habeas corpus court, or of any number
of habeas corpus courts, that the facts were X and that on X facts Y law
applies are not infallible; if the existence uel m n of mistake determines
the lawfulness of the judgment, there can be no escape from a literally
endless relitigation of the merits because the possibility of mistake always
exists. . . . What seems so objectionable is second-guessing merely for the
sake of second-guessing, in the service of the illusory notion that if we
only try hard enough we will find the "truth."
Id. at 447, 451.
119. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 818 ("If the habeas courts were indeed
the Supreme Court's foots~ldiers[during the Warren Court era] in the due process
revolution, then a change in the nature of that conscription logically should follow
the Court's changing philosophy of criminal constitutional law and renewed trust of
state courts."); Hughes, supra note 16, a t 328 ("The federal habeas revolution has
been attacked and curbed and is now being turned around. Swings of the pendulum are a natural part of the rhythm of affairs and need not always be viewed
with great alarm."); Max rose^, The Great W r i G A Refkction of Societal Change,
44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 364 (1983) (explaining that while the Warren Court habeas
cases broadening the scope of the writ "may now seem extreme to some, but they
may, nonetheless, have served a useful and important purpose when they were announced. The new rules helped implement a widely heralded civil rights movement
that had begun in the early 1950s to arouse the conscience of America."). Even
Professor Bator acknowledged the seductiveness of the idea of expanding federal
habeas jurisdiction when state courts are untrustworthy in enforcing federal rights.
There is surely appeal in the notion, and perhaps it makes sense a t a
time when there still is a justified suspicion and distrust of statecourt
rulings as to federal constitutional rights, to have a jurisdiction with a
large and roving commission "to prevent a complete miscarriage of justice . . . ."
Bator, supra note 94, at 525 (citation omitted). Bator, however, was stalwart
enough to resist this notion:
Similarly, I resist the notion that sound remedial institutions can be built
on the premise that state judges are not in sympathy with federal law.
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the Court discusses whether state court judges need t o be deterred from too narrowly construing federal constitutional
protections.

1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
The three issues of constitutional interpretation--expansiveness, balanceability and equality-are not as
important in this vision because the focus is on the trustworthiness of state courts rather than on the characteristics of rights.
For example, a person could be a liberal expansivist as to constitutional rights, yet still be satisfied with a limited role for
habeas if that person were convinced that the state courts were
enforcing constitutional rights effectively. As a practical matter,
however, liberals generally tend to favor federal power and,
thus, do not tend t o be inverse correlationists.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. Inverse correlation visionaries believe in
the first three functions of habeas in which de novo litigation
visionaries believe: vindicating individual rights, deterring
state courts from too narrowly construing the substance of
federal rights, and pressuring state courts into improved procedures for vindication of federal rights. The big difference between de novo litigation visionaries and inverse correlation

Again we must think in terms of tomorrow as well as today. Hopefully
we will reach the day when the suspicion will no longer be justified that
state judges-especially Southern state judges--evade their responsibilities
by giving only the appearance of fairness in their rulings as to state
defendants' federal rights.
Id. at 524.
120. In Fay, the majority never explicitly stated a distrust of state courts, but
the whole thrust of the opinion indicates this belief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963). The pendulum swung by the time of Stone, where the majority stated, W e
are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several
States." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976). Since then the pendulum
has swung back and forth. Contrast, for example, two 1993 cases, Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1721 (1993) (opining that state judges do not need
deterring), with Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1755 (1993) (arguing that
permitting the enforcement of Miranda claims through habeas will a d as a beneficial deterrent to state courts). See also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-07
(1989) (acknowledging the need to deter state courts as a significant aspect of
habeas); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 563 (1979) (holding that there is beneficial
deterrent value from enforcing claims in habeas relating to the selection of a grand
jury).
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visionaries with respect to function is that the former believe
the federal courts constitute a front line forum in the battle for
constitutional rights, while the latter believe that federal courts
provide a backup mechanism in case the front-line state courts
fail t o fulfill their obligations. Thus, inverse correlationists
don't put much stock in the other three habeas functions urged
by de nouo litigation visionaries: keeping federal courts in practice, promoting state-federal dialogue, and seeking uniformity
in federal law.
b. History. Although I know of no existing attempt t o
provide a history for the inverse correlation vision, a plausible
one can be created. One would begin in the Reconstruction era
and state the unassailable conclusion that the 1867 Act was
promulgated for the very reason that state courts in the South
were refusing to enforce federal constitutional obligations. One
would then note that Congress signaled the Supreme Court,
once Reconstruction fervor had died down, to judicially limit
the wide scope of habeas corpus,121which the Supreme Court
promptly did when it established the exhaustion of state remedies requirement? We would then skip ahead to Frank u.
MangumlB in 1915 as an indication that the federal courts
would stand ready t o remedy egregious constitutional violations
for which the state courts did not provide a remedy. The gradual expansion of the writ thereafter until the culmination in
Brown u. Allenla could be explained as a result of the increasing recognition that state court criminal justice was in
many ways primitive and in need of unifying federal oversight.
The Warren Court met this need by federalizing criminal procedure law, and expanding habeas via its 1963 trilogy to empower federal district courts to police this criminal procedure revolution. Our history would finish with an assertion that is ac-

121. Professor Liebman synthesizes the history on this point. Liebman, supra
note 5, at 2064-69. In 1868, Congress passed an a d that withdrew the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction under the 1867 habeas corpus statute. See Act of March 27,
1868, ch. 34, 15 Stat. 44. In 1885 Congress restored the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the 1867 statute. See A d of March 3, 1885, ch. 353, 23 Stat. 437. At
the same time Congress invited the Supreme Court, in light of the restored right
to appeal, to define "the true extent of the Act of 1867, and the true limits of the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts and judges under it" so that Congress could determine "whether further legislation is necessary." H.R.REP. NO. 730, 48th Cong.,
1st Sess., at 6 (1885).
122. Ex park Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1886).
123. 237 US. 309, 329-30 (1915).
124. 344 U.S. 443 (1953); see supra note 36.
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knowledged even by most liberals: generally state courts have,
for the last couple of decades, tried their best to correctly apply
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine as promulgated by
the Supreme Court.125 Based on this perception, inverse
correlationists contend that federal habeas today should be a
rather limited remedy that exists to catch those relatively few
instances in which the state courts have egregiously failed to
perform their constitutional duties.
c. Federalism. To an inverse correlation visionary, state
courts have the capacity t o be just as effective in enforcing federal constitutional rights as are federal courts. The key question for an inverse correlationist is whether the state courts at
a given point in time have the inclination to hK1l that capacity. If they do, then the federal habeas role is of a secondary
nature.
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. Proponents of the inverse correlation vision can argue that
their vision most truly Wills the actual intent of the 1867
Congress. This vision relies not on the explicit language of the
statute-which is quite broad and gives no indication that the
writ's scope should expand and contract in changing circumstances-but rather on the underlying purpose of Congress that
the federal courts stand ready to enforce constitutional rights
when state courts were unwilling to do so. Proponents of this
vision would point out that Congress has, for the most part, acquiesced to both the expansions of the writ by the Warren
Court, and the subsequent contractions by more conservative
courts.126This could be taken as an indication that Congress

125. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
126. See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 5, a t 707 ("[V]irtually all ingredients of
federal habeas law were a ~ o u n c e dwithout statutory authority. At least since
1886, federal habeas law has developed by judicial innovation, followed (sometimes)
by legislative ratification."). The habeas statutes have been significantly revised
only twice. The first significant amendments after 1867 occurred in 1948, but they
altered the basic form and ftndion of federal habeas corpus very little. "Indeed,
most of the new provisions only wrote the specifics of Supreme Court decisions
supra note 15, $ 19 a t 90. The
into the statute book." YACKLE,POSI'CONVICTION,
second significant revision occurred in 1966. At least some of the 1966 amendments were prompted by the Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy and signified
Congress's intent to tighten habeas jurisdiction. Probably the most significant of
the 1966 revisions was the addition of 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(d), which granted a presumption of correctness to properly arrived a t state court factual determinations.
As Professor Weisselberg has demonstrated, this amendment had a dramatic effect
on the percentage of state petitioners who received evidentiary hearings.
Weisselberg, supra note 6, at 167-68.
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has accepted and, indeed, ratifed the Court's role as expander
and contractor of habeas doctrine in keeping with the relative
willingness of state courts to enforce federal rights.

3. The practical issue of the efects of habeas litigation
Under the inverse correlation vision the costs and benefits
of federal habeas litigation change over time. When state
courts are unwilling t o enforce federal rights, then the benefits
of habeas litigation far outweigh its costs. On the other hand,
when state courts show themselves generally willing to enforce
federal rights the costs of redundant and protracted litigation
outweigh the benefits.

G. Vision Seven: The Equitable Remedy Vision
The vision of habeas as an equitable remedy argues that
each habeas case is unique, and that few, if any, general principles of habeas law are necessary t o justly decide habeas cases.
Rather, the habeas court should look at several factors including, but not limited to, the importance of the right involved, the
egregiousness of the claimed violation, the skill with which the
petitioner was represented in the state courts, the penalty
imposed on the petitioner (with particular concern for whether
the sentence was death), the diligence of the petitioner's attempt t o assert the claim, and the inability of the petitioner to
state a claim because the state authorities have somehow obstructed the process. After considering these and other pertinent factors, the federal habeas court should render a just
decision. Thus, for example, with respect t o a procedurally
defaulted claim, the habeas court should not apply a general
rule that defaulted claims are barred, but instead should look
at all factors to see whether justice requires that the federal
court honor the procedural bar in the particular case before it.
Justice Stevens is the best exemplar of this vision along with,
as was pointed out earlier,ln being a rights-selectivist. In-

127. Justice Stevens' rights-selectivist ideas are discussed supra, notes 66-68.
The most prominent landmarks along the trail of Justice Stevens' equitable remedy
vision include Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U S . 72, 95-96 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring).
[I]f the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an express waiver
by the defendant himself may sometimes be excused. Matters such as the
competence of counsel, the procedural context in which the asserted waiver occurred, the character of the constitutional right at stake, and the
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deed, the two visions are highly compatible because one of the
significant factors equity considers is the nature of the right
claimed to have been violated.

1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation
A proponent of the equitable remedy vision need not espouse any particular position concerning expansiveness of interpretation of constitutional rights, but necessarily needs to
espouse a particular position concerning their balanceability
and equality. Clearly, such a visionary must believe rights to
be balanceable, inasmuch as other factors which equity considers can outweigh a right's vindication. Similarly, such a visionary believes that rights are unequal, with some rights more
powerful and thus in need of vindication than are others.
2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. To an equitable remedy visionary, the mission of habeas corpus is to do justice. Thus, it focuses on the
vindication of individual rights, and pays little heed t o proposed systemic goals such as deterring state courts, spurring
state systems to change their procedures, and keeping federal
courts involved in the dialogue. The equitable remedy vision
implicitly eschews uniformity of federal law as a goal, since
justice may require, for example, on the facts of one case, that
a procedural default be respected, while on different facts in
another case an identical procedural default should be ignored.
Further, different federal district judges will have different
ideas of what is just on the facts of any given case.
6. History. The idea that habeas is an equitable remedy
has a relatively short history. The first connection between
habeas and equity in Supreme Court jurisprudence occurred in
an opinion by Justice Frankfurter in 1953? The habeoverall fairness of the entire proceeding, may be more significant than the
language of the test the Court purports to apply.
Id. (footnote omitted); see K u h l m a ~v. Wilson, 477 US. 436, 476 (1986) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (arguing that a colorable claim of innocence is but one of the factors, and not always an essential one, in determining whether the "ends of justice"
require a federal habeas court to consider a successive petition); Murray v. Carrier,
477 U.S. 478, 498-506 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing
that several factors should go into determining whether the federal court should
ignore a state procedural default).
128. U.S. a rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 573 (1953) ( F r a f i r t e r , J.,
dissenting) ("I need hardly point out that in a court of equity causes are disposed

782

BRIGHAMYOUNGUNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW [I994

aslequity connection made its debut in a majority opinion in
Fay v. Noia,lB and since then the idea that habeas is governed by equitable principles has become a recurring motif in
Supreme Court opinions.130It is crucial t o note, though, that
many of the references to "equitable principles7'in opinions by
conservative Justices have a far different meaning than the
idea of equity espoused by Justice Stevens. Justice Stevens'
notion of equity in habeas is a case-by-case concept; the conservative Justices use the concept of "equitable principles" when
they establish generic rules governing habeas, e.g., a procedural default cannot be excused unless very narrowly defined
"cause and prejudice" is established.13' Such rules reflect primarily the one-fair-chance vision. With all due respect t o the
conservatives, the idea of generic equity is a contradiction in
terms: while equity can support vague and general maxims,
such as that the equitable claimant must not have "unclean
hands," the idea of equity loses its essential meaning when a
court establishes inflexible rules applying to all cases.ls2

of on the facts as they appear at the time of the disposition, and that habeas
corpus is certainly to be governed by the rules of fairness enforced in equity."). But
see 1 JAMES
LIEBMAN,FEDERAL
HABEASCORPUSPRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
3
(1988) ("[H]istorically habeas corpus developed a s 'a legal, not an equitable, remedy.").
129. 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963) ("Furthermore, habeas corpus has traditionally
been regarded a s governed by equitable principles.").
130. See, eg., Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745, 1766-67 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that equitable treatment pervades the law of habeas); id. at 1757 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (making a similar argument); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710,
1729 (1993) ( O ' C o ~ o r ,J., dissenting) (stating that equitable principles have governed habeas); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 484 (1991) (holding equitable
principles govern abuse of the writ); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986)
(stating that equitable principles traditionally governed in habeas); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 478 n.11 (1976) (noting the equitable nature of the writ).
131. The following cases are the leading ones in development of the standard:
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 US. 722, 750-51 (1991); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478, 485-89 (1986); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977).
132. See Patchel, supra note 20, a t 1034.
Equitable doctrines involve the balancing of the respective interests of
particular parties in a particular case. The "balancing" utilized by the
Court to come up with limits on habeas review, however, is an entirely
different kind of balancing. The Court "balances" the generic interests of a
class of individual-habeas
petitioners-against the generic interests of
the states in order to define the limits on habeas review and formulate a
rule that then is applied as a mandatory requirement in all cases. This
type of "balancing of interests" is an argument of policy, not of principle.
I t does not involve consideration of, and decision regarding, rights of the
parties before the Court, but rather a utilitarian compromise of individual

I
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c. Federalism. To an equitable remedy visionary, federal
courts need not be conceived as being better at dispensing justice than state courts, but are conceived of as being freer to do
so. For example, state appellate courts often feel obligated to
enforce procedural defaults no matter how serious the claimed
conditional violation, because they envision that the failure to
consistently uphold procedural defaults could result in significant damage to the orderliness of the state system. A federal
court can, if circumstances warrant, overlook the procedural
default without doing any lasting harm to the state's interest
in orderliness, since the state rule would still be that such
defaults are enforceable on direct appeal.
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. There
is no indication that the 1867 Congress thought of habeas as
an equitable remedy. Instead, equitable remedy visionaries rely
on a 1948 amendment to section 2243lS as the primary authority for the equitable nature of the writ: "The Court shall
summarily hear and determine the facts, and dispose of the
matter as law and justice require."134 There is virtually no
legislative history concerning what Congress meant by the
term "and justice," but it is not implausible to equate "justice"
with equity or equitable principles.
3. The practical issue-the effectsof habeas litigation
Proponents of the equitable remedy vision, focusing on
habeas issues on a case-by-case basis, are not overly interested
in assessing systemic costs associated with habeas corpus. They
do see the definte benefit of vindicating constitutional rights in
those relatively few cases in which such vindication was not
accomplished at the state level.

H. Vision Eight: The Death-is-Diferent Vision
The premise of this vision is that just as "death-is-different" from all other punishments as a matter of Eighth Amendment law,'" so death-is-different for purposes of the writ of
rights in light of broader societal goals.

Id.
133. 28 U.S.C. 8 2243 (1988).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. The idea that "death-is-differentnwas implicit in Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1974) and became explicit shortly thereafter in Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (explaining that Furmun had recognized that death was differ-
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habeas corpus in the sense that the writ has an especially
important function t o perform in cases where the petitioner is
death-sentenced.136This vision differs from the others we
have discussed in that it is only a partial vision: it must adopt
one of the other visions as to non-death penalty petitioners.
The most common coupling is of the de novo litigation vision
with the death-is-different vision, given that most liberal adherents of the de novo litigation vision are also death penalty
opponents.
1. The three general issues of constitutional interpretation

A death-is-different visionary need not hold any particular
viewpoint concerning how expansively the rights of death sentenced petitioners should be defined, but does necessarily believe that those rights, given the life at stake in a death penalty case, should not be easily counterbalanced by any countervailing interest. This necessarily means that death-is-different
visionaries view the rights of death-sentenced petitioners with
greater weight than the claims of non-death sentenced petitioners.

ent). The Court has continued to adhere to this position. Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957 958-59 (1991); Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125-26 (1991); Beck
v. Alabama, 447 US. 625, 637-38 (1980); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357
(1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
136. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514, 2529-30 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the ever-shrinking power of federal
courts to review claims of error in state death penalty cases "undermines the very
legitimacy of capital punishment itself"); Smith v. Murray, 477 US. 527, 523-25
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority gives insufficient weight
to the fact that the petitioner has been death sentenced); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 525-26 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that if inadvertence of
counsel should constitute "cause" in a non-capital case a fortiori it should consti,
Justice in Capital Castute cause in a capital case); Richard J. B o ~ i e Preserving
es Whik Streamlining the Process of Collateral Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REV.99, 100
(1991) (arguing that, at least in capital cases, federal habeas jurisdiction should
not throw barriers in front of the petitioners); Hoffmann, supra note 18, a t 147-50
(arguing that the capital jurisprudence law is so complex, changing, and that national standards are so important that difference should be given to the federal
courts with their particular expertise to avoid constitutional error); cf Jeffries &
Stuntz, supra note 5, at 720-21 (urging broad forgiveness of procedural defaults
concerning the sentencing stage of capital proceedings, not necessarily because
death-is-different, but because the decision whether to impose the death penalty is
so rife with subjectivity and discretion that the concept of factual reliability loses
its clarity and harshness).
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2. The four theoretical issues specific to habeas

a. Function. According t o death-is-different visionaries,
a special function of habeas is to assure that no state executes
an inmate unless that state has scrupulously protected the
death-sentenced petitioner's constitutional rights.
b. History. The history of this vision is only slightly
more than two decades old, because it was not until the 1970s
that the Supreme Court began t o make signifcant Eighth
Amendment law concerning the death penalty.13' Over the
succeeding two decades, the Supreme Court made many pronouncements concerning the constitutional requirements of
death sentencing procedures, resulting in one of the more complicated bodies of constitutional criminal procedure law? To
death-is-different visionaries the combination of the ultimate
nature of the sanction, the complicated nature of the governing
law, and the suspicion that state authorities are particularly
susceptible to political pressure in death penalty cases,13g
makes a strong argument for assigning the federal courts a
special watchdog function as to death penalty cases.
c. Federalism. As was just pointed out, death-is-different
visionaries believe that states are in particular need of federal
oversight with respect t o the highly volatile cases that result in
death sentences. Indeed, there is a clear historical resonance
here with the Reconstruction era, since most of the states that
have high death row populations and that most often carry out
executions are in the Deep South. Further, there is statistical140 as well as anecdotal evidence that racial factors still

137. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US. 153, 188-95 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408
US. 238 (1972).
138. Hoffmann, supra note 18, at 147 (arguing that Eighth Amendment death
penalty jurisprudence is "more elaborate and confusing than almost any other area
of constitutional law").
139. Steven B. Bright, In Defense of Life: Enforcing the Bill of Rights on Behalf of Poor, Minority and Disadvantaged Persons Facing the Death Penalty, 57
Mo. L. REV. 849, 864 (1992) (arguing that one of the reasons why state courts
tolerate injustices in death penalty cases, such as shoddy representation and racial
discrimination, is that "courts do not function well when they are caught up in the
passions and politics of the moment. And no case involves the passions of the
moment more than a death penalty case, particularly one involving an interracial
crime.").
140. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.279, 286-87 (1987) (discussing statistical
data showing that defendants charged with killing white victims were 4.3 times
more likely to receive death sentences than defendants charged with killing blacks).
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loom large in determining who gets the death sentence and
who doesn't.l4'
d. Congressional versus Supreme Court authority. A
death-is-different visionary necessarily believes that the Supreme Court has significant power to structure habeas jurisdiction, since there is no indication in any of the habeas statutes,
or in the congressional intent, that death penalty petitioners
should be treated any different than other petitioners.

3. The practical issue of the efects of habeas litigation
Death-is-different visionaries believe that the potential
benefits of habeas litigation for death penalty petitioners-the
vindication of a constitutional right that saves a prisoner from
being unconstitutionally executed-far outweigh any attendant
costs.

I. A Note About Adherence to Multiple Visions
A word is in order about the possibility that a person
might credibly adhere t o more than one vision. Some of the
visions are obviously incompatible, such as the de novo litigation vision and the one-fair-chance vision. Others could rationally be combined, as Justice Stevens has done with the
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions. Even some
visions that do not at first glance appear to be compatible could
rationally be combined by utilizing one as an exception t o another. For example, one could be primarily a one-fair-chance
visionary, while at the same time believing that a petitioner
with a colorable claim of factual innocence should have the
one-fair-chance principles applied less rigorously than a petitioner who does not have such a claim of innocence. Similarly,
one could be generally an inverse correlationist, yet find that
certain states, or certain courts within states, are so hostile to
federal constitutional rights that federal habeas cases involving
decisions of those courts should be treated in line with the de
nouo litigation vision.lq Numerous other combinations are
also possible.

141. See Bright, supra note 139, at 853-862.
142. See Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment?
A Preliminary Study, 77 GEO.L.J. 251, 286 (1988) (concluding that most states are
enforcing the Fourth Amendment, but that Georgia, and possibly Arizona and
South Carolina, are not).
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So far I have examined the eight visions in the abstract. It
is now time to become more concrete and see how these visions
unfold with respect to the ten contexts in which they arise in
habeas litigation: exhaustion of state remedies, the scope of
cognizable claims, then-existing law claims, new-rule claims,
mixed question claims, pure fact claims, procedurally defaulted
claims, abuse of the writ, successive petitions, and the standard
for obtaining relief.'" The task I will undertake with respect
t o each of these contexts is threefold. First, I will set forth the
nub of the context, which includes an analysis of what is at
stake, along with any governing statutes. Second, I will examine how each vision would resolve the nub of the context. And
third, I will analyze the case law to attempt to determine
which vision or visions of habeas it reflects.

A. Context One: Exhaustion of State Remedies
1. The nub of the context
As Reconstruction ardor waned, Congress invited the Supreme Court t o judicially constrict the broad habeas jurisdiction of the 1867 Act.'" The Court responded in Ex parte
R0ya11'~~in 1886 by creating the "exhaustion of state reme-

143. I have chosen these ten contexts because they encompass the key issues
that are peculiar to habeas law and thus permit discussion of all the significant
Supreme Court habeas cases. One might argue about the omission of the issue
whether a claim of innocence, pure and simple, is cognizable in habeas. See
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853, 869-70 (1993) (wrestling with this issue with a
majority of the Court concluding that such a claim is cognizable, at least in a
death penalty case). This issue, however, concerns whether a right of innocence
should be recognized as a right under constitutional criminal procedure law. This
issue is not peculiar to the habeas context even though it seems more likely to
arise on habeas than on direct review. I t is not dficult to imagine such an issue
arising on direct review, however. Imagine that the petitioner has been convicted
and then shortly thereafter finds what the petitioner believes to be convincing
evidence of innocence. The petitioner then files a motion for a new trial based on
this newly discovered evidence, which is denied. The petitioner then appeals both
the conviction and the denial of the new trial motion. The petitioner loses through
the state appellate system. The petitioner could then seek certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court and one of the claims would be that the petitioner's constitutional right not to be incarcerated when provable innocence was denied by the
state court's failure to grant the new trial motion. For a discussion of whether the
Court should recognize a constitutional right to innocence, see Steiker, supra note
5, at 305 11.12.
144. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
145. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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dies" requirement. The Court reasoned that as a matter of
comity between separate sovereigns, the state should have the
first opportunity t o remedy claims of error arising from a state
criminal pr~ceeding."~
In 1948 Congress codified the exhaustion requirement.14' The Court proceeded, without a great
deal of controversy, to work out the basic principles governing
exhaustion.'" There is only one exhaustion-related issue that
has proven t o be doctrinally controversial: whether a petitioner
can proceed in habeas with a "mixed" petition, that is, one that
contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Our discussion will focus on that issue.

2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. The de novo litigation
vision is essentially inconsistent with the exhaustion requirement: if it is important for a violated right t o be vindicated,
and vindicated sooner rather than later, and if the federal
courts are superior at vindicating those rights, then it makes
no sense t o force petitioners to attempt to vindicate those
rights in the "inferior" state courts.'4gIf de novo litigation vi146. Id. at 253.
147. 28 U.S.C. 8 2254(b), (c) (1988). This section provides:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.

Id.
148. See LIEBMAN,supm note 128, a t 45-52 (setting forth the fundamental
rules of exhaustion of remedies, some of the more important of which are that
"[elxhaustion does not require a petition for a writ of certiorari to the . . . Supreme Court;" that "raising a claim on direct appeal--or in one complete round of
state postconviction proceedings-exhausts it, even if other state remedies remain
available;" that "[rlaising a claim on direct appeal exhausts it even if the claim
was not presented a t trial;" that "[a]ctually presenting the claim on direct appeal
exhausts i t whether or not the state courts explicitly ruled on it;" and that a petitioner is not required "to pursue state remedies that are inadequate or futile").
149. See Yackle, Misaduentures, supra note 15, a t 363 ("[Tlhe states have established and now employ postconviction remedies that all too oRen frustrate the
adjudication of federal claims. Accordingly, I contend that petitioners should be
relieved of any responsibility to pursue those remedies before seeking federal habeas relief.").
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sionaries started with a clean slate, they would likely create a
system in which a defendant who raised a constitutional claim
would be removed to federal district court litigation, or, less
radically, would permit a convicted petitioner with a constitutional claim t o appeal directly t o federal court, bypassing state
appellate procedure^.'^^ But de novo litigation visionaries are
not writing on a clean slate: the statute clearly requires exhaustion.lsl The statute does not, however, speak explicitly to
mixed petitions: as to those, de novo litigation visionaries
should argue vigorously for permitting federal habeas litigation
as to the unexhausted claims as well as the exhausted ones,
because the petitioner has paid the required obeisance t o state
procedures by submitting at least some of the claims t o state
corrective processes. To force a petitioner to rerun the state
gauntlet as t o unexhausted claims unjustifiably risks the continued incarceration of a person whose constitutional rights
have been violated.
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries are quite happy with the exhaustion requirement because
it makes a habeas petitioner follow normal appellate channels
by raising the issue in the 'lower" courts-state courts-before
raising the issue in the "higher" court-that is, the federal
habeas court. Thus, as to a mixed petition, an appellate review
visionary should staunchly advocate that the federal court not
hear any unexhausted claim
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist is
likely t o be neutral as to the exhaustion requirement in general. As to mixed petitions, though, a rights-selectivist should be
more inclined to permit litigation of the unexhausted claim if
the claim involves a right favored by the rights-selectivist. The
possibility of a petitioner with a valid claim of a violation of a
favored right languishing in prison, particularly on death row,
while undergoing another round of state litigation, is not a
comfortable one for a rights-selecti~ist.~~'

150. See Yackle, Explaining, supra note 15, at 1028-40 (considering but ultimately rejecting removal as a desirable option).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (for applicable text, see supra note 147).
152. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 545 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing for flexible application of the exhaustion requirement and contending that
if the already exhausted claims state good grounds for relief, then "postponing
relief until another round of review in the state and federal judicial systems has
been completed is truly outrageous").
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d . The innocence-selectivist v i s i o n . The
innocence-selectivist is likewise likely to be neutral with respect t o the exhaustion requirement in general. As t o a mixed
petition, the innocence-selectivistvision would suggest that the
federal court should hear an unexhausted constitutional claim
only if the petitioner also has a colorable claim of factual innocence.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. A one-fair-chancevisionary
should applaud the exhaustion requirement since it forces petitioners to seek to have their claims vindicated in the forum
favored by one-fair-chance visionaries: the state courts. As to
mixed petitions, one-fair-chance visionaries should have no
hesitancy in sending the petitioner back t o state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims.
f. The inverse correlation vision. Inverse correlationists
believe in the exhaustion requirement t o the extent that they
believe the state courts are generally enforcing federal constitutional rights. Thus, at least during the past couple of decades,
an inverse correlationist who is convinced of the good faith of
state courts should be in favor of forcing a petitioner with an
unexhausted claim to exhaust that claim in the state system.
g. The equitable remedy vision. To the extent possible,
an equitable remedy visionary would want to interpret the
exhaustion statute in a flexible manner allowing consideration
of the equities of the particular case. Since the statute could
plausibly be interpreted to permit the litigation of a mixed petition, an equitable remedy visionary would argue for that interpretation and then look at the equities of each mixed petition
t o see whether it would be just to require the petitioner to
resort to state court to exhaust the unexhausted claims. If, for
example, the unexhausted claim is also a patently valid one
(that is, if the petitioner exhausted it in state court and lost,
but on proceeding to federal court will inevitably win), then it
would be unjust t o require the petitioner t o exhaust the
claim.153
h. The death-is-differentvision. We should start here by
noting that while non-death sentenced petitioners, whose motive is to end the litigation as soon as possible by getting out of
prison, are likely to view as highly undesirable a second round
153. This may well have been the situation in Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S.
1, 3-5 (1981) where the Court in a per curium opinion required a petitioner in
such a position to exhaust the claim in state court.
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of state litigation over an unexhausted claim, death penalty
petitioners will not view a second round of state litigation as
necessarily bad. Certainly there are some death penalty petitioners who have real hope of getting their sentences overturned in federal court, and who will view with dismay a seeond round of state litigation with the death sentence hanging
over their heads. Just as clearly, petitioners who do not have
much hope of getting their sentences overturned, and who are
simply trying to prolong their lives through litigation, may be
more than happy t o undertake another round of litigation in
state court. But focusing on the group that desires to have their
claims expeditiously litigated i n federal court, a
death-is-different visionary should contend that the federal
court has broad power to hear unexhausted claims of death
penalty petitioners.

3. The case law analyzed
The Court addressed the nub of this context in the 1982
case of Rose v. Lundy,'" holding six-to-three1" that the
policy against piecemeal litigation requires that a petitioner
with a mixed petition either dismiss the petition and return to
state court t o exhaust the unexhausted claim, or proceed only
with the exhausted claims in federal court?' This result is
consistent with the appellate review, one-fair-chance, and inverse correlation visions. It is inconsistent with the de novo
litigation vision, the rights-selectivist vision (since the opinion
gives no indication that the resolution depends upon the nature
of the unexhausted claim), the innocence-selectivist vision (the
opinion also contains no indication that the case should be
handled differently if the petitioner has a colorable claim of
innocence), and the equitable remedy vision (since the requirement of exhaustion of the unexhausted claim is an inflexible
one). Since the petitioner in that case had not been sentenced
t o death, the case does not directly indicate whether it is consistent with the death-is-differentvision, but there is no indication in the opinion that resolution of the issue depends upon
whether the petitioner has been sentenced to death.
154. 455 US. 509 (1982).
155. In the majority were Justices Burger, Brennan, Marshall, 07Connor,

Powell, and Rehnquist. Justices Blackmun and White concurred in the judgment,
Justice Stevens dissented.
156. Ludy, 455 U.S.at 520-21.
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A real oddity of Lundy is that two of the six adherents t o
the majority opinion were Justices Brennan and Marshall, who
were de novo litigation ~isionaries.'~'Given the inconsistency
of this result with the de novo litigation vision, it is difficult t o
understand why these Justices voted in favor of the total exhaustion requirement. One would instead have expected them
to join the opinion of Justices Blackmun and White, which
would permit piecemeal litigation unless it rose to the level of
abuse of the writ.158
The dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens in Lundy bears
comment because it constitutes his most full-blown exposition
of the rights-selectivist portion of his combination
rights-selectivist/equitableremedy vision. The essence of his
position bears quotation:
In my opinion claims of constitutional error are not fungible. There are a t least four types. The one most frequently
encountered is a claim that attaches a constitutional label to
a set of facts that does not disclose a violation of any constitutional right. . . . The second class includes constitutional violations that are not of sufficient import in a particular case to
justify reversal even on direct appeal, when the evidence is
still fresh and a fair retrial could be promptly conducted. A
third category includes errors that are important enough to
require reversal on direct appeal but do not reveal the kind of
fundamental unfairness to the accused that will support a
collateral attack on a final judgment. The fourth category
includes those errors that are so fundamental that they infect
the validity of the underlying judgment itself, or the integrity
of the process by which that judgment was obtained. This
category cannot be defined precisely; concepts of "fimdamental
fairnessn are not frozen in time. . . . Errors of this kind justify
collateral relief no matter how long a judgment may have
been final and even though they may not have been preserved
properly in the original trial.

....

. . . The doctrine of nonretroactivity, the emerging "cause
and prejudice" doctrine, and today's "total exhaustion" rule
are examples of judicial lawmaking that might well have been
avoided by confining the availability of habeas corpus relief to
cases that truly involve fundamental ~ n f a i r n e s s . ' ~ ~

157. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
158. Lundy, 455 U.S. at 528-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 543-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations and footnotes omitted).
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Stevens then states the rights-selectivist position in a nutshell:
"The availability of habeas corpus relief should depend primarily on the character of the alleged constitutional violation and
not on the procedural history underlying the claim."160

B. Context Two: What Constitutional Claims
Are Cognizable In Habeas
1. The nu6 of the context

The nub of this context is whether all constitutional claims
are cognizable in habeas. The governing statutes provide that a
person who is "in custody in violation of the Constitution . . . of
the United States"161is entitled to the writ. They give no indication that anything less than all constitutional violations are
cognizable in habeas. Yet this issue has provoked several significant Supreme Court opinions over the past two decades.
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. This vision, of course,
with its belief in expansive, nonbalanceable, and equal constitutional rights, believes that the governing statute should be
taken at face value and that all claims of constitutional violation should be cognizable in habeas.
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries are aligned with de novo litigation visionaries in this
context because the appellate reviewers' cardinal principle of
parity demands it: on direct review, all constitutional claims
are cognizable, so similarly all claims should be cognizable in
habeas.
c. The rights-selectiuist vision. The rights-selectivist
visionary would argue that only the favored rights should be
cognizable in habeas. This is the heart of the rights-selectivist
position. Non-favored rights should not be cognizable in habeas
because they simply clutter the habeas docket and distract
courts from vindicating favored constitutional rights.
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. The essence of the
innocence-selectivist position is that the only constitutional
claims that should be cognizable are those that are supplemented with the colorable claim of factual innocence. Put suc-

160. Id. at 547-48(Stevens,J., dissenting).
161. 28 U.S.C. 54 2241(cX3), 2254(a) (1988).
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cinctly, innocence-selectivists would contend that a petitioner
who is clearly guilty of the crime is simply not held "in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United States."lg2
e. The one-fair-chancevision. In substance, the one-fairchance vision provides that the only constitutional claims that
should be cognizable are those which the petitioner did not
have a full and fair opportunity t o litigate in state court. In
terms of the statutory language, a one-fair-chance visionary
must argue that a state court decision against the petitioner's
constitutional claim means that the petitioner is not being held
"in violation of the Constitution . . . of the United state^."'^^
f. The inverse correlation vision. An inverse
correlationist has no plausible means of interpreting the statute more narrowly than t o encompass all constitutional claims.
An inverse correlationist would likely implement the vision by
indulging in strong presumptions that the way the case was
handled in state court was constitutionally acceptable.
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy
visionary would likewise have no basis for excluding any constitutional claim fkom the ambit of habeas. The equitable remedy visionary would implement the vision by looking at all factors bearing on the justice of the incarceration. Under this
vision, a petitioner might be able t o establish a constitutional
violation, yet still not be able to show that the incarceration is
so unjust as to be "in violation of the Constitution . . . of the
United state^."'^^
h. The death-is-different vision. The death-is-different
visionary has an a fortiori argument: the statute makes all
constitutional claims cognizable in habeas, and policy dictates
that this be even more true with respect t o constitutional
claims raised by death penalty petitioners.
3. The case law analyzed

a. Stone v. Powell.lBS Stone was the first major conservative counterattack against the Warren Court's habeas jurisprudence. Stone was a radical departure from anything that
had come before, and the majority opinion has, if anything,
become even more remarkable over time. The issue in Stone
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id.
Id.
428 U.S.465 (1976).
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was whether a petitioner who had litigated and lost a Fourth
Amendment search and seizure claim in state court could bring
that claim in federal habeas. By a vote of six-to-three,'" the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment claim as to which a
petitioner had a full and fair opportunity for litigation in state
court is not cognizable in habeas?' The underpiming of the
decision was that, while the defendant has a "personal constitutional right" not to be subjected to an illegal search or seizure, the right to have that evidence excluded at trial is not a
"personal constitutional right."lB8Since the right is not a personal constitutional .one, it may be counterbalanced by opposing
interests?" The Court identified extensive costs from enforcing the exclusionary rule in habeas, including diverting attention from the issue of guilt or innocence; the exclusion of reliable evidence of guilt which leads t o freeing of the guilty; the
disproportionality between the harm and the remedy; the encouragement of scorn of the criminal justice system; and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the Court found very little, if any, additional deterrence t o police misconduct from
enforcing the right years after the fact via federal habeas.'?'
The fascinating aspect of Stone for purposes of this Article
is the melange of different visions employed in the majority
opinion. The opinion adopted the one-fair-chance history espoused by Professor Bator,"' and the holding that a Fourth
Amendment claim can only be litigated in federal habeas if the
petitioner did not have a full and fair opportunity t o litigate it
in state court is pure Bator as well. The holding that a Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule claim does not constitute a "personal constitutional right" seems consistent with a fundamental
rights-selectivist vision, while the assertion that suppression of
evidence often frustrates the truth-seeking function smacks of
the accuracy of the guilt/imocence rights-selectivist variant.
The Court also adverted to the equitable nature of the writ,
thereby invoking the equitable remedy vision.'" The majority
further suggested that the primary function of habeas should

166.
Stevens,
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

In the majority were Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and Stewart. Justices B r e ~ a n Marshall,
,
and White dissented.
Stone, 428 U.S. at 481-82.
Id. at 486.
See id. at 488.
Id. at 489-94.
Id. at 475-77.
Id. at 478 a l l .
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be to "assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty," thereby invoking the innocence-selectivist
vision. '" Finally, the opinion also stated:
[Wle are unwilling to assume that there now exists a general
lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the
trial and appellate courts of the several States. . . . Moreover,
the argument that federal judges are more expert in applying
federal constitutional law is especially unpersuasive in the
context of search-and-seizure claims, since they are dealt with
on a daily basis by trial level judges in both systems.'"

This assertion seems t o come directly from the inverse correlation vision. Thus, the opinion can be seen as precedent for five
of the visions (or six, if one counts both of the rights-selectivist
variants). On the other hand, the opinion clearly rejects the de
novo litigation vision. It also rejects the appellate review vision
because Fourth Amendment claims that have been litigated in
state court are often reviewed by the Supreme Court on direct
review. Thus, Stone destroys direct appealhabeas parity as to
Fourth Amendment claims. The opinion does not speak directly
to the death-is-different vision since, although both petitioners
involved in the consolidated cases had been convicted of murder, there is no indication in the opinion that either had been
sentenced t o death. Still, there is nothing in the opinion t o
indicate that the Court believed that death was different for
habeas purposes.
Because Stone embraced aspects of at least five different
visions that were more restrictive than the de novo litigation
vision dear to the heart of the Warren Court, there were any
number of nightmare scenarios that de novo litigation visionaries might imagine subsequent t o Stone. Probably the most
likely fear was that the conservative majority would be willing
t o pursue an accuracy of the guilt/innocence rights-selectivist
course that would result in the exclusion from the scope of
habeas many constitutional rights not directly related t o guilt
or innocence. Justice Breman articulated this concern in dissent:
I am therefore justified in apprehending that the groundwork
is being laid today for a drastic withdrawal of federal habeas

173. Id. at 491 n.31.
174. Id. at 494 11.35.
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jurisdiction, if not for all grounds of alleged unconstitutional
detention, then at least for claims-for example, of double
jeopardy, entrapment, self-incrimination, Miranda violations,
and use of invalid identification procedures-that this Court
later decides are not "guilt related."175

But, surprisingly, Justice Brennan's prediction has not been
borne out.
Despite a conservative majority ever since Stone was handed down, one will see in reviewing the four Supreme Court
decisions subsequent to Stone that it has never been expanded
to exclude any other claim of constitutional violation from the
scope of habeas. Stone remains a burr under the saddle of de
novo litigators, however, both because it has never been overruled as to Fourth Amendment claims, and because the conservative majority has proceeded t o use other visions articulated
in Stone, particularly the innocence-selectivist and
one-fair-chance strands.
b. Jackson v. Virginia.'" The fvst of two prosecution
efforts in 1979 to expand Stone involved a petitioner who
sought to argue on habeas that there was insufficient evidence
presented at trial to warrant a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State authorities argued that because the petitioner already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
sufficiency of evidence claim in state court, he should not be
permitted to raise the same claim on habeas. The Court voted
five-t~-three''~
not to extend Stone, for two primary reasons.
First, the full and fair opportunity argument was contrary to
Congressional intent.'" Thus, the majority seemingly rejected the one-fair-chance vision, but as we will see, this rejection
had no staying power. Second, unlike the Fourth Amendment
claim in Stone, the issue of the sufficiency of evidence was
central to the petitioner's guilt or inn~cence."~The holding
that Stone was distinguishable because the issue in Jackson
was central to guilt or innocence could be taken as an endorsement of the guilt-related rights-selectivist position, but since

175. Id. at 517-18 ( B r e ~ a n ,J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
176. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
177. In the majority were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, and
White. Justices Burger, Rehnquist, and Stevens concurred in the judgment. Justice
Powell did not take part in the case.
178. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323.
179. Id.
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three of the five members of this majority had dissented in
Stone,lS0this should more likely be viewed as simply an attempt to distinguish Stone even on its own terms, rather than
t o embrace the rights-selectivist guilt related vision.
c. Rose v. Mitchell.'"
The second prosecutorial effort
in 1979 to expand Stone involved whether a petitioner could
raise in habeas the argument that the grand jury that had
indicted him was selected in a racially discriminatory manner.
Again, a five-person rnaj~rity''~voted not to extend Stone. In
doing so, however, the majority did not so much criticize
Stone's rationale as distinguish it. The majority held that it
doubted whether the petitioner could expect a full and fair
hearing from the very state judiciary that was responsible for
the claimed violation in the first place.'" This argument
seems to reflect the one-fair-chance vision. The majority also
held that the right at issue was not just a judicially created
remedy, and was substantially more compelling than the one in
Stone.lS4Both of these smack of the rights-selectivist position.
d. Kimmelman v. Morris~n.'~~
The next attempted extension of Stone came in this 1986 case. There, the petitioner
alleged that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective
under the Sixth Amendment for failing t o properly raise a
Fourth Amendment exclusionary claim. State authorities argued that since the Fourth Amendment claim itself could not
support habeas litigation, and the petitioner had opportunity to
raise the claim in state court, the petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel could not support habeas jurisdiction
either. AU nine members of the Court rejected this argument in
an opinion that could be read to embrace three different visions
of habeas. First, the Court said the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is fundamental, in contradistinction t o the exclusionary
rule in Stone,'" a position that seems fundamentally
rights-selectivist in nature. Second, the Court noted that constitutional rights are accorded t o the innocent and guilty alike,

180. Justices B r e ~ a n Marshall,
,
and White.
181. 443 U.S. 545 (1979).
182. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White were in the
majority. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stewart concurred in the judgment. Justices Stevens and White dissented in part.
183. Rose, 443 U.S. at 561, 563.
184. Id. at 563-64.
185. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
186. Id. at 376-77.
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which seems a rebuff of the innocence-selectivist position. Finally, the Court noted that the Sixth Amendment claim could
prevail on direct appeal and thus should be cognizable in habeas, a position supportive of the appellate review vision.lg7
Three conservative Justices concurring in the judgment
alluded t o yet another vision of habeas, arguing that Stone
should not be extended because the Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair opportunity to contest the charges, which does not
exist when counsel is ineffective.lS8This, of course, derives
from the one-fair-chancevision
In this most recent effort to
e. Withrow v. William~.'~~
expand Stone, prosecuting authorities argued that a claim of
defective Miranda warnings fell squarely within the Stone
principle. This argument seemed to have the best chance of
winning an extension of Stone of any of the cases thus far discussed. Like the exclusionary rule, the Miranda warnings are
prophylactic in nature and can easily be characterized as not
personal constitutional rights. The state authorities' claim
came close to prevailing, losing five-to-four.lgOThe majority
gave four reasons for rejecting the expansion of Stone, three of
which can be connected with different visions of habeas. First,
the Court noted that even though Miranda created a prophylactic rule, that rule still protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination which is a "fundamental trial right," whereas the right protected by the prophylactic
exclusionary rule-the right not to be subjected t o an unconstitutional search or seizure-does not protect any fundamental
trial right.lgl This argument seems fundamentally
rights-selectivist in nature. Second, the Court said that unlike
illegally seized evidence, the exclusion of which invariably
makes more difficult the correct ascertainment of guilt, the
Miranda warnings serve t o guard against the use, at trial, of
unreliable statements obtained during in-custody interrogation,
'~~
which might hinder the comect ascertainment of g ~ d t . This

187. Id.
188. Id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment; Burger & Rehnquist,
JJ., joining).
189. 113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
190. In the majority were Justices Blackmun, K e ~ e d y ,Souter, Stevens, and
White. Justices Rehnquist, 07Connor, Scalia, and Thomas concurred in part and
dissented in part.
191. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753.
192. Id.
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argument seems to be of the guilt/innocence determination
rights-selectivist in nature. The third and primary reason given
by the majority for not extending Stone t o Miranda warnings
was that such an extension would not decrease the habeas
workloads of the federal courts, since almost all Miranda
claims would simply be recast as FiRh Amendment involuntary
confession claims.lg3 This argument is puzzling in terms of
visions because it adverts to the practical effects of habeas litigation in the abstract, seemingly without connection t o any
vision whatsoever. While the court considered this the most
important of the criteria examined in deciding this case, it
appears unlikely that the court really intended to elevate the
examination of costs of habeas to federal court dockets to the
status of a separate vision.
The opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, concurring in part and dissenting in part, is intriguing because it encompasses a smorgasbord of visions comparable to that of the majority opinion in Stone. The opinion begins
with the assertion that habeas is "significantly different" from,
and narrower than, direct appeal, a rejection of the appellate
review vision.lg4 Justice O'Connor then notes that habeas is
governed by equitable principles, an invocation of the equitable
remedy vision.lg5 The opinion argues that, as was the case in
Stone, Miranda warnings impede the accuracy of the
guilt/innocence determination,lg6 an invocation of the
guilt-related rights-selectivist vision. Justice O'Connor continues by asserting that since the police and the state courts have
grown accustomed t o Miranda, and usually comply with it, "it
is precisely because the rule is well accepted that there is little
further benefit to enforcing it on habeas."1g7This statement is
the most explicit one to be found anywhere in habeas jurisprudence of the inverse correlation vision. Justice O'Connor concludes by arguing that Miranda warnings do not implicate a
"fundamental trial right," thereby invoking the fundamental
rights-selectivist vision. '"

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1754.
at 1757 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
at 1758-59.
at 1765.
at 1761.
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Justice Scalia's opinion, joined by Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting in part, is instructive because it
clearly sets forth the visions upon which these two arch-conservatives rely. Justice Scalia begins by noting that habeas corpus
is an extraordinary writ governed by equitable principle^,'^^
thereby seemingly invoking the equitable remedy vision. Yet as
Justice Scalia's voting in other cases indicates, his use of the
term "equitable" refers to generic equity, which I have argued
is not equitable at all, but rather an indirect means of propounding the one-fair-chance vision.2w Indeed, Justice Scalia
directly says that, in almost all cases, the most powerful equitable consideration is whether petitioner has had a full and fair
opportunity t o litigate the claim in state courts. "Prior opportunity to litigate an issue should be an important equitable consideration in any habeas case, and should ordinarily preclude
the court from reaching the merits of a claim, unless it goes to
the fairness of the trial process or t o the accuracy of the ultimate result."201The exception suggested by Justice Scalia as
to errors that go t o the "fairness of the trial process" is unclear
in its provenance while the second exception for claims relating
"to the accuracy of the ultimate result" refers to petitioners
with colorable claims of factual innocence, and thus reflects the
innocence-selectivist vision. Justice Scalia leaves no doubt,
however, that he views these exceptions as narrow ones. Thus,
he and Justice Thomas can fairly be characterized as strong
proponents of the one-fair-chancevision.
4. Summary

No context in habeas law more N l y illustrates the profusion of visions that vie for supremacy in habeas doctrine: language in various majority opinions supports the appellate review, fundamental rights-selectivist, accuracy of the
guiltlinnocence d e t e r m i n a t i o n r i g h t s - s e l e c t i v i s t ,
innocence-selectivist and one-fair-chance visions. One is tempted to say that this jurisprudence manifests confusion as well,
since the language appears not in any easily ascertainable
progression. Still, the bottom line can be stated with clarity: all
constitutional claims are within the scope of habeas, except for

199. Id. at 1767 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
200. See supra notes 126-127 and accompanying text.
201. Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1768.
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Fourth Amendment claims as to which the petitioner has had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in state courL202

C. Context Three:Pure Law Claim Based on
Then-ExistingLaw
1. The nub of the context
In this context the petitioner's claim is that the state court
applied the wrong rule of decision t o the petitioner's claim
under the law that existed at the time the issue was decided.
Claims of this sort are relatively infrequent, since state judges
usually manage to correctly perform the relatively easy task of
determining the correct constitutional rule to apply to an issue.

2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. Obviously, visionaries of
this stripe believe in de novo review of all issues, including
pure issues of then-existing law.
b. The appellate review vision. Equally obvious, appellate review visionaries believe in de novo review of pure issues
of a then-existing law because that is the standard used on
direct review and the parity principle requires no less in habeas.
c. The rights-selectivist vision. As to the favored rights
that are cognizable in habeas, rights-selectivists would also be
in favor of de novo review of pure issues of an existing law
since those rights are particularly worthy of vindication.
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. Similarly, as to the
relatively few cases that make the cut because the petitioner is
able t o allege a colorable claim of factual innocence in addition
to the claim of constitutional violation, innocence-selectivists
would argue for de novo review of the pure issues of then-existing law, because those issues are particularly worthy of vindication when the petitioner may be innocent.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. One of the key characteristics of the one-fair-chance vision that distinguishes it from the

202. I have chosen not to include a discussion of the Court's latest decision
concerning the cognizability of claims in habeas, Reed v. Farley, because it involved
a statutory claim (breach of the speedy trial provision of the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers), not a constitutional one. Reed v. Farley, 114 S. Ct. 2291 (1994). The
Court, while ruling that the claim was not cognizable, eschewed reliance on Stone,
and argued that analysis of statutory violations was quite different. Id. at 2296-97.
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four visions thus far discussed, is that its proponents do not
believe in de nouo review of pure issues of then-existing law if
the petitioner had a full and fair chance to litigate the issue in
state court. Adherents of this vision would tolerate the possibility that a state court could use the wrong constitutional rule
under then existing law, and still have its judgment insulated
from federal habeas review as long as the defendant was afforded a fair procedural opportunity to litigate the issue. A
one-fair-chance visionary would likely contend that the possibility of this happening is remote since trial courts are usually
smart enough t o figure out the correct rule to use, and if they
aren't, state appellate courts are almost certain to correct their
decisions.
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision reposes a lot
of trust in state courts-at least at this point in history-but
does allow for correction of the occasional case in which the
state commits a serious blunder. Certainly the application of
the wrong constitutional rule under then existing law would
fall into the category of blunders that an inverse correlationist
would wish to remedy via habeas.
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy
visionary would certainly opt for de novo review of pure law
claims of error based on then existing law, although such a
visionary might ultimately conclude that other factors in the
case would render it unjust to award relief.
h. The death-is-diferent vision. Certainly as to claims
raised by death penalty petitioners, visionaries of this stripe
believe in de novo review of pure law claims based on then
existing law.

3. The case law analyzed
The power and obligation of the habeas court to review de
novo pure law claims based on then existing law has been an
accepted part of habeas law at least since Brown v. Allen:203
"State adjudication of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these
questions that the federal judge is commanded to de~ide."~"
This is consistent with every vision except the one-fair-chance

203. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
204. Id. at 506; see also Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 318 (1963) ("[Tlhe
district judge . . . may not defer to [a state court's] findings of law.").
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vision, and is particularly supportive of the de novo litigation
and appellate review visions. Given the remarkable success of
the one-fair-chance vision in other contexts, it is perhaps surprising that not even the most conservative of Justices, who
tend to be predominantly adherents of the one fair chance
vision, have yet had the temerity to suggest that pure law
claims based on then existing law should be accorded anything
less than de novo federal reviewe205Nor did Professor Bator
suggest as much?O6 even though his vision, carried to its logical conclusion, would deny de novo review (indeed any review
at all) to such issues if the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate them in state court.

D. Context Four: Pure Law Claims Based on New Rules
1. The nub of the context

A pure law claim based on a new rule asserts that while
the state court ruled against the defendant's claim using the
correct constitutional rule under the law that existed as of the
time of the state court adjudication, the Supreme Court subsequently established a new, more defendant-favorable rule
which should be applied retroactively to the petitioner's claim,
and that will result in a finding of a constitutional violation.
Retroactive application of constitutional criminal procedure
rules became a major issue for both direct review and habeas
purposes when the Warren Court began identifying new rights
with regularity.207 Subsequent conservative courts have not

205. The closest they have come was Justice Thomas, Rehnquist and Scalia's
recognition of the argument that "mixed questions" of law and fact should be accorded "deferential review" by the habeas court. Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482,
2491 (1992).
206. Bator, supra note 94.
207. Prior to the Warren Court's constitutional criminal procedure revolution
all decisions regarding the rights of criminal defendants were retroactive. Steiker,
supm note 5, at 354 ("Prior to the mid-1960s, the Court simply did not inquire
into retroactivity of decisions regarding the rights of criminal defendants; all such
decisions were retroactive."); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 15, at 2382.
There was a time when the Supreme Court followed the common law
practice and assumed that current understandings of the law would apply
to any pending case, irrespective of the means by which the case came
before the bar. Yet in the 19608, when the Court began interpreting the
Constitution in innovative ways, there was pressure to apply its new precedents only to fbture cases and thus to deny their retroactive effect on
judgments already in place.
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been nearly as active in creating new constitutional rules of
criminal procedure favorable to criminal defendants, except
with respect to the death penalty, where the expansion of
defendants' rights picked up steam after the Warren Court
era.2osThus, while pure law claims based on new rules do not
arise across the board as frequently as they did in the Warren
Court era, such claims are not rarities, particularly in death
penalty cases. The nub of this context, then, is whether habeas
petitioners should be entitled t o the benefit of new constitutional rules that went into effect after their convictions became
final.

2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. A de novo litigation
visionary, being a rights expansionist, should argue that all
defendants who have been constitutionally wronged should be
entitled to a remedy even if the wrong was not recognized until
the petitioner's case was already finalized. But even some of
the most liberal members of the Warren Court were not comfortable with the idea of retroactively applying all of the cases
expanding criminal procedure constitutional rights, given that
such retroactive application would likely have freed a large
percentage of the prison population.209Still, de novo litigation

Id. See a h Friedman, supra note 10, a t 804 (Friedman states that "[plrior to
Brown v. Allen [344 US. 443 (1953)l the retroactivity problem was not acute. . . .
[because] [clollateral attack was generally unavailable, so retroactivity presented a
problem only on direct review. Moreover, due process as applied to the states had
a relatively limited meaning and therefore, simply put, there were not many rights
to which retroactivity could apply, a t least with regard to state prisoners.");
Hoffmann, supra note 19, at 175-76 (arguing that before the mid-1960s "[flederal
habeas, in short, was rarely available to state prisoners. And, of course, until the
1960s and the rise of the incorporation doctrine, the Court simply did not have
much constitutional law to apply to state criminal proceedings").
208. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
209. Justices Black and Douglas argued for virtually complete retroactivity.
,
Goldberg, and Marshall were
The other liberals, Justices Warren, B r e ~ a n Fortas,
willing to hold major constitutional rulings to be non-retroactive. For example, in
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634-35 (1968), the Court held that the right to
a jury trial in serious cases established in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162
(1968), and the right to a jury trial in serious criminal contempt cases a s established in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 208 (1968), were not to be applied retroactively. Justices Warren, Brennan, Fortas and Marshall joined the decision. Justices Douglas and Black dissented. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 US. at 635 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). I n Stovall v. Denno, 388 US. 293, 297 (1967), the Court held the
right to the exclusion of evidence of tainted identifications in the absence of counsel, established in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v.
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visionaries are likely to be as favorable or more favorable than
any other visionaries to the liberal retroactive application of
new constitutional rules.
b. The appellate review vision. In this context appellate
review visionaries radically part company from de novo litigation visionaries. To a n appellate review visionary the principle
of parity dictates that if the defendant would not have been
entitled to the benefit of the rule had the Supreme Court chosen to take the defendant's case on certiorari from the
defendant's direct appeal, then the habeas petitioner should not
be entitled to benefit from the new rule because that would
make habeas review more favorable to the petitioner than
direct reviewO2l0
c. The rights-selectivist vision. As to favored rights, a
rights-selectivist would be in favor of relatively liberal retroactive application of new constitutional rules.
d. T h e i n n o c e n c e - s e l e c t i v i s t v i s i o n . T h e
innocence-selectivist must argue that retroactivity should be
judged on a case-by-case basis: a petitioner who can allege a
colorable claim of innocence should get the benefit of a new
constitutional rule, but retroactive effect shodd not have any
precedential value to petitioners who cannot allege the colorable claim of innocence.
e. The one-fair-chance vision. The one-fair-chance visionary should be adamantly opposed to retroactive application of
new constitutional rules: if the petitioner had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the claim, and had the correct constitutional rule applied at the time, that is all to which the petition-

Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), not to be retroactive. This decision was joined by Justices Brennan and Warren, while Justice Douglas dissented. Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. at 302 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black also dissented. Id. at 303
(Black, J., dissenting). In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966), the
Court held that the right to warnings established in the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) was not to be applied retroactively. Justices Warren,
B r e ~ a nand Fortas joined this decision. Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
Miranda, 384 US. a t 736 (Black, J., dissenting). In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 636-37 (1965), the Court held that the rule in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US. 643
(1961) (stating that illegally seized evidence is required to be excluded at trial),
was not to be applied retroactively. Justices Warren, Brennan and Goldberg joined
this decision. Again, Justices Black and Douglas dissented. Walker, 381 U.S. a t 640
(Black, J., dissenting).
210. Liebman, supra note 5, a t 2095-96 ("Teugue's nometroactivity doctrine restores parity [between direct appeal and habeas] by ensuring that the sum total of
the law that the prisoner can draw upon in seeking release on habeas corpus is
the same as would have been available on direct appeal in the Supreme Court.").
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er was entitled. There is no such thing as absolute truth, and
thus no reason to believe that the Supreme Court was any
wiser when it promulgated the new rule than it was when it
promulgated the old one.
f. The inverse correlation vision. Inverse correlationists
should also vigorously oppose the retroactive application of new
rules for the benefit of habeas petitioners. The key question for
inverse correlationists is whether the state courts are f a i t W l y
upholding federal constitutional rights, and this is certainly the
case if the state court has correctly applied the federal constitutional rule as it existed at the time the state court rendered a
decision.
g. The equitable remedy vision. An equitable remedy
visionary would examine several factors in determining whether a new rule should be retroactively applied including: the
importance of the right created by the new rule, the damage of
the violation to the petitioner in that particular case, and the
damage to the state interests by applying the new rule retroactively.
h. The death-is-differentvision. Death-is-different visionaries would argue for wide-ranging retroactive application of
new rules t o the benefit of death penalty petitioners because it
would be wrong to execute a defendant who was the victim of
constitutional violation, even if that violation becomes manifest
after the defendant's conviction has already become final.211
3. The case law analyzed

The Warren Court opted for a solution to the retroactivity
problem that was applicable equally to direct review and habeas. In Linkletter v. Walker,212the Court stated that the retroactive application of a new constitutional rule must depend
upon "weigh[ing] the merits and demerits in each case"213
based upon the prior history and purpose of the new rule, the
reliance placed by state authorities on previous doctrine, and
the effect on the administration of justice of retroactively apply-

211. Hughes, supra note 16, at 333 ("In a constitutional system, putting to
death a person whose conviction or sentence rests upon a non-harmless constitutional error should be viewed with as much abhorrence as executing a person who
is 'factually' innocent.").
212. 381 U.S.618 (1965).
213. Id. at 629.
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As t o direct review, the Court banished
ing the new ruleO2l4
the Linkletter test in 1982:15 and five years later substituted
yet another rule, both times seeking more predictability and
uniformity in retroactivity doctrineO2l6But as of 1989,
Linkletter still governed retroactivity in habeas. Linkletter's
and
sway was ended that year, though, by Teague v.
a new body of retroactivity case law quickly developed.'18
Through Teague and its progeny, the Court delivered a triple

214. Id. at 636.
215. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 562 (1982). The Court held that
subject to three exceptions a decision of the Court is to be applied retroactively to
all convictions that were not yet final a t the time the decision was rendered. Id.
The frrst two exceptions: (1) when a decision did nothing more than apply settled
precedent to different factual situations, and (2) when the new ruling was that a
trial court lacked authority to convict the defendant in the first place-were always
to be applied retroactively. Id. at 549-50. The third exception, where the new rule
was a "clear break" with past precedent, was not to be applied retroactively even
on direct review if the new rule explicitly overruled a past precedent or disapproved a practice the Court had arguably sanctioned in prior cases or overturned a
long standing practice that lower courts had uniformly approved. Id. at 551.
216. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (abolishing the "clear
break" exception of Johnson and holding that a new constitutional rule should be
applied retroactively to all cases not yet h a l or pending on direct review a t the
time the decision was rendered).
217. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
218. See. Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948, 954-57 (1994) (stating application
of the Double Jeopardy Clause to a noncapital sentencing proceeding would extend
the rule of Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), and would constitute a
new rule that could not be applied retroactively); Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct.
2112, 2118-19 (1993) (holding that as a new rule, rule of Falconer v. Lane, 905
F.2d 1129 (1990), which requires an instruction that the jury cannot return a murder conviction if it finds the defendant possessed a mitigating mental state, cannot
be applied retroactively); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 898-903 (1993) (holding petitioner's contention, which was that the three special issues the Texas capital sentencing procedures require the jury to answer prevented the jury from adequately considering certain mitigating evidence, would, if accepted, require announcement of a new rule that would not be entitled to retroactive application);
Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 232-45 (1990) (holding that rule of Caldwell v.
Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), that i t is unconstitutional to pronounce a death
sentence based on a jury's false belief that the determination of the appropriateness of a capital sentence rests elsewhere, is entitled to retroactive effect); Butler
v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 411-16 (1990) (stating that the holding of Arizona v.
Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), which was that the Fifth Amendment bars policeinitiated interrogation following a suspect's request for counsel in the context of a
separate investigation, was a new rule that would not be applied retroactively);
Same v. Parks, 494 US. 484, 489-93 (1990) (contention that a jury is required to
be permitted to base its decision in a death penalty case on sympathy would announce a new rule that would not be retroactive); Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
318-19 (1989) (holding that absence of an instruction informing the jury it could
consider and give weight to defendant's mitigating evidence did not announce a
new rule and thus did not call into question the doctrine of retroactivity).

VISIONS OF HABEAS
whammy t o "new rule" claimants. First, the question whether a
proposed new rule should be retroactively applied is a threshold one t o be considered before the merits of the claim and, if
the decision would not be applied retroactively to all persons
whose right t o direct appeal has expired, then the habeas court
may not consider the merits of the
Second, the only
"new rule" decisions that can be given retroactive effect for the
benefit of all persons whose right to direct appeal has expired
are those that fall into one of two very narrow categories: (a)
those that place primary conduct beyond the power of the lawmaking authority to proscribe, or (b) those "without which the
likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously dimini ~ h e d . "The
~ ~ ~rationale for permitting these two exceptions
was the need to deter state courts from too narrowly construing
federal rights."' And third, a rule is "new" if the result "was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final."222
To see how Teague works in practice, we need t o start with
the third precept frst: the very expansive definition of when a
rule is "new." The typical situation raising the retroactivity
issue is the situation in which there was no directly controlling
Supreme Court precedent on the point at the time the state
court made its constitutional ruling. Then, after the defendant's
conviction became final, the Supreme Court announced a rule
on that issue that is more defendant-favorable than the rule

219. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
220. Id. at 311-13 (plurality opinion).
221. See id. at 305-06.
222. Id. at 301. "In general, however, a case announces a new rule when it
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government." Id. The definition of a new rule was arguably made even more restrictive in Butler v. McKeUar, 494 U.S. 407, 413 (1990) ("The 'new rule' principle
therefore validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions."). Even some people who could hardly be classified as liberals with respect
to habeas believe that the Court has defined "new rule" too restrictively. See, e.g.,
Joseph L. Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: H o w Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane, 1990 B.Y.U.L. REV. 183, 211.
The suggestion in Teague, Penry, and especially Butler, is that the current Court expects extremely little of state courts. All that state courts
need do, in order to avoid reversal on habeas, is to obey the most obvious
federal constitutional precedents. Surely, however, the Court can and
should expect more from state courts than simply the ability to read
headnotes and follow clear, binding federal precedents.

Id.
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that was applied by the state court. The defendant then becomes a habeas petitioner, urging that the trial court's error of
law, viewed retrospectively, warrants habeas relief. Clearly
such a petitioner prefers to try to characterize the argument as
a pure law claim based on then-ezisting law.'= The petitioner
will attempt to do this by claiming that the later announced
Supreme Court rule should have been anticipated by the state
court based on then-existing precedent. If the petitioner can
succeed in this attempt, then the petitioner avoids the whole
"new rule" quagmire, because the rule was not a "new" one a t
all. Teague's expansive definition of "new rule" almost invariably defeats the petitioner's efforts to shoehorn the case into
the then-existing law context, because only if there were a
Supreme Court case virtually on point contrary to the state
court's handling of the issue would the claim fit into the
. ~ ~ the case is forced into the
then-existing law c a t e g ~ r y Once
new rule context, the other two holdings of Teague go to work.
Not only will most such claims fail because they do not fall
within the two narrow exceptions for when a rule can be applied retroactively, but most such claims will not even be decided on the merits since retroactive effect is a threshold issue. If
the new rule would not be entitled to full retroactive effect,
then the habeas court cannot even consider the merits of the
proposed rule.
The regime established by Teague and its progeny is consistent with the appellate review and one-fair-chance visions.
The two exceptions for when a rule is entitled to retroactive
effect even on collateral review are consistent with a
rights-selectivist vision, albeit one with a narrow definition of
what constitute the favored rights. Teague and its progeny are
n o t at a l l s u p p o r t i v e of t h e d e novo l i t i g a t i o n ,
innocence-selectivist, or death-is-different visions. Surprisingly,
Teague rebuffs the inverse correlation vision in its assumption
that state judges need deterring.

223. See supra part 1II.C.
224. Teague, 489 US. at 333 ( B r e ~ a n ,J., dissenting) ("Few decisions on appeal or collateral review are 'dictated' by what came before. Most such cases involve a question of law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge to
resolve the case in more than one way.").
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E. Context Five: Mixed Question Claims
1. The nu6 of the context
In the gray area between pure law claims and pure fact
claims lies what are referred to either as "mixed questions of
To understand
law and fact" or "law application" ~1airns.z~~
this context we need to first examine the governing law with
respect to pure fact questions, and then move on to mixed questions.
A key question in habeas law is what power the federal
habeas court should have to determine issues of fact on which
constitutional claims depend. Prior t o 1963, the law on this
point could be summed up in two precepts: (1)contested issues
of fact that were raised but not decided in the state courts
required that the federal court hold an evidentiary hearing;226
and (2) as to contested issues of fact on which there were state
court findings, the district court had discretion either to rely on
the state court fact-finding or to conduct its own evidentiary
hearing.227The Warren Court found these two principles not
t o be precise enough to guide district courts in the way the
Court wanted those courts t o behave. The Court therefore
handed down one of its 1963 trilogy of cases, Townsend v.
Sain,2a specimg six circumstances in which a district court
was obligated t o hold an evidentiary hearing,2zgand reiterat-

225. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). For example, if the question is
whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, the definition of "voluntary" is a
matter of pure law, while the question whether the defendant's allegation that he
or she was denied food and sleep for twenty-four hours is true is a pure question
of fact. If the defendant's allegation of fad is found to be true, then the question
whether the confession meets the legal definition of "voluntary" is a matter of
applying the law to the facts and falls into the category of a mixed question of
law and fad. This example illustrates the grayness of the line between pure questions of fact and mixed questions, since it is not semantically or logically unreasonable to contend that the question whether the particular defendant's confession was
"voluntary" under the circumstances is a pure question of fact. Nonetheless, in
Miller v. Fenton the Supreme Court held that determining whether a confession
was voluntary was a mixed question of law and fad. For discussions of the topic
of mixed questions and law application questions see 1 LIEBMAN,supra note 128,
at 275-83; Liebman, supru note 5, at 2000-01 & 11.12; and Henry P. Monaghan,
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM.L. REV.229, 234-38 (1985).
226. Walker v. Johnson, 312 U.S. 275, 284-86 (1941).
227. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458-61 (1953).
228. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
229. In Townsend the Court stated:
[A] federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant under the following circumstances: If (1) the merits of the factual
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ed that habeas courts always have the power to hold evidentiary hearings and make new findings of fact, even if not obligated

to do so.230In response to Townsend, Congress enacted subsection (d) of section 2254 in 1966.Z3' That statutory provision
dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record a s a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed a t the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the
state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact
hearing.
Id. at 313.
230. Id. at 312.
231. 28 U.S.C. 9 2254 (1988) states in part:
(d) I n any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court, a determination after a hearing on the merits of a factual
issue, made by a State court of competent jurisdiction in a proceeding to
which the applicant for the writ and the State or an officer or agent
thereof were parties, evidenced by a written finding, written opinion, or
other reliable and adequate written indicia, shall be presumed to be correct, unless the applicant shall establish or it shall otherwise appear, or
the respondent shall a d m i t
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
State court hearing;
(2) that the fad-finding procedure employed by the State court was
not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed a t the
State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or
over the person of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to
represent him in the State court proceeding,
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in
the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding
in which the determination of such factual issue was made, pertinent to a determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support
such factual determination, is produced a s provided for hereinafter,
and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record
a s a whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record:
And in an evidentiary hearing in the proceeding in the Federal court,
when due proof of such factual determination has been made, unless the
existence of one or more of the circumstances respectively set forth in
paragraphs numbered (1) to (7), inclusive, is shown by the applicant,
otherwise appears, or is admitted by the respondent, or unless the court
concludes pursuant to the provisions of paragraph numbered (8)that the
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does not directly affect Townsend inasmuch as that case continues to govern the question as to when a habeas court is obligated to, or has the discretion to, hold an evidentiary hearing.
The statute instead kicks in at the point at which the court has
decided to hold an evidentiary hearing, and says that state
court findings of fact that are not defective in any one of eight
ways are entitled to a presumption of correctness that can only
be overcome by "convincing evidence" offered by the petitioner
that the factual determination was erroneous.232While section 2254(d) does not overrule Townsend, its presumption of
correctness was clearly intended to decrease the frequency with
which petitioners could succeed at such hearings and to have
an indirect effect on the willingness of habeas judges to exercise their discretion to permit such hearings.233
The resolution of pure fact claims is one of the areas of
habeas law that is most closely governed by case law and statute. The upshot is that habeas petitioners will find it difficult
to obtain an evidentiary hearing, and if successful in doing so,
will find it hard to overcome a properly-arrived-at state court
factual determination-the federal court exercises deferential,
not de novo review. This brings us to the nub of the context
regarding mixed issues: are they entitled to de novo review like
then-existing pure law claims, or are they governed by
Townsend and section 2254(d)?
2. How each vision would respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation visionaries, true to their name, argue for de novo review of mixed
questions. Further, they will bend over backwards to character-

record in the State court proceeding, considered as a whole, does not
fairly support such factual determination, the burden shall rest upon the
applicant to establish by convincing evidence that the factual determination by the State court was erroneous.
232. See Weisselberg, supra note 6, a t 152-53.
Townsend and section 2254(d), however, govern separate successive stages
in a habeas corpus case: the six criteria of Townsend determine whether
a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, while the eight factors
enumerated in section 2254(d) determine whether the state court's fmdings must be presumed correct if such a hearing is held.

Id.
233. Id. at 166-68 (citing statistics showing that the frequency of evidentiary
hearings "plummeted" after the 1966 amendment).
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ize a claim on the border between pure fact and mixed question
as a mixed question, thereby evoking federal de novo review.
b. The appellate review vision. In keeping with the cardinal principle of parity, appellate review visionaries would
argue that the same standards for determining what is a "pure
fact" issue and what is a "mixed question" issue should be
applied in habeas as on direct review.
c. The rights-selectiuist vision. A rights-selectivist visionary would incline toward classifying factual issues relating
to favored rights as within the mixed question category so as to
evoke de novo review.
d . The innocence-selectivist vision. An innocenceselectivist would be inclined to nudge determinations into the
"mixed question" category whenever it appeared that the petitioner had a colorable claim of factual innocence so as to garner
de novo federal review.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. A one-fair-chance visionary
would attempt to cast wide the net of "pure fact" determinations so as to minimize de novo review: to these visionaries if a
job has been done well once there is no reason to do it twice.
f. The inverse correlation vision. These visionaries, believing as they do that in the present day state courts are generally trustworthy with respect to litigation of federal constitutional issues, would follow one-fair-chance visionaries in casting wide the net of "pure fact" determinations.
g. The equitable remdy vision. The equitable remedy
visionary likely would put little stock in the distinction between "pure fact" and "mixed question" determinations and,
instead, would look to see how important the determination
was in the context of the case and how well, and fully, it had
been dealt with in state court. The better and more M l the
treatment in state court, the less likely a n equitable remedy
visionary would be to want to grant a federal evidentiary hearing.
h. The death-is-differentvision. Death-is-different visionaries would be more likely to categorize debatable issues in
death penalty cases as ones of "pure fact" so that the petitioner
could be afforded de novo federal review.
3. The case law analyzed
The Supreme Court understandably has had difficulty
drawing a clear line between issues of "pure fact" and "mixed
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The most well-known and oft-cited case on the issue is Miller v. Fenton:"
wherein the Supreme Court decided, in an eight-to-one2%decision, that whether a confession is
voluntary is a mixed question entitled to de novo review.237
There are two aspects of the Court's opinion that are of interest
to us from a visionary perspective. The first is that the Court
saw an unbroken line of precedent, both in direct appeal and
habeas cases, for treating the voluntariness of the confession as
a "mixed question."238This implies acceptance of the appellate review vision, since it indicates that de novo review on
direct appeal should likewise evoke de novo review in habeas.
Second, the Court noted that often the characterization of a
determination turns upon whether the lower court was in a
better position to make that determination, such as if it hinges
on demeanor or credibility.239Since the state court judge will
generally be in no better position to make the determination of
"voluntariness" than will the federal court judge, de novo review is appropriate.*O This is an implicit rejection of the
one-fair-chance vision, and probably the inverse correlation
vision as well: both would argue that one should strain to categorize a fully and fairly litigated issue as one of "pure fact" in
order t o evoke the presumption of correctness, and thus, if not
avoid the relitigation, at least have some assurance that the
relitigation will not reach a different result. Yet in some cases
less well-known than Miller v. Fenton, the conservative Court
has tended to push debatably categorizable issues into the
category of "pure fact."241Thus, perhaps the one-fair-chance

234. See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113 (1985) ("In the $ 2254(d) context,
as elsewhere, the appropriate methodology for distinguishing questions of fact from
questions of law has been, to say the least, elusive.").
235. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
236. In the majority were Justices Burger, Blackmun, B r e ~ a n ,Marshall,
O'Comor, Powell, Stevens, and White. Only Justice Rehnquist dissented.
237. Miller, 474 U.S. a t 112.
238. Id. at 109.
239. Id. at 114-17.
240. Id. at 117.
241. Yackle, Hugioscope, supra note 15, a t 2380. Yackle argues that the Court
has categorized debatable issues as pure fact, particularly in two cases, Wainwright
v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429 (1985) (holding that the partiality or bias of jurors is a
pure question of fad), and Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983) (holding
that the competency of a defendant to stand trial is a pure question of fact).
Yackle then states, "Since this Court is inclined to think that most issues should
be decided in state court, it strains to characterize state decisions as findings of
fad, rather than applications of law to fad, and thus invokes the statutory pre-
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and inverse correlation visions are at work in this context,
after all. Nothing in this context seems supportive of the
rights-selectivist, innocence-selectivist, equitable remedy, or
death-is-hfferent visions.

F. Context Six: Pure Questions of Fact
1. The nub of the context
As was noted in the discussion of mixed question
claims,242once an issue is characterized as one of pure fact,
the habeas court's handling of it is closely controlled by
Townsend v. SainZd3and section 2254(d)? The key threshold question under both the case and the statute is whether the
state fact-finding is flawed in any one of the enumerated ways.
The one controversial issue in this context, then, is how the
habeas court should handle the situation where one of the state
factfinding defects exists, but that defect is petitioner's fault for
failing to properly present the issue at the state level. This is
the issue on which our discussion in this context will focus.
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation visionaries desire the habeas petitioner to have a fresh start in
federal court and, thus, are not at all bothered by the prospect
of a petitioner relitigating an issue that the petitioner litigated
badly in state court.
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries, on the other hand, believe that a habeas court which is
in most respects acting in an appellate capacity, should not
provide a forum for permitting petitioners to bolster the record
regarding a factual issue which the petitioner failed to properly
present in the 'lower" court. There may be some wiggle room
for an appellate review visionaries here, though, given that
they recognize that a habeas court, unlike a normal appellate
court, does have the power and the tools necessary t o make
findings of fact. Thus, it could be argued that even for an ap-

sumption in favor of the result reached in state court." Yackle, Hagioscope, supra
note 15, at 2380.
242. See supra part 1II.E.
243. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
244. 28 U.S.C. $ 2254(d) (1988).
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pellate reviewer, the very nature of the habeas court militates
against a strict view that facts cannot be relitigated.
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist would
favor permitting relitigation of a factual issue pertaining to a
favored right that was badly presented by the petitioner in the
state courts.
d . The innocence-selectivist vision. The innocenceselectivist would favor the relitigation of a badly-litigated factual issue when the petitioner was able to supplement the constitutional claim with a claim of colorable factual innocence.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. The one-fair-chancevisionary, of course, would be adamantly opposed to permitting
relitigation of a badly-litigated issue, since the petitioner by
definition had the one-fair-chance to litigate that issue in the
state courts.
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision would be
more favorable to permitting such relitigation when the state
courts appear generally hostile to federally-protectedrights.
g. The equitable remedy vision. The equitable remedy
visionary would look at how important such a factual issue is
in the context of the case, how much control the petitioner
personally had over the litigation of that issue, and then examine other factors in the case t o arrive at an equitable resolution
t o the question whether the litigation should be permitted.
h. The death-is-differentvision. Death-is-different visionaries would, of course, argue for broadly permitting relitigation
of factual issues when the petitioner is laboring under a death
sentence.
3. The case law analyzed
The Supreme Court decided this issue in Keeney v.
~ a r n a y o - ~ e y eins ~1992.
~ ~ In a fi~e-to-four~~'
decision the
Court held that a petitioner who has badly litigated a factual
question in state court cannot relitigate that question in federal
court unless the petitioner can show "cause" for the failure to
properly litigate, and "prejudice" from the failure to properly
litigate.'" The majority was convinced that the cause and

245. 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992).
246. In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and
White. Justices Blackmun, Kennedy, and Stevens joined with Justice 07Connor's
dissenting opinion.
247. Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1719.
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prejudice standard would "appropriately accommodate concerns
of finality, comity, judicial economy and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate
The majority also saw the exhaustion requirement as a reason for reaching this result because a petitioner's merely having stated the
claim in state court, but then failing to properly litigate it, does
not accord the state system its one-fair-chance to resolve the
claim properly.249
The majority's decision is consistent with the appellate
review vision, the one-fair-chance vision and a n inverse correlation vision that believes that state courts are currently doing
a good job of enforcing federal constitutional rights. Implicitly,
the majority decision is also consistent with a very narrow
innocence-selectivist vision, since there is a n exception to the
requirement of "cause and prejudice" for a petitioner who can
put forward a colorable claim of factual innocence.250 The
majority's decision is inconsistent with the de novo litigation
vision, the rights-selectivist vision (since there is no indication
that permitting relitigation depends upon the nature of the
r i g h t a t issue), t h e equitable remedy vision ( t h e
"cause-and-prejudice" standard is an across-the-board rule, not
one that is applied on a case-by-case basis), and the
death-is-different vision (there is no indication that a death
sentenced petitioner should be permitted broader opportunities
to relitigate).
Tamayo-Reyes is an interesting case because two Justices
who normally vote conservatively in habeas cases, Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy, joined more liberal Justices Blackmun
and Stevens in dissent."' The linchpin of Justice OYConnor's
dissent is that "[hlabeas corpus is not an appellate proceeding,
but rather an original civil action in a federal
From
this, Justice O'Connor reasoned that a trial level court in a n
original civil action has broad powers to determine factual
issues and should use those powers to arrive a t the best decision possible.25s To Justice O'Connor, once the petitioner has
presented a properly preserved claim to the federal court that

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id. at 1720.
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.478, 493-96 (1986).
Keeney, 112 S. Ct. at 1721 (O'Co~or,J., dissenting).
Id. at 1722.
See id. at 1725.
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the state courts were given the opportunity t o litigate, federalism concerns diminish.254Justice O'Comor also argued that
Congress implicitly adopted the holding of Townsend v.
Sain255when it enacted section 2254(d), and thus the liberal
Townsend standards for granting a hearing continued t o govern.256Surprisingly for Justices O'Comor and Kennedy, this
dissent in large part embraces the de novo litigation vision. It
also constitutes an explicit rejection, at least in part, of the
appellate review vision.

G. Context Seven: The Squandered State Court
Opportunity-Procedurally Defaulted Claims
1. The nub of the context
This context deals with the situation in which the habeas
petitioner has squandered the opportunity to litigate an issue
in the state system. In habeas law this squandering goes by the
name "procedural default" and most ofien occurs when a defendant fails t o properly raise an issue at the trial level. It can
also occur at later stages of the state proceeding, however, for
instance failing to appeal a properly preserved
or failing to appeal at all.258This context looms large in Supreme
Court habeas jurisprudence and has provoked more significant
opinions than any other habeas topic over the last two decades.

2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation visionaries, in favor of giving petitioners a fresh start in federal
court, would ignore procedural defaults unless it can be shown
that the default constituted a knowledgeable waiver that was
the result of the defendant's personal choice. Even in that circumstance a de novo litigator would want the habeas court to
have the power to ignore the waiver if the reasons for doing so
were compelling.
. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries would be very intolerant of petitioners who try t o bring

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id.
372 U.S. 293, 310-18 (1963).
See fieney, 112 S. Ct. at 1724 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 482-83 (1986).
See, eg., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 727-28 (1991).

820

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIWRSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

procedurally defaulted claims because those claims generally
cannot be pursued on direct review.
c. The rights-selectivist vision. The rights-selectivist
would be forgiving of defaults that relate t o the favored rights.
d . The innocence-selectivist vision. An innocenceselectivist would be inclined t o forgive procedural defaults
when the petitioner is able t o supplement the constitutional
claim with a claim of innocence.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. One-fair-chancevisionaries
are inalterably opposed t o permitting litigation of an issue in
federal court if the petitioner had failed t o take advantage of a
fair chance t o litigate the issue in state court.
f. The inverse correlation version. Inverse correlationists,
at this point in time being satisfied with state court handling of
federal constitutional issues, would not be tolerant of
procedurally-defaulted claims.
g. The equitable remedy vision. A proponent of the equitable remedy vision would examine how important the claim is
in the context of the case and how responsible the petitioner
was for having defaulted it, then consider other factors in arriving a t an equitable decision whether t o enforce the procedural
default.
h. The death-is-diferent vision. Death-is-different visionaries favor federal courts broadly ignoring state procedural
defaults.
3. The case law analyzed
The first time the Supreme Court dealt with the issue of
procedural default in the habeas context was in 1953 in
Daniels u.
a lesser-known companion case t o Brown
v. Allen.260In Daniels, without much discussion, the Court
held that a claim procedurally defaulted in state court should
not be reviewed by the habeas
The de novo litigation
visionaries of the Warren Court could not, of course, live with
this result and a decade later overruled it in the most famous
of the Warren Court era habeas decisions, Fay v. N ~ i a . ~In~ '
the Noia majority opinion, Justice Brennan penned the
quintessential de novo litigation visionary sentence:
259.
260.
261.
262.

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
Id.
Id. at 482-87.
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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"[C]onventional notions of finality in criminal litigation cannot
be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal
constitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied
without the fullest opportunity for plenary federal judicial reThe Court held that the federal habeas court must
hear a procedurally defaulted claim unless the state can show
that the petitioner "knowingly and deliberately bypassed" the
state court remedy.264Further, the federal habeas court may
hear a claim even where the petitioner "deliberately bypassed"
the state remedy.265
Just as the Warren Court liberals could not live with the
rule in Daniels, so the later conservative Court could not live
with the de novo litigation position adopted by Noia. The Burger Court delivered a blow t o Noia in 1977 in Wainright v.
S y k e ~ In
. ~ the
~ ~ majority opinion Justice Rehnquist argued
that since the adequate and independent state ground rule
would prevent the Supreme Court on direct review from deciding the merits of a constitutional claim that the state had validly held to be procedurally barred under state law, it would be
similarly improper for a federal habeas court to consider an
issue that had been procedurally defaulted by the petitioner in
state court, since the state court's upholding of the procedural
bar would be an analog of an adequate and independent state
ground.267 Justice Rehnquist also stressed the legitimate
state interest in enforcing the contemporaneous objection
and noted the possibility of defense counsel sandbagging by intentionally failing to litigate a constitutional claim so
He also
as t o build in error reversible at the federal
noted that federal courts' litigation of procedurally defaulted
claims would "detract from the perception of the trial . . . in
state court as a decisive and portentous e~ent."~"
The majority decision in Sykes is consistent with the appellate review, one-fair-chance, and inverse correlation visions.
The decision did leave open one narrow door for federal review
of a procedurally defaulted claim: if the petitioner can show

263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 438.
Id.
433 U.S.72 (1977).
Id. at 87.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
Id. at 90.

822

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I994

"cause" and "prejudice" for the default, then federal review
should be a~ailable?~'
The opinion, however, left the definitions of "cause" and "prejudice"
and thus as of 1977 it
was not possible to tell whether the Court would, via the
"cause and prejudice" exception, partially endorse one of the
selectivist visions.
In concurring, Justice Stevens gave an early indication of
his rights-selectivist/equitableremedy vision:
[Ilf the constitutional issue is sufficiently grave, even an
express waiver by the defendant himself may sometimes be
excused. Matters such as the competence of counsel, the procedural context in which the asserted waiver occurred, the
character of the constitutional right at stake, and the overall
fairness of the entire proceeding, may be more significant
than the language of the test the Court purports to apply.273

Justice White, concurring in the judgment, would have stuck
with the Noia "deliberate bypass" standard, but would have
tightened Noia by not requiring that the defendant have been
personally involved in a waiver in order for the waiver to be
enf~rceable.'~~
Justices Brennan and Marshall, in dissent,
championed ~ o i a . The
~ ? ~heart of the dissent, which turned
out to be prescient, is that "the ordinary procedural default is
born of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel."276Indeed, all subsequent significant
Supreme Court decisions regarding procedural default have involved situations in which the petitioner claims that the procedural default occurred due to arguably substandard performance by counsel.
The procedural default principle of Sykes has been proven
by later cases t o be as powerful and lasting as its "cause and
prejudice" exception has been proved t o be narrow. In Engle u.
Isaac:"
in 1982, the Court declined to limit Sykes t o issues
that did not affect the truth finding function of the trial, thus
rejecting an accuracy based rights-selectivist exception to the
general rule.278In Murray v. Carrier,'" in 1986, the Court
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 87.

at 95-96 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
at 98-99 (White, J., dissenting).
at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
at 104 ( B r e ~ a n J.,
, dissenting).
456 U S . 107 (1982).
Id. at 129.
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reaffirmed that the "cause" requirement must be met by a petitioner even where the claim calls into question the reliability of
the guilt determinati~n.~"But the more significant aspect of
Carrier is that the Court explicitly held that substandard performance by counsel that causes the procedural default only
constitutes "cause" if it was the result of constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.281Further, while not defining
"prejudice," the Court held that the showing must be "greater
than that necessary under 'the more vague inquiry suggested
by the words "plain error.""'282 Finally, the Court held that
there was an exception to the "cause and prejudice" exception:
a defendant who has procedurally defaulted the claim and
cannot show "cause" or "prejudice" can nonetheless have the
claim considered on the merits if that petitioner can allege a
colorable claim of actual innocence.283
The issue whether death-is-different for habeas purposes
was explicitly raised in Smith v. Murray," a companion case
to Murray v. Carrier.285Smith had no claim that he was actually innocent of having committed the homicide for which he
was convicted, but argued that he was actually innocent of the
death sentence in that he likely would not have been sentenced
to death had not his attorney failed to object at sentencing
hearing to the admission of privileged statements that Smith
had made to a court appointed psychiatrist.286A majority of
the Court held that the actual innocence exception to the
"cause and prejudice" requirement for procedural default encompassed not only factual innocence of the act itself, but also
actual innocence of the death penalty.287By this holding the
Court at least partially embraced the death-is-different vision,
since the Court could logically have limited the actual innocence exception t o actual innocence of the underlying act. The
Court tempered this recognition of the death-is-different vision,
however, by stating: "[Wle reject the suggestion that the principles of Wainright v. Sykes apply differently depending on the

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

477 U.S. 478 (1986).
at 495.
at 492.
at 493-94 (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135 (1982)).
at 496.
477 U.S. 527 (1986).
477 U.S. 478 (1986).
Smith, 477 U.S. at 528-32.
Id. at 537.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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nature of the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its
criminal
In Carrier, the claim of attorney error was that the attorney had left out a claim from a n otherwise timely appeal. The
Court left open the question whether Noia's "deliberate bypass"
standard should continue to govern when counsel completely
defaulted the appeal.28g The Court addressed this issue in
1991 in Coleman u. Thompsonzgoand concluded that no different standard should apply: "[Flederal habeas review of the
[procedurally defaulted] claims is barred unless the prisoner
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate
that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental
miscarriage of justice."291 The majority clearly rejected the
idea that the "cause-and-prejudice" standard itself, rather than
the actual innocence exception to it, should be interpreted differently and more leniently when the petitioner is death sentenced. Coleman was the final nail in the coffin of Noia.
The most recent important decision in the procedural default line of cases is Sawyer u. W h i t l e ~ ~in~ '1992. There, the
Court revisited the issue first raised Smith v. Murrayzg3of
what constitutes "actual innocence" of the death penalty so as
to permit the habeas court to consider on the merits a
procedurally-defaulted claim. A six-person conservative majorityZs4held that such a showing requires the petitioner to allege a claim that he or she was completely ineligible for the
death penalty under the governing criteria, not merely that the
constitutional error may have resulted in the imposition of a
death sentence that would not otherwise have been imposed on
a petitioner who was in fact eligible.2g5
The current state of the law in the procedural default context is that it is consistent with the appellate review,
one-fair-chance, and inverse correlation visions, but with a
narrow innocence-selectivist component and a partial

288. Id. at 538.
289. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492.
290. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
291. Id. at 750-51.
292. 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992).
293. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
294. In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, K e ~ e d y Scalia,
,
Souter, Thomas,
and White. Justices Blaclunun, O'Connor, and Scalia concurred in the judgment.
295. Sauyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
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death-is-different component. The law is inconsistent with the
de novo litigation vision, except in the narrow circumstances in
which the petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice." The
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions have no support
in this context's current law.

H. Context Eight: "Abuse of the Writ"
1. The nub of the context
A habeas corpus petitioner sometimes will file additional
petitions after the first one is denied. If a subsequent petition
contains a claim that was not alleged in an earlier petition, the
question becomes, in habeas vernacular, whether the petitioner
has "abused the writ" by not having included the later claim in
the earlier petition. The governing statute is section 2244(b) as
amended in 1966. It states that a subsequent application for
the writ that contains a claim not included in an earlier petition
need not be entertained by a court of the United States or a
justice or judge of the United States unless the application
alleges and is predicated on a factual or other ground not
adjudicated on the hearing of the earlier application for the
writ, and unless the court, justice, or judge is satisfied that
the applicant has not on the earlier application deliberately
withheld the newly asserted ground or otherwise abused the

The statute strongly suggests that the court should not entertain the new claim if the petitioner deliberately withheld it
from an earlier petition.297The key question for a statutory
interpretation is whether the final phrase "or otherwise abuse
the writ" expands the abuse of the writ doctrine to encompass
claims that were not deliberately withheld.

2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context
a. The de novo litigation vision. De novo litigation visionaries would attempt to construe the phrase "or otherwise
abused the writ7'as encompassing very little, if any, more than

296. 28 U.S.C.$ 2244(b) (1988).
297. Because the statute says that the court "need not" consider the claim, not

that it "cannot," there is still discretion even, to hear a claim that was earlier
withheld.
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grounds that were deliberately withheld, because such visionaries wish constitutional claims to be aired, however belatedly.
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries would tend to construe the statutory language broadly a s
encompassing a large realm of behaviors beyond deliberately
withholding a claim, since appellate review visionaries contend
that each petitioner generally gets one, and only one, appeal. I n
the habeas context the petitioner's "one appeal" is the initial
habeas petition.
c. The rights-selectivist vision. A rights-selectivist would
tend to construe the statutory language more favorably to petitioners who were presenting claims involving favored constitutional rights.
d . The innocence-selectivist vision. The innocenceselectivist would attempt to construe the statutory language
more favorably to petitioners who also present a colorable claim
of innocence.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. One-fair-chance visionaries
don't even believe in initial habeas petitions if the petitioner
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim in state
courts. Further, they are no more favorable to petitioners who
had that fair chance but did not raise the claim. Thus, a fortiori, one-fair-chance visionaries are unalterably opposed to the
idea that a petitioner can make additional federal habeas fdings after the initial one. Thus, one-fair-chance visionaries
would construe the statutory language "or otherwise abuse the
writ" very expansively to encompass many behaviors beyond
deliberate withholding.
f. The inverse correlation vision. This vision has no applicability to this context because it speaks only to what effect
a n earlier state proceeding should have on a federal habeas
court, not what effect a n earlier federal proceeding should have
on a later federal proceeding.
g. The equitable remedy vision. As always, proponents of
this vision would argue for a flexible definition of "abused the
writ" that would permit the habeas court to consider a variety
of factors in making that determination.
h. The death-is-different vision. A death-is-different
visionary would go out of the way to find that a death penalty
petitioner had not "otherwise abused the writ."
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3. The case law analyzed
In the last of the Warren Court's 1963 habeas trilogy,
Sanders v. United States,298the Court held that the habeas
court has a duty to hear a claim that was not presented in a n
earlier habeas petition unless the petitioner had deliberately
withheld the claim in the earlier petition.299Further, even if
the claim had been deliberately withheld, the habeas court had
the discretion to entertain the claim if the ends of justice so
required.300 Three years later Congress enacted section
2244(b), which was not explicitly inconsistent with Sanders,
but which also was accompanied by legislative history indicating that the purpose of the amendment was to "introduc[e] a
greater degree of finality" in habeas.301 Neither the statute
nor the legislative history, however, clarifies whether the "or
otherwise abused the writ" language was designed to cut back
on the Sanders holding.
The Supreme Court construed the "or otherwise abused the
writ language" in McCleskey v. ZantSo2in 1991. ~ u s t i c eKennedy stated for the majority that "the doctrine of abuse of the
writ refers to a complex and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage, statutory
developments, and judicial decisions."303 The Court then decided that "[albuse of the writ is not confined to instances of
deliberate abandonment."304The doctrine instead encompasses all claims not presented in a n earlier habeas petition unless
the petitioner can show "cause" and "prejudice" for failing to
raise the claim in the earlier proceeding or can show a probable
claim of actual innocence of the crime.305The Court imported
the holdings from the procedural default cases to the abuse of
the writ context, because both contexts "imply a background
norm of procedural regularity binding on the p e t i t i ~ n e r . " ~ ~
The holding in McCleskey is consistent with the appellate
review and one-fair-chance visions. Further, it creates a narrow
exception that reflects an innocence-selectivist vision. I t is
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

373 U.S. 1 (1963).
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18-19.
S. REP.NO.1797, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966).
499 US. 467 (1991).
Id. at 489.
Id.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 490.
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flatly inconsistent with the de novo litigation, equitable remedy, and death-is-different visions (McCleskey was in fact
death-sentenced), and impliedly inconsistent with the
rights-selectivist vision, since there is no indication in the opinion that it matters what the right is that is involved in the
newly asserted claim.
I.

Context Nine: Successive Petitions

1. The nub of the context

The preceding context involved the situation in which the
petitioner asserts in a subsequent petition a claim that was not
asserted in an earlier petition. The current context, by contrast,
involves a situation in which the petitioner raises the same
claim in a later petition that was raised and rejected in an
earlier petition. This context is governed in a backhanded sort
of fashion by section 2244(b)?O7 which states that a habeas
court "need not" entertain a "subsequent application for a writ"
unless the subsequent application contains a newly asserted
ground that is not an abuse of the writ. The phrase "need not"
entertain implies that the court may entertain a subsequent
petition raising the same ground, and the question becomes
when a habeas court should exercise its power to do so.308
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. As always, de novo
litigation visionaries favoring adjudication of constitutional
claims on the merits, virtually whenever and however they are
raised, would argue that the statute should be interpreted so as
t o require the habeas court to consider the successive petition if
there is any reason to think that the result might be different.
b. The appellate review vision. Appellate review visionaries are not fans of permitting habeas petitions beyond the
initial one and, thus, would argue that the statutory language
should be construed so as to minimize the number of successive
petitions that habeas courts are required (or even permitted) to
consider.
c. The rights-selectivist vision. The statutory language is
nebulous enough to allow rights-selectivists to argue that the

307. See supra notes 284-85 and accompanying text.
308. See Kuhlmam v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 449-52 (1986).
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habeas courts should be more inclined to consider a successive
petition when it involves a claim relating to a favored right.
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. The statute leaves
plenty of room for an innocence-selectivistt o claim that the circumstance in which a habeas court "need" consider a successive
petition is one in which the petitioner alleges an accompanying
colorable claim of innocence that was not alleged earlier.
e. The one-fair-chancevision. Obviously, one-fair-chance
visionaries do not believe in permitting successive petitions
and, thus, would argue that the statutory language should be
construed so as to virtually never permit a habeas court to consider a successive petition.
f. The inverse correlation vision. As was the case with
respect t o the abuse of the writ context, the inverse correlation
vision does not address this context, which does not involve
statelfederal relations, but federallfederal relations.
g. The equitable remedy vision. Equitable remedy visionaries would look first t o see if anything had changed between
the decision on the earlier petition and the successive petition.
If it had, then they would argue for reweighing the equities of
the case. If nothing had changed it would be hard to see what
equity would exist in reconsidering the claim.
h. The death-is-different vision. A death-is-different
visionary would urge that the statute be interpreted to permit
reexamination of a claim raised by a death-sentenced petitioner
if there were any conceivable reason to believe that the result
might be different.
3. The case law analyzed
The 1948 predecessor of section 2244(b)309addressed only
the issue of successive petitions, while the current version of
the statute includes successive petitions and those claimed to
constitute an abuse of the writ. As to successive petitions, the
statute stated that a habeas court, "shall [not] be required to
allegentertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus,yy310
ing a claim already decided adversely to the petitioner in an
earlier petition if the court "is satisfied that the ends of justice
will not be served by such inquiry." The key question under
this statute is when the "ends of justice" would be served by

309. 28 U.S.C. 8 2244(b) (1948) (amended 1966).
310. Id.
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adjudicating a successive petition. The Warren Court answered
this question in Sanders3" in a manner mostly, but not entirely, favorable to habeas petitioners. According to the Court,
the "ends of justice" required reexamination if the prior evidentiary hearing had not been full and fair, or if there had been a n
"intervening change in the law" favorable to the petitioner, or
"some other justification for having failed to raise a crucial
point or argument in the prior applicati~n."~'~
The Court noted that these two grounds did not exhaust the "ends of justice"
inquiry because the test "cannot be too finely particulari ~ e d . " ~Unfavorably
'~
to habeas petitioners, however, the
Court held that the burden is on the petitioner to show that
the ends of justice would be served by the r e l i t i g a t i ~ n . ~ ' ~
In 1966 Congress amended section 2244 to its present
form, deleting the "ends of justice" inquiry.315 The amended
statute does not on its face provide any more guidance concerning when successive petitions should be permitted, although
the history of the amendment seems to indicate that it was
part of a Congressional plan to make habeas a t least somewhat
less easily available to petitioner^.^'^ This is certainly the
way the conservative majority saw the congressional intent
when it handed down its key successive petition case,
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, in 1 9 ~ 6 . ~The
" heart of the opinion was
joined by only four members of the Court, but as the Court
added more conservative members it became clear that those
key portions were accepted by a clear majority of the
For the plurality, Justice Powell-always the most
outspoken innocence-selectivist on the Court-balanced the
interests of subsequent petitioners against countervailing state
interests and concluded that only petitioners who have a colorable claim of factual innocence have any legitimate interest
that counterbalances the weighty interests of the state in finality and repo~e.~"
This is the one instance in current habeas
311. Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17 (1963).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
316. Kuhlrnann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 450-51 (1986) (examining the history
of the statute and coming to this conclusion).
317. Id. at 436.
318. The plurality opinion in Kuhlmann is clearly accepted as good law by the
majority in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 488-90 (1991).
319. Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 451-52, 454.
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jurisprudence in which the innocence-selectivist vision provides
the primary rationale for the result rather than simply providing a rationale for an exception to the general rule. The decision is also consistent with the appellate review and
one-fair-chance visions, while it is inconsistent with the de novo
litigation, rights-selectivist, equitable remedy, and (probably)
death-is-different visions.

J. Context Ten: The Question of Harmless Error
1. The nub of the context

A prisoner cannot get relief from a conviction either by
reversal on direct appeal or by issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus on collateral review, even for error of constitutional
magnitude, unless that error was harmful.320 On direct review the law is favorable to petitioners who have established
constitutional error: the burden is on the state to prove that
the error was harmless, and the level of the burden is that the
state must show harmlessness beyond a reasonable
T h e n u b of t h i s c o n t e x t is w h e t h e r t h e s a m e
petitioner-favorable standard should apply to habeas. No federal habeas statute gives any guidance on this point.
2. How each vision could respond to the nub of this context

a. The de novo litigation vision. In their heart of hearts,
de novo litigation visionaries are likely to disapprove of the
whole concept of harmless error: If error was of constitutional
magnitude, then it by definition was h a r m f ~ 1 .But
~ ~ ~given
that the law recognizes the doctrine of harmless error, de novo
l i t i g a t i o n visionaries would a r g u e t h a t t h e s a m e

320. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). There are, though, some
constitutional errors that are so basic that they defy harmless error analysis and
require automatic reversal. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1991)
(White, J., dissenting as to part 111 only) (collecting authorities).
321. Chapman, 386 U.S. a t 24.
322. Perhaps surprisingly, Justices Warren, Brennan, Douglas and Fortas
joined the majority in Chapman. I t was left for Justice Stewart, hardly a liberal in
matters of constitutional criminal procedure or habeas corpus, to argue that the
Court had never before recognized constitutional error as harmless and that the error found in Chapman was not the sort for which a harmless error doctrine should
be adopted in any event. Chapman, 386 at 42-45 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice
Stewart, however, noted that he would not rule out the doctrine of harmless error
in all circumstances. Id. a t 44 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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petitioner-favorable rule that applies on direct review should
apply in habeas.
b. The appellate review vision. Under their cardinal principle of parity, appellate review visionaries would strenuously
contend that the same standard for harmless error should
govern on direct review and in habeas.
c. The rights-selectivists vision. Rights-selectivists would
argue that as to the favored rights that make the cut, they
should be treated no less favorably than the same rights are
treated via direct review.
d. The innocence-selectivist vision. Innocence-selectivists
would argue that as to the favored petitioners who have alleged
a colorable claim of innocence, the same petitioner-favorable
standards should apply in habeas as on direct review.
e. The one-fair-chance vision. One-fair-chance visionaries
should hold a bifurcated position regarding this context. On the
one hand, these visionaries do not even believe habeas jurisdictions should extend to claims as to which the petition& had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate in state court, and thus
would argue for a much less petitioner-favorable standard of
harmless error a s to those petitions where the petitioner litigated in state court and lost, and then litigated in federal court
and won. But as to errors established by a petitioner on habeas
who did not have the one fair opportunity to litigate the claim
in state court, the one-fair-chance visionary should argue for
the same harmless error standard that would be applicable on
direct review.
f. The inverse correlation vision. An inverse correlationist
would not admit many cases through the federal habeas door,
but a s to those that entered and prevailed, a n inverse
correlationist should argue for the same petitioner-favorable
standard a s on direct review.
g. The equitable remedy vision. To a n equitable remedy
visionary the harmfulness of the error should simply be one
factor in the equation on a case-by-case basis. Thus, such a
visionary might argue for a range of different definitions of
harmfulness to apply to different circumstances.
h. The death-is-differentvision. While a death-is-different
visionary might be willing to admit that error a t the guilt stage
of a capital trial could be found to be harmless, such a visionary would certainly argue that the standard for harmfulness
should be just a s petitioner-favorable in habeas a s on direct
review. A death-is-different visionary would find it hard to
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imagine that error occurring at the sentencing phase of a capital trial could be harmless, and if writing on a blank slate,
would likely simply banish the harmless error doctrine from
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Given that the law does
recognize that an error at capital sentencing can be harmless,32s a death-is-different visionary would certainly contend
for the same petitioner-favorable standard for harmless error i n
habeas as on direct review.

3. The case law analyzed
The Supreme Court dealt with the nub of this context in
Brecht u. A b r a h ~ r n s o nin
~ ~ 1993.
~
The majority held in a
f i v e - t o - f ~ u rdecision
~~~
that, at least as to "trial error," the
less petitioner-favorable test for harmless error fkom Kotteakos
u. United States326should apply: that the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict."327It is unclear from the decision whether the prosecution bears the burden of proving that the error is harmless
under this test, or the defendant bears the burden of proving
that it was harmful. The reason for this uncertainty is that the
majority opinion, in which Justice Stevens concurred and was
the necessary fifth vote, states that the burden is on the petit i ~ n e r ,while
~ ~ ~ in a separate concurring opinion Justice
Stevens stated that the burden is on the prosecution.32gThe
majority opinion argued that a growing body of Supreme Court
case law recognizes that habeas is different from, and less
petitioner-favorable than, direct review.330 Unlike direct review, habeas has a limited role as an extraordinary remedy
against violations of fundamental fairness.331The costs to the
state of a federal habeas court granting the writ because the

323. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 754 (1990) (holding that a state
appellate court can constitutionally uphold a death sentence that was "based in
part on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circumstance by either reweighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence or by [engaging in] harmless
error review").
324. 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
325. In the majority were Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and
Stevens Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, Souter, and White dissented.
326. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
327. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteahs, 328 U.S. at 776).
328. Id.
329. Id. at 1723 (Stevens, J., concurring).
330. Id. at 1719.
331. Id.
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state cannot prove that the error was harmless are heavy,
while petitioners who get to this point do not fall into the category of persons who have been "grievously wronged."332The
Court also dismissed t h e argument t h a t t h e
petitioner-favorableharmless error rule was necessary t o deter
state court judges, stating "[albsent affirmative evidence that
state-court judges are ignoring their oath, we discount
petitioner's argument that courts will respond to our ruling by
violating their Article VI duty to uphold the Constit~tion."~~~
The majority opinion is clear in its disaffirmation of the
appellate review vision. The result is also inconsistent with the
de nouo litigation, innocence-selectivist, equitable remedy, and
death-is-different visions. The opinion is at least partially compatible with a rights-selectivist vision, since it applies only t o
"trial error'' claims whose affect on the jury may be quantitatively assessed, but not t o defects such as deprivation of right
to counsel, which "require[] automatic reversal of the conviction
because they infect the entire trial process."3s4 It is unclear
whether the category of "trial error" accords with either the
fundamental version of the rights-selectivist position or the
accuracy version of the rights-selectivist vision. The majority
opinion is also consistent with one-half of the bifurcated vision
that a one-fair-chance visionary should hold: in Brecht, the
petitioner had litigated the issue at the state level and, thus,
could be held to a higher standard in habeas. The opinion gives
no indication whether the result would differ if the petitioner
had not had the opportunity to litigate the issue in state court.
The decision is also quite supportive of the inverse correlation
vision in its assertion that, as far as the Court can tell, state
judges are not in need of deterrence.
Justice Stevens' vote with the majority here bears scrutiny.
This is the only instance in recent memory in which Justice
Stevens joined a majority opinion that reached a conservative
It is certainly debatable whether Justice Stevens

332. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1721.
333. Id. (citing Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
334. Id. at 1717 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-08 (1991), a
direct review case in which the "trial error" category was created).
335. Justice Stevens did concur in part and concur in the judgment in Teagut!
v. Lane, and was conservative in that he would have adopted Justice Harlan's
retroactivity analysis on habeas. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 319-20 (1989)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). He rejected, however, the rest of the majority's retroactivity analysis. Id. at 320-23.
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correctly followed the logic of his own chosen visions in reaching this result. While the decision is consistent in some respects with a rights-selectivist vision, the dichotomy between
trial error and "structural error" does not seem to accord with
the dividing line that Justice Stevens has consistently espoused
between favored "fundamental" rights and unfavored
non-fundamental rights.336Nor does the result in Brecht accord easily with the equitable remedy vision, since it establishes a rule common to all claims of "trial right" error. On the
other hand, in support of Justice Stevens, it could be argued
that even equitable remedy visionaries must state generally
applicable principles on some issues, one of which is the standard for harmless error. Perhaps Justice Stevens' vote is generally consistent with a broader premise underlying both his
rights-selectivist and equitable remedy visions, that habeas is
an extraordinary writ that does not serve the same purpose as
direct appeal.
In a dissent joined by Justices Blackmun and Souter, Justices who generally vote conservatively in habeas cases, Justice
White argued that there should be parity between the standards for direct appeal and habeas, apparently invoking the
appellate review vision.337Yet a third conservative, Justice
O'Connor, penned a lengthier dissent in which she invoked a
potpourri of theories. She agreed with the majority that habeas
review is different from, and less petitioner-favorable than,
direct review but argued that under equitable principles the
nature of the right involved is imp~rtant.~"
She then argued
for a distinction between rights critical to the reliability of the
process and prophylactic rules.33gContinuing this theme, she
argued that the Chapman harmless error standard promotes
the accuracy of guilt/innocence determinations, while the
Kotteakos standard does not offer "adequate assurances of reliability."340She then suggested that logically the Kotteakos
standard could apply to claims of error that do not involve the
accuracy of the guilt determination process, but concluded that
this would cause more confusion than it would be worth.341
336.
337.
senting).
338.
339.
340.
341.

Set! supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1726-27 (1993) (White, J., dis-

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1728-29 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
'1729 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1730 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1730-31 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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This whole disquisition is reflective of the accuracy of the
rights-selectivist vision, a vision with which Justice O'Connor
had not earlier affiliated herself in any significant degree.

w.

CONCLUSION:
A SUMMARY
OF THE STATUS
OF THE VISIONS

Thus far I have examined how each of the eight visions
fares in each of the ten contexts peculiar to habeas law. I will
now attempt to take a step back and summarize how powerful
each of the visions is under current habeas doctrine. I will
begin with those visions that seem t o have the least power and
progress to the most powerful ones.
There are two visions that clearly have little power in
current habeas jurisprudence. The first is the equitable remedy
vision, which claims only Justice Stevens as an adherent. Admittedly, some of the more conservative Justices bandy the
term "equity" about, but they are not really talking about equity, but rather about generic interest balancing.342Under current law, there is no license for a federal district judge to rule
on issues in any of the contexts by considering the equity of the
individual case.
The second vision that has virtually no power in current
habeas jurisdictions is the death-is-different vision. Its only
inroad is to provide a rationale for ignoring a procedural default of a defendant who is "actually innocent" of the death
penalty. Given the narrowness with which the Court has defined "actual innocence" of the death penalty, it seems unlikely
that this exception will be of much benefit to death-sentenced
petitioners. In no other context is a federal court authorized to
treat a death-sentenced petitioner any more favorably than a
petitioner not sentenced to death.
Moving up one notch, I would characterize the
innocence-selectivistvision as having only somewhat more than
minimal power in habeas jurisprudence. Despite the Court's
many invocations of innocence as an important factor, in reality
i ~ o c e n c eonly operates as a narrow exception to save a petitioner who is somehow at fault, either by procedurally defaulting a claim, failing to properly present all facts supporting the
claim, or filing a subsequent petition.343The Court has never
342. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
343. Berger, supra note 83, at 986 11.232 ("My informal survey covered 1987
through the first nine months of 1992. Although I kept no exact tally, failures of
claims of likely innocence clearly outnumbered successes by a large multiple.").
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made innocence a guardian of habeas' front door: there is no
requirement that in order for a claim to be cognizable the petitioner must accompany it with a colorable claim of innocence.
The role of innocence as a factor is, instead, relegated to admitting only a handful of petitioners in through the back door
despite their earlier, improvident litigation activities.
Moving another step up the ladder, there are two visions
that I would classify as exerting moderate power in habeas
jurisprudence. The first is the rights-selectivist vision. Despite
the fact that Justice Stevens seemingly has been unsuccessful
in recruiting additional rights-selectivists among members of
the Court, there are still three particular issues for which the
rights-selectivist vision is perhaps more explanatory of current
doctrine than any other-and at least two of these issues are
significant ones. The first significant issue over which
rights-selectivism has explanatory power is the exclusion of
Fourth Amendment claims from the purview of habeas (as long
as the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
those claims in state court). One of the prime bases of Stone v.
Powell was that Fourth Amendment exclusionary claims did
not constitute a "personal constitutional right," a n argument
that is rights-selectivist a t its core. The second significant aspect of habeas doctrine that may be explained by the
rights-selectivist vision is the less petitioner-favorable harmless
error rule that the Court established in Brecht v. Abrahamson
for claims of "trial" error. While it is not clear what sorts of
errors comprised the category of "trial" error, this is clearly a
category that must be composed by valuing some rights over
others. The third issue, which I think is less significant, which
rights-selectivism explains, is the two Teague exceptions for
when a new rule can be applied retroactively. These exceptions
are so narrow, however, that they do not seem to be nearly as
significant as the rights-selectivist aspects of Stone and Brecht.
The second vision I would rank as having moderate power
is, perhaps surprisingly, the de novo litigation vision. While its
proponents have been understandably outraged by many of the
conservative Court's attacks on the 1963 Warren Court habeas
trilogy, there are four important areas where habeas doctrine is
still consistent with the de nouo litigation vision. First, all
constitutional claims are cognizable in habeas except Fourth
Amendment exclusionary claims that the petitioner had a f d
and fair opportunity to litigate in state court. While the Stone
v. Powell principle is obviously hateful to de novo litigation
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visionaries, the fact remains that the principle is a n anomaly.
All subsequent efforts to expand Stone to other rights have
failed, even the attempted expansion to Miranda claims which,
it seems t o me, fall squarely within the rationale of Stone. Second, pure law claims based on then-existing law are entitled to
de novo review, and not even the most conservative of Justices
has suggested otherwise. Third, mixed question claims still
evoke de novo review, and while some conservatives on the
Court wish it were otherwise, they do not seem to have the
votes to carry the day, although they may have sufficient clout
to get debatable issues classified as pure fact rather than as
mixed questions. Fourth, pursuant to Townsend v. Sain and
section 2254(d), there will be de novo factfinding if the state
proceeding was flawed in any of the enumerated ways.
I now move with trepidation to trying to analyze the power
of the appellate review vision. Prior to 1993, this vision seemed
to have as much explanatory power as any in the lineup. There
were then, and still are, many significant areas of habeas jurisprudence that can be explained by the appellate review vision,
including the exhaustion rule regarding mixed petitions, de
novo review of pure law claims based on then-existing law, de
novo review of mixed questions, vigorous restrictions on retroactive application of new rules to benefit habeas petitioners,
strict rules holding petitioners to the consequences of their
procedural defaults, and narrow availability of review for subsequent petitions. Admittedly, there was one important way in
which habeas was narrower than direct review that violated
the parity principle, namely, Fourth Amendment claims that
the petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in state
court. Further, the loopholes that permit the habeas court to
ignore procedural defaults and entertain subsequent petitions if
the petitioner can establish "cause and prejudice" are also inconsistent with the principle of parity because they make habeas review broader than direct review. But despite these instances of lack of parity in both directions, as of 1993 a proponent of the appellate revision vision could contend that the
vision provided a powerful explanatory principle. To my mind,
t h o u g h , t h e r e s u l t i n B r e c h t i n 1 9 9 3 of a l e s s
petitioner-favorable standard of harmless error, a t least as to
claims of "trial error," significantly undermines the power of
the appellate review vision. There now seems to be a majority
of the Court that is willing to stand for the proposition that
while habeas generally cannot be broader than direct review
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(with the "cause" and "prejudice" exception), it can and should
be narrower in significant ways, not all of which presumably
have been spelled out as of yet.
We are left, then, with what I believe t o be the two most
powerful visions currently operating in habeas doctrine: the
one-fair-chance and inverse correlation visions. These visions
can account for many significant doctrines of habeas jurisprudence: the rule of exhaustion with respect to mixed petitions;
the principle of Stone u. Powell; the very stingy rules regarding
retroactive effect of new rules in habeas; the perceived tendency to categorize debatable issues as ones of pure fact, rather
than as mixed issues; the doctrine of Tamayo-Reyes that a petitioner is stuck with earlier, faulty litigation of an issue unless
due t o constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel; the strict
enforcement of state procedural defaults; the strict limits on
consideration of subsequent petitions; and the rule in Brecht
establishing a less petitioner-favorable standard for harmless
error in habeas than on direct review. But while these visions
are the most powerful, they have not taken over habeas jurisprudence as completely as opponents of the Court's conservatives have suggested. I have already noted above four important ways in which the de novo litigation vision has power.
Further, whenever the conservative Court has established a
strict rule it has always accompanied that rule with exceptions
that would not be approved of by a strict one-fair-chancevisionary. The whole idea that there is an exception for "cause" and
"prejudice" that will allow a petitioner to avoid the effects of
earlier substandard litigation is inconsistent with both these visions, as are the two Teague exceptions permitting retroactive
application of a new rule in habeas in narrow circumstances.
Further, the narrow areas in which the innocence-selectivist
vision has power also undercuts any claim of overweening power of the one-fair-chance and inverse correlation visions.
For further study: One thing that this Article has not done,
due to my desire to keep it to manageable proportions, is to examine whether the conservatives on the Court have been intellectually honest in deciding habeas cases. Their opponents have
certainly contended vocally that the conservatives are on a
mission to destroy habeas and will expediently adopt any vision
that will serve that purpose as to the issue at hand. The charge
is a serious one: not just that the conservative Justices are
wrong as a matter of history and policy, but that they are so
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result-oriented as to be intellectually dishonest.3MIt is certainly true that the conservatives have invoked many different
visions and that the progression of visions employed over the
years does not seem to be line&. I hope to scrutinize this claim
of intellectual dishonesty in a follow-up

344. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Pas De Dew: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S . CAL. L. REV. 2467, 2496 (1993) ("The Teague decision was painfully disingenuous. It was disingenuous to pretend the decision was about inequity
in retroactivity law. . . . Rather, the Teague Court was adopting its own approach
to serve its own purposes.") (footnotes omitted); Friedman airs his opinion in an
earlier article also, claiming that:
For anyone familiar with the climate surrounding the decision [in Teague]
it is difficult to conclude that the Court's determination was the product
of much more than unseemly impatience with a Congress that was considering related issues, but evidently too slowly for the Court. Moreover,
the result in the Teague cases plainly was the work of a Court anxious to
speed the pace of executions.
Friedman, supra note 10, at 800; Patchel, supra note 20 a t 1045-46 ("[Tlhe Court's
main concern in the cases developing the new habeas has not been to render a
principled decision in the particular case, but rather to use each case as a vehicle
for rewriting its jurisdictional statutes."); Weisberg, supra note 10, a t 9 (speculating
that some of the conservative habeas decisions can be explained by the fact "that
the Court was simply frustrated with the inadequacy of the execution rate of
America's death row inmates"); Yackle, Hagioscope, supra note 15, a t 2331-32 ("The
objection in 'conservative' circles is not so much that habeas petitions are heard by
national tribunals that have better things to do, but that collateral litigation is
undertaken at all, particularly in death penalty cases, and, accordingly, that criminal defendants may effectively upset their convictions and sentences."). Yackle finds
the current Supreme Court conservative majority to be a party to this agenda. Id.
a t 2333); Yackle, Misadventures, supm note 15, a t 393:
The Court's "conservatives" may simply be hostile to the claims that litigants wish to press in any court and thus squeeze from both ends a t
once-forcing petitioners out of federal court on the promise of state process while a t the same time signaling the state courts that most anything
they do will suffice.
Id. (footnote omitted).
345. Tentatively entitled Confusion, Evolution, or Mission?: The Conservative
Court and Habeas Corpus (forthcoming).

